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ABSTRACT
The general question motivating this dissertation is how firms that are lagging
technologically in newly liberalized economies can catch up to world standards and develop a
capacity for continuous learning. Based on the uneven restructuring of the Chilean and Mendozan
(Argentina) wine industries this research challenges the conventional views that market institutions
and state tutelage automatically supply the kind of knowledge that firms need in order to achieve
technological world standards. It hypothesizes that upgrading requires "learning institutions,"
where members of a professional community can rework and improve through application, received
knowledge embodied in new capital equipment, production techniques and market information. The
systematic, wide, unprejudiced discussion of tacit knowledge from production and marketing
experience is what helps firms discover what works best for them locally, and allows them to map
out a set of incremental standards they can aspire to meet to rebuild their competitiveness.
This study suggests how learning institutions that generate such a discussion might be
created. In Chile and Mendoza two natural experiments show how firms, knowledge professionals,
and the state inadvertently are building fora for the discussion of tacit and received knowledge and
the formulation of targetable production standards. One is a consortium of wineries with an
evaluation committee; the other is a set of broad subregional wine evaluation panels. Both
collectively rework and improve received knowledge based on making tacit experience explicit.
Both set standards, monitor their members' progress, and recommend improvements. Both avail
themselves of private sector knowledge and discrete public programs in coherent ways. Knowledge
professionals play an important hand in organizing both initiatives. This does not seem accidental;
as knowledge becomes more important to industrial competition the individuals and groups that
carry it have grown in importance, especially when they have a strategic understanding of the value
chain and of how conception and execution relate to each other.
These findings suggest ways in which the state can induce the private sector to provide the
kind of assistance firms need most, and in so doing, help reconstitute more competitive firms and
promote more constructive interfirm relations and private-public sector relations. Knowledge
professionals need not be the direct targets of these initiatives but their inclusion is likely to be
crucial to their success.
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CHAPTER 1
Understanding Technological Change:
Tacit Knowledge, Professional Experts, and New Learning Institutions
Introduction
This dissertation concerns the role of knowledge in industrial restructuring and upgrading
in developing countries.1 The importance of knowledge to development cannot be overstated. In its
1998/99 World Development Report (WDR) the World Bank suggests that...
"For countries in the vanguard of the world economy, the balance between
knowledge and resources has shifted so far toward the former that knowledge has
become perhaps the most important factor determining the standard of living--more
than land, than tools, than labor. Today's most technologically advanced economies
are truly knowledge-based. And as they generate new wealth from their innovations,
they are creating millions of knowledge-related jobs in an array of disciplines that
have emerged overnight: knowledge engineers, knowledge managers, knowledge
coordinators."2
While growth accounting has yet to provide precise measures of the role of knowledge in
economic growth, it suggests that neither land, nor physical capital, nor education (human capital)
per se satisfactorily explain all of total factor productivity growth (TFP). If knowledge can be
1I refer to the restructuring processes that were triggered during the 1970s and 1980s when structural adjustment
programs (SAPs) were implemented in closed economy developing countries, with the purposes of getting the prices
"right", liberating factors of production, and removing obstacles to competition. SAPs include some combination of
policies to liberalize firms' economic environment--e.g., removal of price controls and licenses to import, export
promotion and import-protection reduction, new codes to encourage investment, modification of legislation to make
more flexible conditions of employment, wages, and dismissal of labor. For descriptions of these policies see, for
instance, Lieberman (1990) and Weaver (1995).
2 The World Bank. 1999. World Development Report 1998/99. Washington, DC; p. 16.
defined as a smarter, better ways of doing things, there is a case to be made for paying close
attention to how factors of production are put together and used. 3 Unfortunately, newly liberalized
economies that need to close significant knowledge gaps have no guarantee of access to knowledge
of the "right" kind because it often cannot be bought off the shelf easily. Knowledge has public
good characteristics--once in the public domain it is non-rival and non-excludable--and is therefore
subject to disincentives to its private supply. The problem is even more complex if one takes into
consideration that each firm has different knowledge needs that vary depending on, say, the sector
in which it competes, the market size, its technology, etc.
Thus, the general question motivating this dissertation is how newly liberalized economies
that are lagging in technology 4 can achieve broad, deep, and continuous industrial upgrading. By
"technology" I refer not only to explicit knowledge embedded in hardware and product and
process designs,5 but especially the tacit (practical, implicit) knowledge on how to make best use of
it. (This distinction is explained further below.) By "broad" I mean to involve more of an
industry than a minority of firms, for example, those participating in international supply chains.
By "deep" I refer to improvements up and down supply chains rather than limited to discrete
segments, for example, processors but not raw input suppliers. Last, by "continuous" I am
3 Economic history suggests that one way to grow is by developing unexploited land or by accumulating physical
capital--roads, ports, factories, telephone networks; another possibility is to expand the labor force and its education
and training. But the relation between these factors and growth is not strictly linear: some countries have seen
economic growth despite having little land (e.g., Singapore, Hong Kong) or natural resources (Japan, Korea).
Conversely, even the Soviet socialist republics' greater accumulation of physical capital and substantial investments
in education during the '60s, '70s, and '80s were unable to match East Asian increases in living standards (e.g., in
Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan). WDR 1998/99, op cit.
4 Throughout the dissertation I use the terms knowledge and technology interchangeably. However, there are many
types of knowledge. The one I refer to here is knowledge about technology, also known as technical knowledge, or
know-how as used in the WDR 1998/99, op cit. Najmabadi and Lall (1995:107) define technology as the stock of
ideas, or the "set of recipes" available to combine and transform material factors of production such as land, labor and
capital into output. This existing knowledge is embedded in the available machinery and equipment and in the
training of the work force.
s In market theory technology consists solely of capital equipment and product and process designs, and is modeled
as a production function; productivity is the same in an industry and in all countries. In practice, technology is
becoming the same in all countries, because capital goods suppliers and engineering consulting firms increasingly
operate globally. However, technology consists of more than machinery, equipment and designs, what Amsden calls
"alpha technology". It includes "...supporting institutions, such as management systems, labor relations, shopfloor
practices, subcontracting arrangements, and public policies--call them beta technology. Beta technology is by no
means similar in the same industry in all countries and is probably responsible for a large part of the differences in
productivity observed in the same industry around the world." (Amsden 1992: 57-58).
thinking of firms developing an organizational capacity for continuous learning beyond a one-time
purchase of hardware or adoption of world-class work practices.
Current restructuring experience shows that while there is no shortage of examples of
individual firms that have adopted the latest hardware the greatest difficulties are, first, finding
strategies that increase the number of "boats" rising with the tide, and second, creating the capacity
for continuous improvement within firms and in their supply chains. As will be shown later, the
recent Southern Cone7 wine sectors' adjustment with which this dissertation is concerned is no
different in the unevenness of the restructuring and the discontinuity of the improvement effort.
Given this, the interesting questions in industrial upgrading are how to get more people and firms to
achieve technological world standards, how they can learn to learn faster, and how they can use
factors of production in smarter, better ways. These questions are posed in the current political and
economic context of liberalization, where most forms of public assistance to firms are suspect, and
government action is constrained.
Hypothesis and Argument
Hypothesis
Based on the Chilean and Mendozan wine industry restructuring experiences my
hypothesis is that in situations of significant technological backwardness, neither market
institutions nor state tutelage may automatically supply the kind of knowledge that firms
need to achieve technological world standards. Knowledge embodied in new capital
6 Reports of impacts of SAPs in manufacturing in the '80s and early '90s were generally disappointing:
manufacturing employment and the number of firms in most late-industrializing countries typically fell. Often
manufactured exports had not grown and diversified as rapidly as was expected. Rather than 'graduate' to higher skill
or technology-intensive production, at best, some of these industries had only seen growth in small firms in low
productivity sectors. For reviews see edited collections by Fontaine (1992), Meier & Steel (1989), Lall (1995), Lall
et al. (1994), and Parker et al. (1995) for Africa; Aswicahyono et al. (1996) for Indonesia; Dussel et al. (1995) and
Pozas (1993) for Mexico, Arriagada (1985), Barros (1989), Corbo and de Melo (1985), Chudnovsky et al. (1996),
Fanelli et al. (1992) and Ominami (1991), for Southern Cone countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile); and Senses (1994)
for Turkey.
equipment, production techniques, and market information needs to be reworked and
improved locally based on the systematic processing of tacit information from production
and marketing experience. What firms require is knowledge that can help them map out
a set of incremental standards they can aspire to meet. Broad, deep, and continuous
upgrading requires as a sine qua non condition the existence of learning institutions that
promote this kind of wide unprejudiced discussion of market and production
possibilities.
The components of the hypothesis are as follows:
1.Tacit Knowledge
Received (explicit) knowledge on new machinery, techniques, and market segments--
obtained through tutelage from technology suppliers (machinery producers, retailers,
licenses), joint ventures with foreign direct investment (FDI), international buyers, etc.--is
not enough for most firms to upgrade because much knowledge is tacit, specific to
particular markets, localities, resources, and firms. Firms ultimately need much more
detailed information from production and marketing experience itself to map out alternative
restructuring paths, understood as a set of incremental, achievable standards to which they
can aspire.
2. Business Models As Paths and Prejudices
Received knowledge or "models" are useful is spelling out specifically the standards that
firms need to meet to participate in certain market segments. By definition, they privilege
certain resources, strategies, market segments, etc., to the neglect of others. The
shortcoming of received models is that they don't necessarily explain how to achieve those
standards; nor are they especially likely to help determine, for instance, how to make best
use of local resource endowments most are unfamiliar with. Further bias may come from
7 "Southern Cone" is a term of general usage that I adopt here to refer specifically to Argentina and Chile, the two
contiguous countries at the end of the South American continent. I therefore leave out Brazil and Uruguay, often
included in the term "Southern Cone".
the economic agents that provide the tutelage, because their knowledge and experience is
also likely to be locality/endowment specific.
3. Reworking Tacit Knowledge
To overcome these limitations and to be of use received knowledge must be reworked and
adapted locally based on an organized discussion of tacit knowledge from production and
marketing experience. This is the information firms need to put together cognitive "maps"
on alternative business opportunities and restructuring paths--what standards need to be met
and how to get there. With this information, strategic players in supply chains can thus take
quick action and avoid the problems of uncertainty (e.g., paralysis, isomorphism, or scatter-
shot strategies) when confronted with the need to restructure. They can more quickly sort
through strategies which work and which do not, and understand the set of incremental
steps they need to take to achieve their goals.
4. Social Process of Construction of New Learning Institutions
Because tacit knowledge is individual- and organization-specific, to be of use the local
discussion and reworking of received and tacit knowledge must be a socially organized
process, in effect, the construction of new "learning" or coordinating institutions. The
knowledge creation that takes place in them must be the product not only of individual
invention, but the result of a wider community debate (e.g., professional or organizational).
Furthermore, it needs to be continuous and systematic (what markets value changes
continuously), and unprejudiced (not influenced, for example, by historical beliefs on the
value of certain competitive assets but rather determined by unbiased empirical testing).
5. Middle Managers/Knowledge Professionals
Technical professionals in middle management positions who have intimate experience and
knowledge of several segments of a supply chain are likely to play an important role in
these sectoral discussions when and if they emerge. Because they are directly in touch with
upper management as well as with shop floor workers, they are likely to be among the best
positioned to synthesize and reconcile explicit and tacit knowledge.
6. State and Market
Neither market nor state are guaranteed to automatically organize these coordinating
institutions on their own, but under certain conditions may contribute to their supply.
However, the state may be able to play an especially important role by providing an
environment in which economic agents are encouraged to organize, to identify and meet
specific market needs in a systematic way.
Assumptions
The assumptions on which this hypothesis is based depart significantly from how we
typically think about knowledge. First, I am assuming that technical know-how is not completely
explicit, codifiable, embodied in capital equipment and production techniques. Rather, much of it
has a tacit component. In an analysis of knowledge creation in Japanese companies Nonaka and
Takeuchi (1995:8-9) make the distinction between one and the other:
"Explicit knowledge can be expressed in words and numbers, and easily
communicated and shared in the form of hard data, scientific formulae, codified
procedures, or universal principles. ... These can easily be 'processed' by a
computer, transmitted electronically, or stored in databases. ...(But) knowledge
expressed in words and numbers represents the tip of the iceberg. (Japanese
companies) view knowledge as being primarily "tacit"--something not easily visible
and expressible. Tacit knowledge is highly personal and hard to formalize, making
it difficult to communicate or to share with others...in any systematic or logical
manner.8
8 Subjective insights, intuition, and hunches fall into the category of knowledge. Furthermore, tacit knowledge is
deeply rooted in an individual's action and experience, as well as in the ideals, values, or emotions he or she
embraces. Tacit knowledge can be segmented into two dimensions, one technical, the kind of informal and hard-to-
pin-down skills or crafts, such as the wealth of information developed by a craftsman after years of work experience.
The other dimension is cognitive, consisting of schemata, mental models, beliefs, and perceptions that people take
for granted. These implicit models cannot be articulated very clearly but shape the way people perceive the world
(Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995:8-9).
Furthermore, tacit knowledge gained using particular technologies and techniques is often
time- and space-specific, especially with respect to the production of agricultural inputs. Ultimately,
tacit knowledge is embodied in the fragmented experience of individuals and organizations (such as
firms). It may be taught by demonstration, on the job in the process of production.9 But to be
shared and communicated it has to be reworked. Thus, I am assuming that although developing
country firms can borrow world class technology, its full transfer, use, and improvement require
production experience and a systematic conversion from tacit to explicit.
The differences with the traditional assumptions of market theory are significant. In the
latter, information is thought to be more or less perfect, explicit, and therefore easily transferable.
Industrial countries, the theory goes, produce far more knowledge that developing economies.
However, developing country firms can catch up and acquire knowledge by tapping and adapting
knowledge available elsewhere in the world. To do so only requires that they maintain open trade
so that knowledge can flow easily across borders through direct purchases, FDI, or licensing
agreements. Alternatively, knowledge can also be produced locally. One result of this assumption
of knowledge as open, explicit, and easily transferable, is that productivity across and within sectors
should be equal.
Admittedly, economists do recognize problems with this assumption: if there were perfect
information, knowledge gaps among countries should be narrowing rapidly, but they are not. In
fact empirical studies have shown for some time the existence of significant productivity differences
among firms, even within the same sector and country.' 0 To explain these observations the
mainstream voice in development thinking, the World Bank, points to the existence of a set of
problems that while real, are different from the ones I refer to, and lead to quite different solutions
and policy implications. To begin with, in addition to the challenge of acquiring knowledge, in its
9 In the U.S. garment industry tacit knowledge is acquired on the job with people working side by side. Inspectors
watch what workers are doing, pick up the faults which the new inspectors miss, and point out to them case by case
what is wrong with the garment. Dussel et al. (1996: 16).
1 For example, productivity can vary widely even among firms using the same hard technology. One explanation is
that over time, incremental in-house innovations can add up to significant productivity improvements. Well-known
studies providing empirical evidence for these arguments include Pack (1984) for East Asia, and Katz (1987) for
1998/99 World Development Report (WDR)--"Knowledge for Development,"--the Bank draws
attention to the challenges developing countries face absorbing and communicating knowledge.
Solutions to these challenges seem almost like preconditions for knowledge to flow freely, for
example, universal basic education, lifelong learning, support for tertiary education,
telecommunication infrastructure for communication and dissemination, etc. It may not be possible
to have perfect information if any one of these factors is missing. With the problem thus defined,
the policy prescription is that all these factors need to be addressed and put into place.
Furthermore, the Bank draws attention to the fact that knowledge falls into the category of a public
good. Because it is nonrivalrous and non-excludable, private agents may not be able to capture the
full innovative return to their efforts. If so, there is likely to be a disincentive to its private supply, a
classic instance of market failure, in which case the government may need to step in. For example,
it may have to strengthen institutions that protect intellectual property rights (IPRs), provide
monetary incentives, or assume personal responsibility for its supply. Moreover, the 1998/99
WDR takes the argument one step further. Even if knowledge gaps between industrial and
developing countries could be closed, the latter might still face other kinds of market failures:
information problems (or knowledge about "attributes") may arise, such as the quality of a
product, the diligence of a worker, or the creditworthiness of a firm. To alleviate these problems
requires mechanisms such as product standards, training certificates, and credit reports; it requires a
variety of market and nonmarket mechanisms to collect and disseminate information that has to be
generated on the spot and continuously refreshed. Because many of these mechanisms are weak or
lacking in developing countries these also need to be put into place."
While the deficiencies observed by the Bank are often quite real, their selection remains
colored by a particular understanding of knowledge embodied in technology as generally explicit
and transferable, subject to the noted constraints inherent to public goods." If, however, one is
Latin America. Mody et al. (1992) provide a theoretical argument and examples of superior organizational
innovations. See work by Pratten (1976a,b), Jones and Prais (1978), noted in Nelson (1981) for industrial countries.
" Williamson (1985) and North (1990) deal with some of these issues in the framework of transaction costs.
12 Amsden (1992) has also noted a separate weakness in this framework: an argument for "markets" that uses "market
failures" as an analytical category is tautological, impossible to falsify.
willing to suspend the assumption of perfect information on a different basis--that much knowledge
is tacit, embodied in individuals and organizations, experience- and locality-specific, and therefore
hard to codify--the analysis may proffer a different set of problems and solutions to technological
catch up. These are likely to be quite different, and perhaps complementary, to those suggested by
market theory. My proposition is that at the most micro-level, the mechanisms by which developing
country manufacturing firms can achieve technological world standards does not lie exclusively in
the "processing" of received (explicit) information, but rather in a complementary knowledge
creation effort that consists of a systematic conversion of tacit into explicit knowledge. But tacit
information is held by individuals, the product of highly personal experience. Thus, to be of use to
the organizations in which they work (e.g., firms), it needs to be shared with others, discussed
collectively, and reworked to be made explicit. Understood this way the organizational needs for a
"knowledge creation" effort are quite different to those required for an "information processing"
effort, and so are the catch up challenges and policy prescriptions for developing countries.
Theoretical Antecedents
The claims that make up this proposition are not entirely new. Parts of them have been
made elsewhere and often in the past, in various implicit and explicit ways. What is different is the
way they are integrated into a broader theory that provides a more complete explanation of the pace
of current restructuring in some Latin American industries than the working models we have right
now. Many commentators studying industrial patterns of adjustment have focused on structural
factors to explain differences in adjustment patterns, for instance, the nature of competition in each
industry, government regulation, firm size, production process, etc. While all these variables are
important, my contribution is to clarify some aspects of adjustment that these models do not
illuminate, and that may provide important clues on how to channel assistance. Given that
knowledge gaps among countries and industries are not narrowing as rapidly as neoclassical
models suggest they should, what are the specific challenges that developing country firms face?
What seem to be the more successful paths firms are taking to achieve world technological
standards? Why are certain knowledge professionals playing more important roles in this catch up
process than they did in the past? What makes the institutions of sectoral coordination in which
they participate the most innovative? Are they new or extensions of the old? How do they resolve
the shortcomings of current and traditional forms of public support and private action?
Several heterodox economic and institutional theories illuminate and provide partial
structure to some of the claims made above. To further clarify the distinctions between explicit and
tacit knowledge it is useful to review first the strong theoretical tradition in American management
schools that actually disbelieves or plays down the value of tacit, implicit, practical knowledge. To
begin with, Frederick Taylor's (1911) studies at the turn of the century proposed finding the one
best method for implementing a job, but left the task in the hands of managers, not the workers
themselves who actually knew more about what they did. Herbert Simon (1945, 1958, 1973),
author of the notion of "bounded rationality", shows a similar disbelief in tacit knowledge when
proposing that organizations in complex environments should distribute information among their
units as little as possible to reduce information load. In addition, Simon proposed a passive view of
organizations, not as knowledge generators but as passive reactors to changes in the environment
through adjustments in their information-processing structures. More recently, the Business
Strategy school of Michael Porter (1990) is built on a very top-down understanding of knowledge
creation and organizational decision making. For example, managers are assumed to have explicit
knowledge on variables or "forces" that allows them to make rational decisions on which sectors
to compete in and which ones to exit from. In sum, none of these traditions dwells on the fact that
employees may have important capabilities as knowledge generators themselves, and therefore do
not explore the mechanisms by which organizations make use of that practical knowledge.
In contrast, a group of economic and firm-level theories recognizes the importance of tacit
knowledge. One of the earliest is Hayek's (1945), who noted that the market is the process
through which individual knowledge is mobilized socially. In turn, Schumpeter's (1951) theory of
creative destruction had a somewhat related theme, highlighting the value of new "combinations"
of knowledge. However, they were both too focused on making efficient use of existing knowledge
to include any specific discussion of how the tacit portion of individual knowledge is made explicit.
A theory by Penrose (1959) proposed the existence of tacit knowledge at the firm level. She argued
that firm inputs (called "services") are a function of the experience and knowledge accumulated
within the organization; but ultimately she did not elaborate on the organizational mechanisms
through which such knowledge is accumulated and codified. Again, it is not clear how knowledge
is created within the organization. Other theories develop more fully how organizations may learn
from tacit knowledge. Argyris and Sch6n (1978) and Argyris (1994) proposed that organizational
learning consists of two different types of activities. One type of learning is obtaining know-how to
solve specific problems based upon existing premises. The latter type of learning is establishing
new premises--paradigms, schemata, models, or perspectives--to override the existing ones. Argyris
and Sch6n call them single loop and double loop learning. In this theory tacit knowledge is an
important part of double-loop learning, but the focus is not on how it is produced, made explicit,
and put to use to compete, but rather how to overcome organizational resistance to change. In
addition, the conception of double loop learning is not as useful in that it is episodic, not
continuous, occasionally triggered by someone who decides to put it into practice.
One of the most complete and helpful firm-level theories of organizational knowledge
creation is that of Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) who hypothesized that firms' competitive advantage
does not come from "processing explicit information" (as is deeply ingrained in the Western
management traditions) but rather from "creating knowledge" out of the systematic conversion of
tacit into explicit knowledge. (In this view, East Asian firms have been misrepresented and
shortchanged in the literature, for their portrayal as successful imitators and adaptators, but not
really all that innovative.) Organizations cannot create knowledge on their own without the initiative
of individuals; but to be useful, highly personal knowledge needs to be converted into explicit
knowledge that can be shared with others in the firm. This model is useful because it captures
several of the knowledge generation issues to which I allude: it spells out the mechanisms by which
individual experience in Japanese firms is converted into organizational knowledge. It also
proposes that middle managers play an important role as "knowledge engineers" because they
involve top management and front-line workers. On the other hand, the model focuses exclusively
on knowledge sharing and reworking within the firm to the detriment of interactions of individuals
with outside entities.
The significance of tacit knowledge appears in several other theories but I mention the next
ones to draw attention to other issues I raise in my hypothesis. For example, the problems of
knowledge transfer of tacit information from industrial to opening developing economies are a
theme recognized more or less explicitly in several models. Falling into this category are the
product life cycle theory (Vernon 1966) and the international division of labor theory (e.g., Froebel
et al. 1980), in which technological innovation in the former and rising wages in industrialized
countries in the latter, encourage multinationals to take mature technologies to developing
economies. In other words, knowledge transfer is "smoothened" by FDI that consists not only of
capital but also the knowledge embodied in the participating organizations and their employees.
These theories are, however, mute about parallel challenges of adaptation to particular local
environments (especially with agricultural products).
By the same token, my ideas on "models" providing paths that both facilitate and prejudice
have antecedents. In their discussions on tacit knowledge Nelson and Winter (1982) suggested that
innovations are unpredictable mutations of routines, and proposed the existence of technology
"regimes" as cognitive beliefs about what is feasible or at least worth attempting. Firms typically
are familiar only with technological options similar to the ones they are currently employing. Put
differently, firms may make certain technological "bets" that may affect subsequent choices. At a
more macro level, in her discussion of late industrialization outside the north Atlantic economies,
Amsden (forthcoming) also proposes that the identity of a role model is an important explanator of
postwar variations in the behavior of late industrializing countries' firms, governments, and exports.
The issue of the reworking of tacit information into explicit knowledge has one of its most
recent antecedents in Amsden's (1989) theory of late industrialization, that of 20th century
countries that compete on the basis of mature borrowed technologies. Firms achieve
competitiveness in these technologies, the argument goes, through incremental improvements in
their production plants. Production experience is the source of the knowledge required for
improvements. Amsden also provided an antecedent to the important role of knowledge
professionals--in her case they are the shop floor engineers, key players making tacit information
explicit in hierarchically managed modem industrial enterprises. She did not elaborate, however, on
how the changing self-conceptions of these technicians may have affected the knowledge creation
effort inside and outside the firm as I propose to do. Amsden does not note whether engineers may
have participated in the creation of industry-specific new economic development institutions.
One of the strongest models on reworking of tacit knowledge and the increasing role of
knowledge professionals is Sabel's (1994) theory of "learning by monitoring". In this model tacit
knowledge is the main building block of economic growth: economic learning involves change and
therefore instability in relations among coordinating agents within firms and between them, and
between firms and the state. Because of this instability institutions of "monitoring" or
coordination are required. Tacit knowledge from coordination is central to their functioning: it is
discussed and reworked to fit new circumstance and to redefine parties' relation to each other.
What is particularly useful about this theory is that it recognizes explicitly that new learning
demands may quickly outdate the usefulness of old divisions of labor in firm hierarchies. Because
of this, relations among top executives, middle managers/technicians, and workers are not cast in
stone as is typically assumed in firm hierarchies, but rather are in a state of flux. While this theory
doesn't directly focus on the increased role that middle technicians may play within firms and in
broader economic development institutions, it suggests reasons why they might.
Another argument that draws specific attention to "received knowledge" in the form of
"models", regarding to how technological paths are chosen, and to the role of professional experts
or "knowledge-bearing elites", is Ziegler's (1997). His argument is that choices of technological
paths are strongly affected by knowledge-bearing groups--scientists, engineers, technicians, skilled
workers--and the way these "elites" conceive of their roles in public efforts of innovation. These
groups see alternative policies in terms of their compatibility with established jurisdictions and
professional self-images. While this explanation suggests a quite different set of drivers of the role
of knowledge professionals to those enunciated by Sabel, it still draws attention to the self-
conceptions of professional groups as an important variable. In this last version what remains
unclear is under what conditions self-conceptions of professional groups may be used positively to
facilitate industry adjustment.
Finally, my claim that there is a strong need for new coordinating institutions that process
tacit into explicit knowledge is illustrated vividly through Amsden's (1989) point that competitive
assets such as natural resources, low wages, and especially government intervention (e.g., to create
"wrong prices") provide firms the opportunity to gain some initial production experience and
become competitive. But in the new political economy of liberalization, most developing country
firms cannot rely on government protection to pick up initial production experience; the political
support for these kinds of measures is no longer guaranteed. The question then is, "How can
firms make up for the loss of this major competitive asset, government protection?" In knowledge-
intensive sectors where low wages and cheap land are weaker competitive assets, what alternative
competitive assets do firms have to quickly obtain the production experience that will move them up
the learning ladder and make them competitive?
The Chilean and Mendozan wine industry adjustments are two natural experiments that may
provide some useful answers to these important questions.
Figure 1.1
LOCATION OF THE SOUTHERN CONE WINE INDUSTRIES
CHILE ARGENTINA
The Cases: Restructuring in the Southern Cone Wine Industries
The recent Southern Cone wine sectors' upgrading experiences provide insights on how
formerly protected manufacturing industries might be able to "bootstrap"" themselves out of
technological "backwardness." In this study I consider why some firms and market segments
within the wine industry have upgraded quicker than others, to draw some general lessons on the
actors, policies, and institutions that can facilitate firm learning. The adjustment process has taken
place as the governance and economic development mechanisms associated with the import-
substitution industrialization (ISI) state collapsed or were eliminated by liberalizing central
governments.
Summary of the Adjustment Processes
Until the '70s, both Chilean and Mendozan (Argentina) supply chains produced wine of
very poor quality for a rising domestic demand. But when local consumption began to fall in the
late '70s the industry had to adjust.
In Chile wine producers reoriented to serve foreign markets. A first wave of large firms
acquired new winemaking knowledge, began to plant hundreds of hectares of fine varietals, and
quickly expanded processing plants with new stainless steel technology. But these investments
were carried out without proper site selection. In addition, irrigation was pumped up excessively to
increase yields at the expense of quality. These were the wineries that shaped Chile's initial
international image as exporter of good value cheap "fighting" varietals.' 4 Starting in the early
" Bootstrapping refers to the process which industrialized countries have used to catch-up with one another when
they have fallen behind in international competition, such as Japan did after World War 1I, and the United States and
Western Europe with respect to the former in the 1980s. It is based only in part on the appropriation of
management and production techniques used by the leader. Key to the bootstrapping strategy are (1.) that companies
develop a set of standards and benchmarks to identify where performance is deficient, (2.) that they identify the
institutions and practices which differentiate the benchmark procedures and practices from their own, and (3.) that
they initiate a series of internal debates and discussion on the critical elements of the benchmark, whether they
should be adopted whole, or how they might be altered to fit into their own organizational practice. See Dussel et.
al. (1996: 30-31), and Sabel (1995).
" "Fighting" varietals refers to those grape types that have greatest acceptance with international consumers--e.g.,
Cabernet Sauvignon, Chardonnay, Merlot, and to a lesser extent Sauvignon Blanc and Riesling. They are the
1990s a second wave of smaller firms, spin-offs and foreign joint ventures with far improved
technological knowledge made the first attempts to give a more "indigenous" personality to the
local fighting varietals. They became more discriminating with respect to where they placed their
vineyards, reduced watering and yields, and incorporated oak barrel aging. A third phase has begun
in the last two years, with several firms moving into the production of ultrapremium wines of
distinctive local character. The concentrated nature of the Chilean wine industry has given the
restructuring effort significant breadth and depth, and its continuity has been sustained largely
through individual purchases of foreign know-how and through foreign participation.
In Mendoza the process unfolded less coherently and with a few years delay, with far less
breadth, and with little impetus in its export drive. Two large firms were active initially in upgrading
to international style wine making, with smaller firms and foreign participation following after.
Some firms leapfrogged to the second phase directly with varietals with a more "indigenous"
personality, while others started out like the Chilean pioneers in the "good value" segment. But
overall, the breadth and depth of the restructuring effort in international varietals has been far
narrower in Mendoza than in Chile. In fact, most of the industry consists of undercapitalized table
wine supply chains that are upgrading by the "bootstraps", gradually accumulating savings to
finance their investments in new hardware and knowledge acquisition. As will be seen, this
difference is associated with the Argentine province's small share of international varietals and a far
more diverse ampelograhic collection of intermediate and low quality grapes.
The Drivers of Technological Catch Up
In the context of a growing internationalization of fine wine production and a drop in
consumption of cheap table wine, tutelage from market agents such as international wine traders,
machinery suppliers, enological laboratories, and international consultants has been key to the
upgrading of Chilean and Mendozan fine wine supply chains. They have provided tried and tested
varietal clones, wine making and grape growing techniques and work practices, the enological
preferred grapes for wineries that wants to launch into exports and want to ensure there is a general consumer
inputs, the processing machinery (and the finance)--in sum, a working model to follow--that is
allowing them to improve their quality and participate in exports. In addition, in some instances the
state has also helped with adaptive research on the main international varietals, marketing assistance,
etc. Especially in Chile this effort has been sustained largely through individual purchases of
foreign know-how and foreign participation.
On the other hand, most table wine suppliers have been less fortunate, far more dependent
on their own local capabilities to upgrade, with fewer market agents to help them, and as will be
seen, with historical prejudice working against them. In contrast to the first group, they do not have
a working model to follow: they have little or no new machinery, varietal clones, or export
experience, hence their exposure to international tutelage is modest at best. They use intermediate
and low quality grapes that unfortunately have not been the focus of domestic or international
research. Nor do they benefit from much tutelage from domestic buyers: supermarkets offer little
of the kind of helpful advice international wine traders provide. Given most table wine producers'
weak financial capacity, improved technology and knowledge needs to come in small increments,
and must be homegrown, i.e., tailored specifically to the varietals and equipment available to them.
Assistance from the state for research on second-tier varietals or other services has not been
forthcoming either, or has been modest at best.
While in some ways the technological gap between fine wine makers and table wine makers
has widened, reflected by a greater dispersion of wine retail prices, the first group of producers also
has problems of its own. International tutelage has helped firms upgrade their production plants
and vineyards to world standards, but it hasn't necessarily taught them mechanisms for continuous
improvement. Growers may have followed international consultants' advice on how to retrain their
vines to better concentrate flavors and aromas, and wineries may have incorporated the latest
stainless steel processing and storage technology, and adopted many of the wine making techniques
developed by the best Australian, French and Californian enologists. Yet almost none of them has
been able to leapfrog several quality categories; most have started in the bottom rung with simple
acceptance of their product. Chile has extensive acreage of the first four varietals.
varietals and slowly worked their way up. The best wineries in general have found that upward
quality movements from the popular premium market segment to superpremium and ultra premium,
and ultimately to a grand cru, are very hard to make. In fact the process is so painstaking that most
domestic producers who have tried to accelerate their movement up the learning curve have
continued to rely on foreign experts and joint ventures, on some occasions with only modest
success.
Thus in what may seem paradoxical, both fine wine and table wine producers face some
common challenges. Technological upgrading involves not only hardware, but especially the tacit
knowledge on how to make best use of it. To progress beyond the production of a generic
international-style varietal whose origin cannot be differentiated, to one that can be recognized as
distinctly and attractively Chilean or Mendozan, requires significant local experimentation. For
example, it requires testing variations in vine training systems that may be more suitable to a
particular microclimate, it may require the use of a particular indigenous yeast that better elicits the
grape's flavors and aromas, or it may demand a more prolonged maceration of grape juice and
skins at a different temperature than is practiced in, say, France or California. With time,
approximate rules of thumb can be developed firm by firm through local experimentation in the lab
or through trial and error in the vineyard and processing plant. But to accelerate this process of
discovery and obtain a more definitive understanding of which varietals do better under what
conditions requires a broader discussion within the wine-making community of each individual's
experiences. Currently the industry has few mechanisms for collective discussion and learning
from production experience that can boost the local upgrading effort.
The same applies to the production of intermediate and low quality wines where local
experimentation may produce even greater returns. For example, in France the Malbeck grape is
considered of intermediate quality, but in Mendoza's climate and soils it appears to have adapted
especially well; the existing 9,000 hectares can produce wines of very good quality. The
opportunity is there to develop a truly unique Mendozan world class wine. However, the know-how
cannot be purchased in France; it will require significant local research. By the same token, some
high-yielding intermediate and low quality varietals that have historically been written off for their
poor quality can produce surprisingly good wines when processed correctly with the right
technology. Because of their high yields they can produce especially competitive wines in certain
market segments. But to turn them into a profitable business opportunity requires detailed
knowledge of the various market segments to which they can be targeted, a clear economic analysis
defining the basic production parameters for which they can turn a profit, and a specific
understanding of how the grapes' quality behave as various growing and processing techniques are
altered. Again, faster progress can be made by encouraging an organized communal discussion of
these individual experiences.
Among several important insights that emerge from this study of Chilean and Mendozan
restructuring are, first, the diminished direct protagonism of the public sector in technological
change, the loss of relevance of corporatist forms for organizing social and economic interests, and
the reorganization of some of those interests in new or different forms. Second, while there is no
shortage of examples in both countries of individual firms that have adopted the latest hardware the
greatest difficulties are finding strategies that increase the number of "boats" rising with the tide,
and creating the capacity for continuous improvement within firms and in their supply chains.
Third, despite these deficiencies there are some interesting homegrown bootstrapping experiences
that suggest how they can be overcome, and explain why social and economic interests in the wine
industry are reorganizing and rebuilding. I claim these are new economic development institutions
in that they are not extensions of previously existing programs, policies, or organizations.
Examples are enologists' evaluation events and particular kinds of firm consortia. Their strength
lies in that they promote wide unprejudiced discussion and systematic processing of tacit
information from production and marketing experience. Knowledge professionals, especially
enologists supported by enological laboratories, play a protagonistic role in these institutions. That
they do so is not accidental: as knowledge becomes more important to industrial competition the
individuals and groups that carry it grow in importance. Qualified enologists have become key
coordinators of fine wineries' upgrading efforts, and generators on their own of significant
technological knowledge, partly thanks to substantial tutelage from buyers and suppliers, and partly
because of their strategic command of the value chain. They understand how conception and
execution relate to each other starting from vineyard, through production, and all the way to
marketing, to identify what improvements are required where, and how they can be implemented. A
final motivation for activism comes from long-postponed professional expectations for status and
public recognition that their profession is accorded in other parts of the world.
Structure of the Dissertation
The dissertation is structured in five chapters. Chapter 2 describes Chile's and Mendoza's
wine industry adjustment in three parts: first, the basic conditions from which firms started in the
early 1980s, second, how the process unfolded in each country describing the producers that
participated in it, and third, those who were left out. I briefly review the origins of the poor quality
wine made in both countries until two decades ago. I then provide a number of indicators showing
that in the last 15 years conditions have changed substantially. There are many positive signs of
upgrading of production capacity to international-style wine making. Next, I describe how the
restructuring process unfolded in the last fifteen years, and the firms that participated in it. Last, I
explain the breadth and depth of the restructuring in each country, greater in Chile than in Mendoza,
yet more exclusionist in the former than in the latter--in the former, one segment of table wine
producers has been entirely left out. In contrast, Mendoza table wine producers have also made
some, if modest, improvements.
In Chapters 3 and 4 1 attempt to answer a set of questions on why not all wine sector
participants are on an upgrading path, why, despite improvements, the value added gap between
Southern Cone wineries and the world's leading wine producers is still significant, and what is
required to continue to close it? Chapter 3 is in eight parts. I review the various forms of market
tutelage that Chilean and Mendozan wine supply chains received from machinery suppliers,
consultants, international wine buyers, from wineries themselves, and a few others. First, I describe
in detail the kinds of learning challenges leading Californian and French wine supply chains faced
in the '70s to improve wine quality. Second, I provide some quantitative evidence and benchmarks
on the mixed progress made by Chilean and Mendozan wine supply chains with respect to
international competitors like Australia, California, Italy, and France. Third, I lay out evidence on
why low labor and land costs offer comparative advantage within limits; further progress requires
more purposeful quality improvements. Next, I detail the various market mechanisms wine supply
chains have used to date to upgrade their capabilities, to explain the current pattern of advances and
bottlenecks in technological learning. Typical technology transfer has come through interactions
with buyers and suppliers, hiring of consultants, joint ventures. The advances are uneven, and both
fine wine and table wine supply chains face similar needs to make tacit knowledge on grape
growing and wine processing techniques more explicit, and to integrate better conception and
execution. I close with an example of a firm that has successfully implemented the continuous
improvement systems to quickly move up the learning ladder and some ideas on how tacit
knowledge can be managed more effectively to induce wine supply chains to learn faster.
The first part of Chapter 4 looks at the role of the state as a source of tutelage for the wine
sector. The second part examines examples that suggest how deficiencies in public sector programs
can be overcome. The discussion is in three parts. First, I turn to the Chilean and Mendozan wine
industries and discuss the relative effectiveness of various public sector programs and liberalization
reforms to assist wine supply chains formulate what they needed most: a realistic set of incremental
standards that could provide a road map to eventual international competition. Some programs and
reforms were completely ineffective or harmful, and a few had partial success. Second, I present a
pair of home-grown initiatives that appear to generate continuous learning. Both include different
types of wine evaluation committees for the systematic discussion of tacit knowledge. I argue that
these are new kinds of institutions, not extensions of existing government programs, business
associations, or individual initiatives. Third, I discuss the logic behind the emergence of these
evaluation events: why the driving force behind them are the enologists and the enological labs, not
the heads of wineries, nor the public sector.
Chapter 5 presents my conclusions. It casts the findings in the literature on technological
learning and draws some policy implications.
Research Design: The Decision to Focus on Technical Knowledge
I chose to examine upgrading in the Chilean and Argentine wine industries for a number of
reasons. The first advantage is the possibility to examine same-sector performance across two
countries, controlling the effects of nation-specific structural factors such as resource endowments
and market size. A second advantage suggested itself as I became familiar with my two cases: there
are instances in which subregional differences in winery restructuring experience within each region
have been quite stark. Thus, the two wine industries allow one to study the different trajectories of
firms across particular subregions and localities in the same country. Third, a number of
peculiarities of the wine sector also provide richness to the cases. For example, given the
complexity of agroprocessing supply chains, there is an opportunity to examine technological
catch-up in a mix of activities in agriculture and manufacturing of varied capital and labor
intensities. Also interesting, as an agroindustrial activity based on a perennial crop it requires long
term investments that pose a number of particularly difficult supply-chain coordination problems.
Similarly interesting, because of the relative scale-neutrality of the technology the firm population is
heterogeneous in size, degree of technological development, and in organization of production. In
Chile it is more heavily concentrated in a few integrated publicly-traded firms; in Mendoza supply
chains are less integrated, and there is a greater presence of cooperatives and bulk producers that
serve the large domestic market.
A fourth factor is that the initial technological conditions in both countries were similarly
obsolete in the preliberalization period. At least until the early '80s both Chile and Argentina had
long traditions in mass-production of very poor quality table wine, focused almost exclusively on
undemanding domestic markets and only exporting in years of surplus relatively small amounts that
were not consumed internally. Hence, they lend themselves well to observe common trajectories
and departures in the technical and organizational solutions to overcome technological
backwardness. Last, in both countries there is a long, rich history of public sector support and
intervention, with policies that range across the spectrum. Thus, it provides an opportunity to
examine in detail to what extent and in what ways the state contributed, if at all, to the apparent
success in firm catch-up in each country.
I structured my fieldwork to understand the extent to which technical upgrading had taken
place up and down wine supply chains and horizontally across the sector, and what key actors had
been involved in the learning process at each stage. I started with field visits to lead wineries in fine
wine production and then diversified into other market segments. I began my fieldwork in
Mendoza and later continued in Chile. For reasons that I will detail in a moment, I focused most of
my attention on the instruments and institutions that promoted broad debates on market and
production possibilities, especially the role of enologists in the acquisition, creation, diffusion and
absorption of technical knowledge. In all, I conducted over 150 interviews and collected evidence
from over 100 wineries, grape juice processors, and grape growers.
The Upgrading "Leaders"
To understand the depth, breadth, and continuity of the wine industry restructuring I first
focused on those Mendoza wineries that the sectoral specialists to whom I initially spoke identified
as the upgrading "leaders". There turned out to be an identifiable isomorphism in their
restructuring style, what I call an "international" path. Most of them were well-capitalized export
pioneers, competing in the popular premium and super premium market segments.' 5 They were the
first to purchase the new world class stainless steel processing technology and import nursery-
certified cloned vine plantings for new drip-irrigated vineyards. Most were located in the prime fine
grape growing vineyards close to the Andes piedmont, cooler and with more direct access to snow-
melt water than the rest of the province. They competed on the basis of the four most popular
"fighting" varietals. They had all purchased roughly the same machinery and implemented similar
vineyard and processing practice changes. They all spoke of the new emphasis on vineyard
management and had learnt well the lesson that a good wine begins with a quality grape. At these
firms I spoke principally to enologists and managers, but also to agricultural engineers and growers
from whom they bought fine grapes, to find out how they had gone about identifying bottlenecks
and implementing quality-enhancing changes in processing plants and vineyards. The interviews
were semistructured, to determine the origins of the firm, which markets it competed in, what
technological bottlenecks it had faced, and what resources it had drawn from to overcome them. In
many instances these conversations served as points of departure to explore other links in their
supply chains. It quickly became clear that this group of lead wineries and growers was small: as
will be seen in Chapter 2 it involved no more than four dozen wineries--half of which had just
started to upgrade--and a few hundred growers with "fighting" varietals, meaning that most of the
industry was not upgrading or was on a separate track.
I also spent the initial weeks understanding the basic concepts of grape growing and wine
processing, the technological improvements that the new machinery involved, and the economics of
the new technology, to begin to sort out the various hypotheses that might explain why some firms
were likely to upgrade and others not. Three key related insights came out of this work: one was
that differences in labor costs mattered little in providing competitiveness in fine wine market
segments; second, the new machinery that was used to make a bottle of export quality wine worth
$5-7 was almost the same as that used to make a bottle worth $50; third, what explained the price
difference between one bottle and the other was partly marketing, but most importantly technical
knowledge. Various aspects associated with technical knowledge such as bottlenecks, sources, and
diffusion paths, suggested themselves as the big topics to research.
Towards an Expanded Definition of "Leadership"
I quickly moved from the lead processing firms to interview public sector research and
extension agents who had a broad view of the sector and could therefore inform me on what the
"s Popular premiums sell for US$3-7 a bottle and super premiums for $7-14 a bottle in the U.S. retail market (IWA
majority of the wine industry was doing. These conversations were the first in which I heard
alternative formulations of what the path to progress might be, and allowed me to understand that
Mendoza's wine sector involved an heterogeneous mix of economic agents. Each had very
different competitive assets, conceptions of what the road to progress involved, and what means
might get them there. For example, export-oriented firms that targeted the superpremium niche
markets needed to implement quite different vineyard practices compared to those targeting the
popular premium consumer--the former were more likely to restrict water to decrease yields and
concentrate grape flavors and aromas. Conversely, growers that sold their production for grape
juice concentrate needed to water their vineyards abundantly to increase their yields and their sugar
content.
Thus as I expanded my understanding of what upgrading "leadership" involved, in more
than four dozen interviews I spoke to people in a varied set of wineries and supply chains, from
leading table wine producers and bottlers, through successful first and second degree cooperatives,
business association leaders, grape juice makers, and enological labs, to exporters of modest quality
fine wines. I also spoke to a dozen processing/bottling equipment manufacturers and retailers, and
a similar number of other suppliers of inputs and services, such as enological laboratories, vine
nurseries, glass bottle manufacturers, irrigation equipment retailers, and technical consultants.
These visits took me far beyond the prime Mendoza piedmont growing area to the hotter, less
desirable, eastern part of the province. The most interesting findings emerged from these
interviews: they provided examples of successful alternative technological upgrading paths,
indicated the general lack of knowledge most of the industry had about them, as well as the
existence of large knowledge gaps on profitable business opportunities in the production of
intermediate quality wines based on medium-yield, intermediate quality varietals.
As will be seen next, the key agents of change turned out to be the enologists, who nurtured
and channeled in useful directions sectoral debates on the possibilities of restructuring.
1998:13)
The Focus on Enologists and their Discussion Groups
Industry participants resolved many of the uncertainties of the restructuring process through
continuous discussion with their colleagues. The most ubiquitous lines of communication seemed
to be among enologists, who shared information on productive experience freely among themselves
and in small discussion groups. In addition, wine evaluation events seemed to be particularly
valuable sources of information in that they resolved in useful ways fierce sectoral debates on the
possibilities of restructuring. Many actors participated in organizing these discussions, but
enologists also seemed to be at their crossroads. Thus, I focused a significant amount of my time
in Mendoza studying the history of wine evaluation events and reconstructing the role of enologists,
especially in the subregion of Eastern Mendoza where the knowledge gaps and the prejudices
regarding its productive possibilities were historically the greatest.
The Emergence of Chile's Smallest Wine Exporters
Based on what I had learned in Mendoza, I designed my research in Chile differently.
Because I had already observed the "international" track to progress in Mendoza, my first visits
were not to the large lead wineries that had taken the same direction, but to small exporters. The
sectoral specialists I initially interviewed pointed me towards them as the new dynamic actors in the
wine sector. I interviewed firm owners and enologists at roughly three dozen of these firms to
understand their origins and the resources they had tapped to overcome the typical bottlenecks
associated with size. I later contacted some of the largest wineries to find out about their own initial
experiences.
Several insights emerged from these interviews. First, different from Mendoza, both large
and small wineries were following similar technological paths in that they all processed the same
fine varietals that were widely accepted internationally, and all had purchased similar processing and
storage technology. The statistics later confirmed that Chile had far fewer varietals than Mendoza,
and the majority of the vineyard surface area consisted of the four most valued internationally.
Second, intermediate and low quality varietals were principally two, Pais and Moscatel de
Alejandri(a. In 1996 they represented only 38 percent of total vineyard surface area. Half of it was
handled by the large integrated wineries and two cooperatives. The remainder was produced in the
secano with rudimentary techniques for own consumption, and wasn't even registered on most
studies of the industry. (The secano is an impoverished area of subsistence agriculture in the
southern part of the Chilean wine region, with average plots of 2.1 hectares and no irrigation.) In
sum, Chile's wine industry didn't have anything like Eastern Mendoza's producers; its population
of firms was far more homogenous in its grape endowments, technology and export orientation.
There seemed to be a greater consensus on what the restructuring path might look like. Thus, I
restricted my interviews to the group of large and small fine wine producers. In effect, the Chilean
wine industry's homogeneity and concentration made it far less complex and interesting than its
Mendozan counterpart.
Third, small wineries had gained much of the technical knowledge through consultants.
When I asked who were the specific people involved the same set of names began to repeat itself. It
did not take long to discover this was an elite of enologists who had previously trained (and often
still worked) for the largest export wineries during the 1980s. At that point I decided to follow the
trajectory of these knowledge professionals to understand how they had obtained their training and
expertise and to what extent it had diffused through the industry.
The Rise of Elite Enologists
Given the relative homogeneity of the industry in terms of varietals and market niches
targeted I spent much of the rest of my time in Chile mapping out the trajectories of this elite group
of enologists: where they had received their education, where they obtained their practical training,
and for whom had they worked as consultants, to measure the diffusion impact of their work. I
documented part of this material through direct interviews with enologists, and part I reconstructed
through firm interviews, conversations with leaders of their professional association, and with the
academics who trained them and interacted with them on a regular basis.
I complemented my field work with more than twenty interviews of personnel at public
sector regulatory and technical agencies, and with other supply chain actors such as enological
laboratories and machinery retailers. I visited several more than once.
Quantitative Data
Several sources of information provided sectoral background and context for my interview
questions. During parts of 1997 and early 1998 I assembled a number of quantitative and
qualitative databases from published sources on sectoral evolution in the two countries. Many of
these historical databases go back to the 1960s and in some instances as far back as the preceding
century. 6 The databases available in each country were not always comparable. For instance, in
Mendoza I was able to learn much on the primary sector because the national wine regulatory
agency had kept very good data. Conversely, quantitative evidence on the evolution of Mendoza's
processing sector is sketchy because the only information available is from an industrial census
carried out every ten years, using a five digit code. By the same token, export data is not as
disaggregated as in Chile. One representative survey of manufacturing firms carried out by
colleagues at MIT provided some information on firm-level export performance."
In contrast, Chilean data on hectares, size of harvests, wine produced, etc., are poorer than in
Mendoza because following the downsizing of the Ministry of Agriculture in the 1970s and
deregulation of grape growing, few if any records were kept. On the other hand, the Chilean
census bureau, INE, continued a yearly manufacturing survey that monitors firms that employ more
than ten workers. Hence, I was able to get a good sense of how output per capita, investment levels,
productivity, employment, etc., of Chilean wine processors had evolved for the last twenty years
(since mid-1970s to mid-1990s).
16 They included statistics such as hectares of vineyards specified by different grape varieties, vineyard size across
subregions in each country, harvest sizes for various types of poor and high quality grapes, number of wineries
involved, prices of grapes and wine (wholesale and retail for different grapes), production costs, input, labor,
machinery, and capital costs, export quantities of various types of wine, etc.
" MIT/CIT-Mendoza Project, 1995-1997.
CHAPTER 2
Two Paths of Technological Catch Up
Introduction: The High Road, The Low Road, and No Road
In this chapter I describe the restructuring of Chile's and Mendoza's wine industry, the
basic conditions from which they started in the early '80s, how the process unfolded in each
country, which firms participated in it, and which were left out. While there are similarities, each
industry evolved quite differently. First, the upgrading from table to premium wine has been far
more widespread in Chile than in Mendoza. Currently over 50 percent of Chile's wine production
consists of four major varietals, the majority of which are sent to export markets. The pioneers
were the largest wineries that made the first investments in new technology and started exports of
premium varietal wines in the early 1980s. However, from the early 1990s on the population of
firms grew and diversified, especially with "boutique" integrated wineries. Yet despite this
diversity, the most striking characteristic of the Chilean wine industry is the convergence in the high
value-added upgrading path that most wine supply chains have followed. Based principally on the
four most popular varietals, they are either occupying the low end of the popular premium segment
($4-6/bottle) or trying to upgrade to the production of superpremiums and ultrapremiums.
By contrast, in Mendoza the industry seems to have split into a minority of firms following
a high value-added upgrading road (as in Chile), and the majority attempting to get on a low value-
added upgrading road. A few large firms were pioneers in export-quality premium varietal wines,
but between them they concentrate a much smaller share of wine production than in Chile. The
population of varietal wine producers has diversified to include more boutique wineries, but
production of premium varietals still represents no more than a few percentage points of total
output. On the other hand, in the early 1990s a group of supply chains embarked on a low value-
added road of high-volume commodities and is slowly but steadily upgrading, some with tutelage
from foreign brokers, others by the bootstraps. The province currently has a flourishing grape juice
concentrate export industry. The quality of table wine production is also improving considerably,
and exports of table wine are growing. The table wine industry is still very large: it is mostly
focused on the domestic market, absorbing more than 60 percent of the province's production. In
terms of volume, the greatest flurry of upgrading activity is taking place not in the premium to
superpremium categories, but among supply chains attempting to break out of the cheap $0.80-$2
table wine segment to upgrade into the lower end of the popular premium market--$2-$5.00--with
intermediate quality varietals.
In each country, those that are on the "no road"--neither on the "high" nor the "low"
roads--and therefore not participating in the upgrading push have some similarities, but are also
quite different. In both countries they tend to be the smaller growers (under 5 hectares) and
processors that work with poor quality varietals. In Chile they live in the secano, dry lands that
marginal not only economically because of their low yields, but also politically. In Mendoza, small
growers in the eastern part of the province are most representative of the province's "laggards".
On the other hand, the differences between the two groups are stark: the former are marginal to the
Chilean wine industry; in contrast, Eastern Mendoza's laggards are part of a subregion that
represents more than half of the province's wine output. One more important difference is that the
latter growers are politically very active. They built a reputation for their willingness to use
aggressive political tactics to seek redress from the public sector during economic downturns.
Recent Evidence of Quality Improvement in Southern Cone Wines
Overview
The Southern Cone wine industries are located contiguously on both sides of the Andes
mountains. On the western side, Chile's entire wine region stretches north to south along a three-
hundred mile corridor extending from Ovalle in the north to Concepci6n in the south. This area of
roughly 40,000 square miles contains all of the country's vineyards and wineries, nested in a series
of valleys with Mediterranean climate. The valleys run east-west for 50-80 miles, starting in the
Andes foothills and ending in the coastal hills next to the Pacific Ocean. In 1996 most of the wine
came from 4,800 vineyards covering 43,000 hectares, with an additional 13,000 hectares of
unproductive, low quality vineyards, for a total of 56,000 hectares. Of those, 28,000 hectares were
of the finest quality varietals. All added, the vineyards account for less than 7 percent of the total
surface area. Official statistics for 1995 place the number of wineries employing 10 and more
people at less than 50, but separate evidence such as export data and association memberships show
that there is an increasing number of smaller wineries, perhaps another 70-100. At the producer
level, the Chilean wine industry's 1995 output was $425 million.
On the opposite side of the Andes mountains lies Mendoza in Argentina, the largest wine-
producing province, responsible for roughly 70 percent of the country's wine production and
almost 100% of its wine exports. Most of the province's 60,000 square miles is a desert, with
agricultural activities located in three small oases. Mendoza has close to 19,000 vineyards, with a
total surface area of just over 140,000 hectares, less than one percent of the provincial total but two
and a half times as large as Chile's. The 1993 Census numbered Mendoza wineries at 451.
Industry output for 1993 was $775 million (Table 2.1).
Table 2.1
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF CHILE'S AND MENDOZA, ARGENTINA'S WINE INDUSTRIES
Wine Industry Chile Mendoza
1978* 1996* 1979* 1996*
Vineyard Surface Area (1996) 107,000 hectares 56,000 hectares 231,000 hectares 143,000 hectares
Number of Vineyards (1996) 31,400 11,000 29,400 19,000
Average Vineyard Size (Hectares) 8.1 hect. (excludes VIII 9 hect. (excludes VIII 7.9 hect. 7.5 hect.
Region) Region)
Number of Wineries 271 (138 w/10+ 120-150 (43 w/10+ 1,050 (1973) 451 (1993)
employees, 133 w/5-9 employees in 1995)
employees in 1979)
Wine Storage Deposits 668 1,298 1221(1992)
Employees in Wine Processing 6,300 (3,960 for firms 4,600 (w/10+ 9,200 (1973) 7,400 (1993)
w/10+ employ. 1979) employees in 1995)
Average Winery Size 23 (43 for firms w/10+ 106 (firms w/10+ 9(1973) 16(1993)
(employees/firm) employees) employees in 1995)
Gross Output in U.S. $ (constant) $179 million $426 mill. (1995) $? million (1973) $775 million (1993)
Gross Output in Liters 561 million 388 million 1,777 million 897 million
Number of Exporting Wineries n.d. 95 n.d. 60 (approx. those that
reconverted, 1997)
Wine Exports in U.S. $ (current) $9 million $412 million (1997) $6.9 million $116 million
Wine Exports in Liters (1 million 216 million (1997) 9 million 134 million
Value Export Wine (U.S. $/liter) $0.87 $1.90 (1997) $0.81 $0.87
Country Population 10 million 14 million 25 million 33 million
Consumption per Capita/Year 45 liters 15 liters 82 liters 41 liters
Year of Liberalization 1975 1991
Source: Based on ProChile, I.N.E.. and S.A.G. for Chile, and on I.N.V., I.N.D.E.C. for Mendoza.
*Most data are for 1978 and 1996 for Chile, and 1979 and 1996 for Mendoza. Year changes are noted in parentheses if different..
Initial Conditions
Until well into the 1970s Chilean and Argentine consumers drank very poor quality wines,
what is normally labeled "table" wine. During import substitution industrialization (ISI) the
average winery produced wine exclusively for domestic consumption: it bought or processed
growers' grapes for a fee, turned it into generic white or red table wine, and sold it in bulk to an
oligopolistic market of bottlers/distributors. Intermediaries made a commission of a few percentage
points facilitating transactions between wineries and bottlers. The latter were a small group of very
large firms based in the urban centers where they distributed the wine. The few bulk producers that
integrated forward survived by targeting niche regional markets in demijohns. These firms
processed intermediate and poor quality but high-yield grapes, with techniques that diluted flavors,
aromas, and color. Most enologists running these bulk wineries were employees with little training,
writing standardized "prescriptions" in their labs for foremen to execute. Their responsibilities
were limited to the production plant, disconnected from marketing or vineyards. Most were
technical high school graduates with an extended secondary education. Until the late 1970s over 90
percent of Mendoza's production consisted of cheap table wine.
Grape quality in the vineyards had deteriorated gradually during most of the century.18
Especially visible in Mendoza, over the years the relative weight of poor quality, high yielding
varietals increased over that of low volume, fine varietals, those with more concentrated flavors and
aromas.' 9 In addition, until as recently as the mid 1980s, local ampelographic knowledge--
information that allows one to distinguish varietals from each other and their different
characteristics--was poor at best, so that growers often confused one grape for another and had a
sketchy idea of the relative quality of their own vineyards. It was not uncommon that the same row
in a vineyard was planted with several different varietals, thus diluting the contribution of the best
plants. Moreover, it was common belief among growers that plant variety actually improved
pollination, hence the incentives to preserve purity were low. Finally, faced with a continuously
growing internal consumer demand that at the time seemed completely undiscriminating in its tastes,
throughout the 1950, 1960s, and early 1970s growers preferred varietals and vine guiding
techniques that increased grape volume regardless of whether they diluted flavors and aromas
(Table 2.2). They even irrigated their vineyards generously right before the harvest to increase the
weight and volume of the grapes, further watering down their flavor.2 0
Table 2.2
Share of Mendoza's vineyard Surface Area with High Yield/High Volume Orthogonal Trellis Systems
Mendoza Province Decade 1950s Decade 1960s Decade 1970s Decade 1980s Decade 1990s
Provincial Average 10% 15% 33% 43% 56%
Source: Based on data from INV, Mendoza
18 Quality is generally ascribed to grapes that are more likely to produce wines with persistence of aroma/bouquet, a
brilliance, clarity and depth in their color, and intensity, balance, and persistence of taste. All wine critics include
grapes such as Chardonnay, Sauvignon Blanc, and Riesling for white wines, and Cabernet Sauvignon, Merlot, and
Pinot Noir for red wines, in their short list of the best varietals. See, for example, Schuster (1989).
19 Higher yields are generally associated with poorer enological quality. Yields vary depending on the variety, but
especially in relation to the amount of water provided to the plant during the growing season. Well-watered
vineyards produce poor quality grapes because they dilute aromas, tannins, and colors, and enhance unwanted herbal
flavor due to vine robustness. For best results in fine wine making, quality vineyards are provided limited water,
especially when close to the harvest date.
20 For a general account of these and other shortcomings of the Argentine wine industry see Foster (1995).
A second part of the reason for the poor quality of Southern Cone wines lay in the poor
machinery used by the wineries themselves. On both sides of the Andes the equipment that
processed and fermented grapes was mostly of Argentine make, the local manufacture of which was
encouraged by ISI restrictions on the importation of capital goods.21 These machines were not
necessarily of poor construction; in fact many of them were well known for their robustness. But
therein lay their problem: they were purposely designed to process large volumes of grapes rather
than to attend to quality. For example, the push to favor volume over quality meant that at harvest
time grape pickers would make little effort to remove leaves and stems when they clipped the
grapes. Thus destemmers and grape presses were primarily designed for robustness and speed to
handle high volumes of these elements, rather than for quality. The result was that a large portion
of broken leaves, stems and crushed grape seeds made their way into the tanks and ended up
fermenting with the grape juice, passing on a distinctly herbal flavor to the wine. In contrast,
today's grapes are pressed with pneumatic bladders over several hours, thereby avoiding crushing
the seeds. As important, in the past not all the mechanical parts in contact with the grapes were
made of stainless steel as they are now, hence rust further contributed to the deterioration of wine
quality.
Perhaps the greatest damage to wine quality used to take place in both regions' storage
tanks, large containers made of wood or cement that paradoxically their owners saw as their pride
and glory. At the turn of the century wineries competed with each other to own the largest wooden
casks. Later during ISI, they outdid themselves to build the largest cement tanks. Among the
problems with these huge containers was the difficulty to clean them, hence allowing bacteria to
grow on their walls that later attacked the wine. In addition, given their size, wine sat in them for
months, oxidizing quickly and losing its color, flavor, and aroma. Finally, until 15 years ago none
of the two regions' wineries had any temperature control equipment, a piece of hardware that is now
widely accepted as essential, especially to process white wines.
The third and by far the most important reason for the low quality of Southern Cone wine
lay in the absence of continuous improvement practices. Not even cutting-edge technology on its
own could resolve this shortcoming. The point is simple: a bottle of wine with a retail value of $50
is made with roughly similar technology as one worth $5-7. A small part of the price differential
may be explained by better marketing, but the major portion is a result of learning to grow a
flavorful and aromatic grape and make a "complex" wine. 2 This requires a methodical mapping
of the grape's microbiological and biochemical behavior under different conditions of sun, water,
and foliage density, identification of those variables that best concentrate a grape's flavors and
aromas, knowledge of the particular yeasts and enzymes that elicit its best characteristics during
fermentation, and an understanding of the wine's behavior over time and when exposed to oak
barrels. A grape's behavior also differs significantly depending on the varietal from which it is
picked, on the microclimate in which it is grown, and the history of a particular growing season. All
these variables behave in predictable ways, but to identify them requires the implementation of
numerous systems to document and analyze them. More broadly, records need to be kept to make
explicit tacit knowledge from production experience, from trial and error experiments, from
information passed on by colleagues by word of mouth, from specialized magazines, or from
controlled experiments in the laboratory. Much of this knowledge can only be generated and
acquired locally. Without these systems in place, wine supply chains can learn very little from their
own and their competitors' successes and mistakes. In Chile and Mendoza, no table wine supply
chains had any of these systems in place.
Conditions were not that much better at the few niche wineries responsible for the remaining
percentage points of production, that of higher quality wines. Typically these were smaller
integrated wineries with a few well known brands, with at least some hectares of fine quality
vineyards, modest bottling facilities, and small, often personalized marketing and distribution
21 Until the mid-'60s Chilean wineries didn't even have basic equipment such as filters (Hernandez 1996: 11).
Bordeu (1995:90) notes that because of restrictions on technology imports during ISI, Chilean wineries had access
only to Argentine equipment of mediocre quality through the A.L.A.L.C. trade treaty.
22 This simple but critical point was brought to my attention by numerous enologists and machinery suppliers
during my interviews.
departments. But the rustic machinery available to the technicians and few university-trained
enologists that worked in these niche wineries severely limited their ability to control wine quality.
Although their knowledge of wine making techniques was superior and the grapes they used were
better than average, the wines quickly lost their best attributes as a result of the intense oxidization
they were subjected to when aged in large wood vats for months and years, also disqualifying them
for export. Despite continuously prodding their bosses to invest in new technology, professional
enologists at these integrated wineries were basically ignored. Winery owners were risk-averse
businessmen, partly due to macroeconomic turbulence associated with ISI, and partly because
steady demand for relatively cheap wine dissuaded them from making big changes.
In sum, by the early to mid-1980s, almost ten years into the new liberal regime in Chile and
towards the end of ISI in Argentina, the general technological conditions in the two countries were
similarly poor. On both sides of the Andes wineries had the same old processing and bottling
machinery, and storage facilities. At least as important as the lack of infrastructure, there was little
or no knowledge of how to make international quality wine. And there were no institutions nor
work practices that focused on quality improvement. Wineries focused almost exclusively on
undemanding domestic markets and only exported in years of surplus relatively small amounts.
Neither did they have the capabilities to begin to document systematically their own successes and
failures.
From the late '70s on, however, Chilean and Argentinean domestic consumption of cheap
table wine fell quickly (Figures 2.1, 2.2), competition from alternative beverages increased, and
wineries faced serious overproduction crises and price collapses (Figures 2.3, 2.4). As had
happened a decade earlier in the West European wine consuming countries, interest in fine wine
also rose so that some fine wine makers started paying attention to what their skilled enologists had
been recommending for some time. Seeking to adapt to the changing circumstances, they decided
to upgrade their technology to make more "modern" wines. Especially in Chile where domestic
demand for table wine was falling dramatically and the economy had liberalized since the mid-70s,
wineries felt pressured to revert plummeting sales with exports. Conversely, macroeconomic
instability in Argentina held back investments and delayed Mendoza wineries' interest in exports
until the 1990s. But despite the somewhat different time frames, the changes this initial batch of
wineries needed to introduce were somewhat similar in both countries, and were a radical break
from the past: they needed to make strong, deliberate efforts to overcome severe infrastructure
backwardness, lack of knowledge to reach a minimal export quality, and total absence of systems
capabilities.
Figure 2.1
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Figure 2.3
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Figure 2.4
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Restructuring and Evidence of Improvement
Following liberalization the wine industries in Chile and Mendoza restructured roughly
following the expected neoclassical economics model." In both regions these reforms induced a
more efficient allocation of resources and a better use of their comparative advantages in land and
labor. In the Chilean wine processing sector for which there is specific evidence, between 1975 and
' Tariffs and other import barriers were reduced (at least initially, down to 10 percent in Chile and an average of 12
percent in Argentina), factors of production were gradually deregulated, public firms were privatized, and state
spending was cut. See, for example, Corbo and Fischer (1994), and Hachette (1992) for Chile, and report by the
Ministry of the Economy (1993) for Argentina.
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1979 labor and inputs expanded (Table 2.3), capital was used more efficiently, and plant size grew.
So did the number of small firms in specialized markets. Output and wages also rose (Table 2.4)
as did exports (Figure 2.5). These changes were congruent with the evolution of Chilean
manufacturing in general, that experienced a rapid increase in total factor productivity. However,
improvement came about through a more efficient use of existing resources rather than because of
an upgrading of the capital stock.2 s When the economy went into a recession and wine
consumption dropped in the early 1980s output fell. Exports were especially hard hit because
wineries had not made the requisite changes in the production infrastructure to allow them to shift
their offerings to more demanding markets. The sector's recovery began slowly in 1986 with
accelerating increases in the capital stock in the 1990s, reflecting the significant commitment by the
industry to improve the productive technological base. Although for Mendoza there are no
comparable statistics, anecdotal evidence suggests similar processes at work.
Table 2.3
ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN FACTORS OF PRODUCTION;
CHILEAN WINE PROCESSING; 1975-1995
Period Output (Q) Inputs (M) Labor (L) Capital Stock (K)
1975-1979 34.4% 39.4% 12.8% 14.1%
1980-1981 -10.9% -12.8% -16.0% -5.1%
1982-1985 -4.5% -0.7% -3.4% 5.2%
1986-1992 15.8% 17.9% 3.4% 5.2%
1993-1995 -0.1% 2.9% 0.9% 18.8%
Source: Based on I.N.E. data.
Table 2.4
ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN OUTPUT/LABOR AND WAGES;
CHILEAN WINE PROCESSING; 1975-1995
Period Output/Labor Period Wage Rise
1975-1982 34.4% 1975-1981 21.4%
1983-1989 -10.9% 1982-1986 -7.4%
1990-1995 -4.5% 1986-1995 7.9%
1975-1995 15.8% 1975-1995 9.2%
1983-1995 -0.1% 1982-1995 2.5%
Source: Based on I.N.E. data.
24 These changes are all congruent with market theory. See Scherer (1980).
25 See Agacino and Rivas (1995).
The modesty of initial conditions in Southern Cone wine supply chains' production
infrastructure and knowledge in the early 1980s, makes the subsequent successes all the more
impressive. Wine industry supply chains have tended to specialize. Large growers with a
comparative advantage in high-yield, sugar-rich grapes, and vineyards that are easy to mechanize are
increasingly dedicated to the grape juice industry, looking for ways to further increase their yields
and sugar content. By the same token, many of those with smaller vineyards and grapes of better
enological value are now working closer with fine wine makers to learn ways to better concentrate
aromas and flavors. Among those doing well, some have integrated forward into their own
processing and marketing. In both countries, those with vineyards of poor enological quality that,
in addition, are not productive enough to sell to the grape juice industry, are having the greatest
difficulty to survive. Their problems are compounded if they don't have the capital to restructure,
as quite often is the case.
Macroeconomic stabilization, deregulation and economic opening have also allowed wine
supply chains to make the most of scale economies and weed out the less efficient. In the past,
scale was less important because many inefficiencies were masked due to inflation, interest group
pressures, administrative or regulatory actions (e.g., legislation, state subsidies, price setting
agreements), etc. Now small grape growers that do not have scale economies are facing
extraordinary difficulties remaining competitive. The same is true of small wineries and grape juice
processors that do not have the scale to survive on thin profit. Ownership in most market niches
has tended to concentrate. Similar to what happened with the wine industry across the world, in the
last fifteen years large foreign and domestic corporations bought up numerous Southern Cone
wineries to feed into their distribution chains. Starting in Chile in the mid 1980s and in Mendoza
towards the end of the decade, these corporations provided the much needed infusion of capital the
industry required.
Many wine supply chains launched themselves into exports of low-priced varietals and
gradually accumulated capital and skill to upgrade to higher quality market niches. First in Chile
and several years later in Mendoza, wine exports exploded. In the former country export sales
jumped from $10 million in the mid-1980s to $400 million in 1997 (Figure 2.5). Albeit starting at
a later date and with lower value per liter, Argentine exports also grew quickly, from $10 million in
the late 1980s to $116 million in 1996 (Figure 2.6).
Figure 2.5
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Figure 2.6
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As impressive is the fact that this growth occurred even as both countries' exchange rates
appreciated, reducing their competitiveness from 1990 on. During the 1990s Southern Cone wine
export growth far outpaced that of the rest of the world at a time when aggregate wine consumption
fell (Table 2.5). Wineries did not remain concentrated supplying the "easier" markets but instead
diversified, reaching far beyond less demanding Latin American consumers to more sophisticated
markets in North America and Europe (Table 2.6).
0 Exchange Rate
Table 2.5
CHILE'S AND ARGENTINA'S SHARE OF THE WORLD'S WINE EXPORT MARKET; 1976-1996
(Millions of Liters)
1976/8 1981/8 1986/9 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
0 5 0
(Avg.) (Avg.) (Avg.)
world Consumption 28,430 28,048 23,702 23,600 23,462 22,930 21,635 21,548 21,847 nd.
% Change -1.3% -15.5% -0.4% -0.6% -2.3% -5.6% -0.4% 1.4%
World Exports 4,655 4,945 4,394 4,441 4,371 4,455 5,003 5,441 5,406 n.d.
% Change 6.2% -11.1% 1.1% -1.6% 1.9% 12.3% 8.7% -0.6%
Chilean Exports 14 9 23 43 65 74 87 100 129 184
% Change -36.8% 151.4% 90.2% 52.1% 13.1% 17.0% 14.9% 19.6% 42.7%
% Share of World Exports 0.31% 0.18% 0.52% 0.97% 1.50% 1.66% 1.73% 1.83% 2.39%
Argentine Exports 36 18 22 44 28 23 25 22 222 134
% Change -48.8% 21.3% 101.5% -37.0% -19.4% 9.5% -10.1% 897.0% -39.5%
% Share of World Exports 0.76% 0.37% 0.50% 1.00% 0.64% 0.51% 0.49% 0.41% 4.10%*
Source: Based on data from Bulletin de L'O.I.V., S.A.G., and I.N.V.
* Sudden increase mostly reflects greater bulk table wine exports to Spain where wine production fell temporarily due to a drought.
Average Yearly Growth of World Consumption (1990-1995): -2.1%
Average Yearly Growth of World Exports (1990-1995): 4.6%
Average Yearly Growth of Chilean Exports (1990-1996): 28.2%
Average Yearly Growth of Argentine Exports (1990-1996): 133.4%
Table 2.6
DESTINATION MARKETS OF CHILE'S AND ARGENTINA'S WINE EXPORTS; 1978-1996
(% of Liters)
Destination Chilean Exports 1978 1980 1985 1990 1993 1995 1996
Latin America 75% 88% 70% 37% 23% 23% 15%
U.S.A. & Canada 7% 10% 27% 44% 42% 39% 43%
Europe 5% 2% 3% 17% 28% 31% 34%
Asia 12% 0% 0% 0% 2% 3% 3%
Other 0% 0% 0% 2% 5% 4% 5%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: Based on ChileVid, Asociaci6n de Exportadores y Embotelladores de Vino.
Destination Argentine 1978 1980 1985 1990 1993 1995 1996
Exports
Latin America 9% 61% 14% 21% 35% 10% 21%
U.S.A. & Canada 2% 12% 8% 13% 14% 1% 4%
Europe 25% 24% 66% 56% 31% 81% 50%
Asia 46% 3% 11% 9% 18% 2% 10%
Other 17% 0% 1% 1% 2% 5% 15%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: Based on I.N.V. export data.
Argentina's exports of grape juice concentrate also grew from less than ten thousand tons a
year in the early '80s to 114,000 tons in 1996 (Table 2.7) Liberalization increased the incentives to
produce a commodity that local markets were slow to demand but for which international markets
were paying handsomely. Since commercial opening in 1991, Eastern Mendoza's abundant supply
of cheap, high yield, high sugar content grapes, has allowed it to become the world's powerhouse of
grape juice concentrate production. The subregion is also specializing in exports of table wine,
increasingly supplying the neighboring country's domestic market. Chile's big integrated wineries
prefer to subcontract their table wine needs to Eastern Mendoza producers, and focus their
production capacities on fine varietals.
Table 2.7
EXPORTS OF GRAPE JUICE CONCENTRATE; ARGENTINA 1990-1996
Year Tons U$S
1990 62,016 35,277,900
1991 35,532 23,662,600
1992 38,777 41,253,100
1993 4,120 4,819,300
1994 11,118 9,998,000
1995 82,812 60,199,190
1996 113,796* n.d.
Source: Based on I.N.V. data
*Preliminary data.; "n.d." means no data available.
The Protagonists of the Restructuring
In the sections that follow I review how the restructuring process unfolded, and who was
involved in it. Starting in the mid 1980s, lead wineries in Chile and Mendoza took what I will call an
"international" high road: they acquired the wine making know-how to satisfy international tastes
by sending their enologists to train to Californian and French wineries and hired the best
international wine consultants to visit them in Chile and Mendoza; they invested heavily in world
class processing equipment, and they planted new vineyards with the finest international "fighting"
varietals--Chardonnay, Sauvignon Blanc, Merlot, and Cabernet Sauvignon--those that were widely
accepted by consumers in the major advanced country markets. Based on purchases of fine grapes
and base wines to local growers and on their expanding quality vineyards they launched varietal
wines in addition to the blends they had always made.
Upgrading Convergence in Chile
The timing and location of the first winery to make investments in modern wine processing
equipment was the result of a chance event rather than a studied strategy. Miguel Torres, an
established Spanish wine-maker met respected Chilean enologist Alejandro Parot in Montpellier,
France, in the late '70s, who initiated his curiosity in the Southern Cone country's productive
possibilities. Torres charged him with identifying a vineyard for purchase to start a "modern"
wine operation. Because Parot was from Curic6 in 1978 Torres ended up purchasing a 100 hectare
vineyard in that area. A year later he opened a processing plant that incorporated the first stainless
steel tanks, temperature controls, and refrigeration equipments ever seen in Chile. For Torres, the
business risk was smaller than it seemed for outside observers; the presses, bottling lines, and
refrigeration unit came out of his Spanish wineries, equipment that had fully depreciated and was
due for replacement. In the Chilean wine world it created a sensation, but mostly in the form of
skepticism rather than admiration. Wineries saw no reason to change what they were doing; at that
time winegrape vineyards totaled 103,000 hectares, with 17,500 of fine varietals. The worst wine
overproduction crisis in Chilean history had yet to strike; consumption remained relatively stable at
48 liters per capita through the 1970s, and there was no competition from imports.
A year later conditions deteriorated quickly as the grape supply increased and domestic
demand fell. Even undemanding exports to Latin America collapsed as several countries went into a
recession with balance of payments problems in the early '80s; these exports could not be
redirected to U.S. and West European markets because they did not have sufficient quality to meet
more demanding consumer expectations. From 1980 through 1983 wine prices collapsed to under
0 10/liter and never fully recovered until the late 1980s. Sales were dramatically reduced and profits
turned negative when wine prices couldn't even cover marginal costs. Small firms were the worst
hit (Table 2.8); small integrated fine wine makers closed down or changed hands, many of them
purchased for their labels by the large integrated wineries that had dominated the sector throughout
the 1970s. For example, Viia San Pedro purchased Vifia Santa Helena; Vifia Concha y Toro
bought Viia Tocornal; Viia Santa Rita took over Vifia Carmen; and Viia Santa Carolina acquired
Vinia Ochagavi(a. Others dumped wine on the black market to avoid heavy alcohol taxation, unfairly
competing against wineries that paid the full tax burden. Among those hurt most were a dozen
cooperatives.2 Poor management and the difficult competitive conditions led to heavy losses
during the 1980s.2 7 One by one they were sold off; in 1997 only three cooperatives were still open
and they operated more like private firms than cooperatives. Most of the wine traders located in the
Vicufia Mackenna area of Santiago that bought bulk wine, and bottled and distributed it to retailers,
also went out of business. They were overwhelmed by the superior marketing and business
management techniques of the large integrated wineries.
Table 2.8
NUMBER OF WINERIES, EMPLOYEES, AND AVERAGE FIRM SIZE; CHILE 1975-1995
CHILE Number of Firms Employees Firm Size
Year Small Medium+ Total Small Medium+ Total Small Medium+ Total
1975 20 35 55 437 3,359 3,796 22 96 69
1979 102 36 138 1,931 3,960 5,891 19 110 43
*Census '79 235 36 271 2,345 3,960 6,305 10 110 23
1985 43 23 66 866 2,733 3,599 20 119 55
1990 26 20 46 578 3,312 3,890 22 166 85
1995 22 21 43 503 4,073 4,576 23 194 106
Sources: I.N.E. Annual Manufacturing Survey of firms with more than 10 employees. Small firms are those with 10-49 employees;
medium+ firms are medium and large enterprises with 50+ employees.
*The 1979 survey was broader: the "Small firm" category includes microenterprises with 5-9 employees.
By 1985 the wine industry had changed considerably from the late '70s: close to 40,000
hectares of grapevines were eradicated or switched to export table grapes, and wine production had
become concentrated in a handful of the same large integrated wineries--principally, Concha y Toro,
Santa Rita, San Pedro, and Santa Carolina. They became the leaders of the turnaround, the only
ones with the capital to absorb substantial losses but ride out the crisis, and to make the requisite
investments in processing equipment to redirect production from domestic table wine to export-
quality varietals. These wineries were controlled by a local elite of families and domestic business
groups with deep financial pockets from other business activities. They borrowed extensively using
their assets as collateral. The largest five or six wineries also raised capital through the stock
market by going public. Many large firms also benefited from access to cheaper lines of credit than
26 Based on Barria, Cereceda, and Echeverrfa (1991) and own research.
" CORFO (February 1986).
the rest of the firms in the economy. 28 The upside of this concentration was that in just a few years
most of Chile's wine industry was on the restructuring path, with exports of fine varietals jumping
from a few percentage points to over 50% in 1997.
The integrated wineries were also helped by the fact that at the time of the crisis, the industry
already had 15,000 hectares of the most prized varietals--Chardonnay, Sauvignon Blanc, Cabernet
Sauvignon, and Merlot (Table 2.9). Thus they did not need to wait for the basic raw inputs required
to produce the wines international consumers preferred. In fact, they continued to make
investments in fine varietal vineyards at a staggering rate. Between 1985 and early 1996 total
vineyard surface of the finest varieties more than doubled to 28,000 hectares, grew to 37,000
hectares by the end of 1997, and based on planting programs in progress was expected to expand a
further 7,000 hectares during 1998 (IWA 1998). Most of these new vineyards were put in by the
largest firms. The primary sector investments alone total more than a half billion dollars. In turn,
stainless steel storage and processing capacity rose from literally zero to over 130 million liters by
1998 (total stainless steel storage could be between 160-200 million liters when all are counted)
(Table 2.10).
Table 2.9
SURFACE AREA WITH VITIS VINIFERA CULTIVARS CLASSIFIED BY QUALITY; CHILE 1978-1996
(Hectares)
1978 1985 1992 1996
Major Grapes of High Enological Quality* 17,484 14,720 24,027 27,670
Other Grapes of Medium & Low Enological Quality 28,769 13,704 12,978 7,099
Major Grapes of Low Enological QualityA 56,781 38,715 21,825 21235
Total Grapes for wine Making 103,034 67,139 58,830 56,004
Proportion of High Quality Grapes 17.0% 21.9% 40.8% 494%
Proportion of Medium and Low Quality Grapes 83.0% 78.1% 59.2% 50.6%
Source: Based on S.A.G. data.
*Includes Chardonnay, Riesling, Sauvignon Blanc, as white grapes, and Cabernet Sauvignon, Cabernet Franc, Merlot, Pinot Noir, and
Syrah as red grapes.
AIncludes Moscatel de Alejandria and Pafs grapes
28 See Agacino and Rivas, op. cit; Galvez and Tybout (1985).
Table 2.10
TOTAL STORAGE, STAINLESS STEEL, OAK, VINEYARDS, & PRODUCTION OF PRINCIPAL WINERIES; CHILE 1998*
Winery Type FirmA Storage Stainless Steel Oak Barrel Fine Grapes Exports Domestic.
(Mill. Liters) (Mill. Liters) (Mill. Liters) (Hectares)l (Mill. (Mill.
Liters) Liters)
Concha y Toro PublJFam. 91.2 22.8 3.0 2,800 36.1 54.6
Santa Rita PublJDBG 45.4 8.7 2.6 1,800 6.5 32.3
Santa Emiliana PublJFam. 18.4 1.8 n.d. 1,330 9.9 8.5
San Pedro PublJDBG 35.5 16.5 1.0 1,300 11.6 24.6
Santa Carolina PublJDBG 25.0 4.5 0.7 600 17.9 15.5
Carta Vieja Priv. Dom. 6.0 0.5 yes 550 103
Lomas Cauquenes Coop. 20.0 0.0 0.0 550 03 3.5
Undurraga PublJFam. 14.0 0.8 n.d. 540 5.8 6.0
CAnepa Priv. Dom. 11.0 6.5 1.2 500 5.1
Tarapacd Joint Vent. 4.0 3.0 n.d. 500 2.1 1.9
Gracia DBG 6.2 6.0 0.2 500 0.6 4.4
La Rosa Fam. 3.2 7.0 n.d. 470 1.7 1.5
Bisquertt Fam. 5.0 n.d. n.d. 450 3.0 n.d.
Carmen DBG 7.9 5.5 0.5 400 2.2 3.4
Itata/Fund. Chile Non. Prof. 1.0 0.9 0.1 350 n.d. n.d.
Casa Lapostolle Joint Vent. 3.2 2.0 0.3 350 0.8 1.0
Caliterra Joint. Vent. n.a. n.a. n.a. 340 4.6 n.d.
Casablanca DBG n.a. n.a. n.a. 340 0.9 n.d.
J. Bouchon Ex-Bulk 2.2 1.6 yes 330 1.1 n.d.
Errazuriz Fam. 2.3 1.0 0.3 320 2.5 n.d.
Santa Inds Fam. 6.8 2.5 1.1 300 3.5 n.d.
Cono Sur FamJDBG 4.6 2.0 n.d. 300 n.d. n.d.
Los Vascos Joint Vent. 3.7 1.5 0.5 300 23 n.d.
Santa Ema Family 3.0 1.0 0.4 300 2.0 n.d.
Cousiio Macul DBG/Fam. 2.0 1.5 0.5 300 13 0.7
Veramonte FDI 3.0 2.5 0.4 300 2.0 n.d.
Macaya Ex-Bulk 4.4 n.d. n.d. 300 n.d. n.d.
Henriquez Ex-Bulk 3.0 n.d. n.d. 300 n.d. n.d.
Los Robles Coop. 19.0 03 0.1 300 1.8 4.2
Viu Manent/S. CIs. Ex-Bulk 3.5 1.2 n.d. 250 0.6 0.4
Chateau Los Boldos FDI 2.0 1.0 0.5 250 0.7 0.6
Miguel Torres FDI 2.2 1.0 0.2 225 1.0 n.d.
L.F. Edwards Fam. 3.0 1.2 0.9 210 03 n.d.
Discover Priv. Dom. 3.0 2.0 0.4 200 1.9 n.d.
Mont Gras Priv. Dom. 5.1 4.8 0.3 200 1.7 2.3
Manquehue DBG 4.0 n.d. n.d. 200 0.0 n.d.
Astaburuaga Ex-Bulk 1.8 n.d. n.d. 200 n.d. n.d.
La Fortuna Fam JDBG 4.4 0.1 0.1 185 03 0.6
Coop. Loncomilla Coop. 14.6 0.0 0.0 160 n.d. 10.0
Torre6n de Paredes FamJDBG 2.0 1.0 n.d. 150 13 n.d.
Portal del Alto Enol. Dom. n.d. n.d. n.d. 150 03 0.3
Morand6 Enol. Dom. 7.4 6.0 n.d. 150 3.0 n.d.
Domaine Oriental FDI 1.8 1.0 0.1 130 1.4 n.d.
Villard Fine Wines Joint Vent. 0.9 0.6 0.3 120 03 n.d.
Terranoble FDI 1.0 0.6 n.d. 120 1.0 n.d.
Segd 0116 Priv. Dom. 4.0 0.1 yes 110 0.6 1.4
Anakena/Porta Joint Vent. 0.6 n.d. 0.2 100 0.4 0.2
Cremaschi-Barriga Fam. 1.5 0.5 yes 100 n.d. 0.3
Balduzzi Fam. 1.0 03 0.1 100 0.1 0.5
San Gerardo Priv. Dom. 0.8 0.2 n.d. 100 n.d. n.d.
La Posada Priv. Dom. 0.8 03 n.d. 100 n.d. n.d.
Santa M6nica Enol. Dom. 5.2 n.d. n.d. 90 2.1 n.d.
de Larose/C. Toqui Joint Vent. 1.1 1.0 0.1 90 0.1 0.6
Tabontinaja Priv. Dom. n.d. n.d. n.d. 70 n.d. n.d.
Valdivieso DBG 8.0 5.0 0.9 70 1.5 n.d.
Echeverria Ex-Bulk 1.3 n.d. n.d. 70 0.5 0.3
William Fevre Joint Vent. 0.5 0.1 n.d. 70 0.1 n.d.
Francisco Aguirre Coop. 3.4 3.2 0.2 60 n.d. 0.6
San Miguel Huique Priv. Dom. 0.8 0.2 n.d. 55 n.d. n.d.
Santa Laura Fam. n.d. n.d. n.d. 50 n.d. n.d.
Dofia Javiera n.d. 0.8 yes 50 n.d. 0.7
Dom6nico Correa Ex-Bulk n.d. n.d. n.d. 50 n.d. n.d.
Rothschild Joint Vent. 0.5 n.d. n.d. 44 03 n.d.
Quebrada Macul Enol. Dom. n.d. n.d. n.d. 15 n.d. n.d.
Ravanal Priv. Dom. 1.5 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
Vifiedos del Sur Priv. Dom. 0.2 0.1 n.d. 15 n.d. 0.1
Valle del Itata Non-Prof. n.d. 1.5 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
Calina FDI 0.4 n.d. n.d. 0 0.1 n.d.
Viiedos del Maule Private n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
Total 433.9 133.5 17.2 21,179 155.5 164.9
Source: There are no official statistics. Table assembled from various data sources including Mathass (1997), Gufa de Vinos de Chile,
ProChile, individual firm reports filed with the Bolsa de Comercio, and own interviews.
*Data reflect firms' status sometime between 1996 and 1998; export data are for 1996.
^Publ.: publicly-traded winery; FDI: foreign direct investment; DBG: domestic business group; Ex-Bulk: ex-bulk wine producer; Enol. Dom.:
Chilean enologist; Priv. Dom.: private domestic firm.; Fam.: family firm; Non-Prof.: non-profit; Coop.: cooperative.
I The vast majority of the vineyard surface area consists of four varietals--Chardonnay, Sauvignon Blanc, Cabernet Sauvignon, and Merlot,
with minority participation of Riesling, Cabernet Franc, Pinot Noir, and Syrah.
Table 2.11
WINERY RESTRUCTURING, CLASSIFIED BY YEAR, OWNERSHIP, AND SIZE; CHILE 1979-1997*
Year 1979/80 1981/82 1983/84 1985/86 1987/88 1989/90 1991/92 1993/94 1995/96 1997/98
Hectares of
Own Vineyards
Aquitania Fco. Aguirre Calina Morand6 Viiedos del Sur
Dom. Oriental William Fevre Sn. Ger6nimo
Echeverria Santa Laura La Ronciere Valle del Itata
Santa M6nica Valdivieso San Gerardo Dofia Javiera
Villard Wines Porta/Anakena Santa Alicia Casa Silva Quebrada Macul
100-200 hect. Tabontinaja Cremaschi-B. San Miguel Santa Eugenia Viia Rothschild
Torre6n Portal del Alto Millahue La Posada Camino Real
Balduzzi Domen. Correa
Terranoble de Larose Porta
Segd 0116 San Pablo
M. Torres Discover Wine Los Boldos Manquehue Mont Gras Loncomilla
Astaburuaga L. Edwards
J. Bouchon Santa Ema Veramonte
Cousiio Macul Los Vascos Viu Manent Ravanal
200-500 hect. Errdzuriz Caliterra Macaya Cono Sur
Santa In6s
Itata Lapostolle Henriquez
Carmen Casablanca
Lomas Cauqenes Bisquertt
La Rosa Gracia
Cinepa Undurraga Carta Vieja
500-1,000 hect. Santa Carolina Tarapaci
Los Robles
Santa Rita
1,000-2,000 hect. San Pedro
Sta. Emiliana
Concha y Toro Vifiedos del
2,000+ hectares Maule
Source: Based on Mathass 1997, Gufa de Vinos de Chile 1997, Bolsa de Comercio, and own interviews.
*List contains principal wineries that restructured but may not be 100% complete. Position of wineries is organized according to the earliest date they started upgrading either in production
processes, vineyards, or world class stainless steel equipment. Most wineries started with improvements in production processes, and later improved vineyards.
Borrowed wine making know-how was initially purchased through international consultants
and by training domestic technicians abroad. More capital and knowledge came in the late '80s on,
in the form of foreign direct investment and joint ventures, especially from France and California.
The Publicly Traded Large Wineries
Vifia Concha y Toro was the first domestic winery to anticipate the times for change.
Established by the local nobility in the nineteenth century but a publicly traded firm since the 1960s,
the winery was lucky enough to have been intervened during Allende's presidency by an able
administrator who kept it reasonably productive and with relatively low debt ratios. By 1980 when
the local wine market collapsed Concha y Toro already owned 900 hectares of vineyards, and was
in the process of grafting them and planting 270 new ones with the finest varietals. It already
exported wine, if mostly to less demanding Latin American markets. That same year it started an
aggressive marketing campaign that included full page advertisements in the New York Times and
made its first sales to England. Exports consisted of nothing more than cheap varietals that the
company processed with same old technology, but now bottled quickly to avoid the loss of color
and flavor from oxidization in large vats. It was in 1981 that the firm made its first serious
investments in a small number of stainless steel tanks and refrigeration equipment to control
fermentation of white wines. More stainless steel capacity and machinery such as pneumatic
presses came in 1986/1987, once the worst years of the wine industry recession were ending. In
1994 it raised $53 million on the New York Stock Exchange to finance investments, and by 1997 it
had built up more than 2,800 hectares of fine vineyards and 23 million liters of stainless steel
storage capacity. In 1998 it was poised to displace an Italian competitor as the top volume importer
to the United States.
Vifia Cousiio Macul and Vifia Santa Rita followed soon after. The former, an established
family firm with 300 hectares of high quality vineyards and business interests in many other
sectors, incorporated stainless steel tanks to process its white varietals, but paradoxically retained
many of the same wine processing techniques. The latter was the second largest Chilean winery,
and was acquired in 1980 by a businessman with investments in several other manufacturing
activities. It had no vineyards and depended on grape purchases from local growers, but had an
important share of the local table wine market. The winery initiated a large scale export project by
introducing the first pneumatic press to Chile for the 1984/1985 harvest; it followed with a second
one a year later. Santa Rita also led the pack with the industrial-scale introduction of small 225-liter
oak barrels for aging. A year later two other domestic business group-owned wineries--Viia San
Pedro and Vifia Santa Carolina--purchased modest amounts of stainless steel storage capacity in
1985 and began small experiments with temperature-controlled fermentations. Because of shortage
of funds they postponed larger scale investments till the early 1990s. The exceptional innovative
family winery was Vifia Cdnepa, whose owner had the deep pockets to purchase modern wine
making equipment, if in a somewhat disorganized way. He traveled to Italy in 1982 and returned
with a container full of machinery, including the latest stainless steel tanks and refrigeration units,
but including outdated continuous presses rather than the more gentle pneumatic versions.
Ironically, similar to Cousiiio Macul the winery continued with the same vinification processes it
had always used--its knowledge on how to make full use of the new technology still modest. In
sum, while Torres and Cdnepa provided initial demonstration effects, most of the charge to acquire
new technology in large scale was led by domestic business groups, most of them publicly traded.
Even as the largest wineries continued their investments in new technology and led an
export recovery from 1985 on, they were also the source of a series of spin-offs and joint ventures
(Table 2.12). For example, in 1986 Concha y Toro spun off one of its labels--Vifia Santa
Emiliana--as a publicly traded independent winery with over 600 hectares of vineyards, owned by
the same holding. A year later Vifia San Pedro's enologist and export manager resigned from the
firm to team up with two other associates and create Discover Wine, dedicated exclusively to
exports. In 1989 Villard Fine Wines emerged as a joint venture between a French supplier of oak
barrels (and grape grower) in Chile with one of Concha y Toro's best enologists and Santa
Emiliana. The latter not only provided part of the initial capital, but also shared its processing and
storage facilities until the start-up winery finished building its own processing plant in 1997. In
1991 a member of the family controlling Concha y Toro started out another winery, Cono Sur, run
independently and with a completely different marketing strategy but within the family holding. In
1992 Santa Rita came out with its own spin-off, Vifia Carmen, dedicated entirely to fine wines for
export and for the domestic market. A year later Vifia Santa Carolina created a new firm, Vifia
Casablanca, run independently by its best white wine enologist, and sharing one of its processing
plants. In the early 1990s the same Concha y Toro enologist who had participated in Villard
started his independent winery in association with other investors. They rented processing and
storage space from various other wineries in Chile and Mendoza until they finished building their
own facility in 1995. In 1992 one of the two large cooperatives that produce pisco, a grape juice
distillate, built a separate winery, Vifia Francisco de Aguirre.
Table 2.12
STORAGE CAPACITY OF LARGEST WINERIES AND SPIN-OFFS:
TOTAL, STAINLESS STEEL, OAK BARRELS ; VINEYARDS; CHILE 1997
Largest Wineries Total Storage Stainless Steel Oak Barrel Surface Area
Capacity Storage Capacity Storage Capacity Fine varietals
(Million Liters) (Million Liters) (Million Liters) (Hectares)
Viia Concha y Toro 91.2 22.8 3.0 2,800
Vifia Santa Rita 45.4 8.7 2.6 1,800
Vifia San Pedro 35.5 16.5 1.0 1,300
Viia Santa Carolina 25.0 4.5 0.7 600
Vifna Cnepa 11.0 6.5 1.2 500
Subtotal 208.1 59.0 8.3 7,000
Spin-off Wineries Total Storage Stainless Steel Oak Barrel Surface Area
Capacity Storage Capacity Storage Capacity Fine varietals
(Million Liters) (Million Liters) (Million Liters ) (Hectares)
Vifia Santa Emiliana 18.4 1.8 n.d. 1,330
Vifia Cono Sur 4.6 2.0 n.d. 300
Viia Discover 3.0 2.0 0.4 200
Vifia Carmen 7.9 5.5 0.5 400
Subtotal 33.7 11.3 0.9 2,230
Total Largest Wineries 241.8 703 9.2 9,230
& Spin-offs
Total Industry (approx.) 650 160 20.0 30,000
Share Largest 37% 44% 46% 31%
Wineries & Spin-offs
Source: Based on Table 2.8
The Next Round of Dynamic Actors: Joint Ventures and FDI
In the mid to late 1980s the first export-oriented foreign investment projects and joint
ventures made themselves visible (Tables 2.11 and 2.13). All were medium- to small-size projects
with their own vineyards to control grape quality and very well established export-marketing chains;
at least initially, not a case remained in Chile. Caliterra was the first partnership between an
established California winery, Franciscan Vineyards, and the Chadwick family, owner of another
well known local vineyard. The partnership was dissolved in 1992 but another one re-established
with Robert Mondavi three years later. (Franciscan Vineyards went on to set up its own
independent winery, Veramonte, in 1995. Viia Los Vascos was the first of a set of international
partnerships between French winemakers and Chilean landowners. In 1988 Vifia Los Vascos
brought together the Eyzaguirre family's 300 hectares of fine varietal vineyards with famous
French winemaker Rothschild who contributed the capital for a processing plant and the
winemaking know-how. In 1991 William Fevre, a producer from the French Chablis region, did
the same with Victor Pino who supplied 70 hectares for Vifia William Fevre. Casa Lapostolle
followed in 1992, a product of Grand Marnier and the Rabat family that set aside 350 hectares of its
best vineyards. In 1994 a Bordeaux-based winery, Larose-Trintaudon, teamed up with the Granella
family who supplied 90 hectares of vineyards to form de Larose/Casas del Toqui. A slightly
different arrangement was Vifia Aquitania set up in 1990 as a joint venture between two well-known
Bordeaux winemakers from Cos d'Estournel and Chateau Margaux and a Chilean enologist:
together they bought 25 hectares of land and set up vineyards and a small winery. The most
prominent recent partnership was established in 1997 between Concha y Toro and Bordeaux's
Mouton-Rothschild to jointly produce a grand cru wine.
Table 2.13
WINERIES THAT RESTRUCTURED CLASSIFIED BY YEAR INITIATED AND BY OWNERSHIP; CHILE 1979-1997
Total '79/'80 '81/'82 '83/'84 '85/'86 '87/'88 '89/'90 '91/'92 '93/'94 '95/'96 '97/'98
FDI 16 1 - - - 1 5 5 1 1 1
Wholly Owned 1 2 1 1 1
Joint Ventures 1 3 4 1
Domestic 63 - 3 1 2 5 3 14 21 8 6
Private 1 4 4 2
Public/DBG 1 1 2 1 1 2
DBG 1 2 3 1 1
Family 1 2 7 1 1
Enologist 2 1 1 1 1 1
Ex-Bulk 1 4 4 1
Non-Profit 1
Coop. 2 1
TOTAL 79 1 3 1 2 6 8 19 22 9 7
Source: See Table 2.8
The first entirely foreign-owned winery was the 1989 purchase by four French investors of
Domaine Oriental with 110 hectares and their modernization of its processing plant and storage
facilities. Chateau Los Boldos with 250 hectares followed the next year, purchased by French
company Massenez, a holding from the Alsace region. Viniedos Terranoble was started in 1992
with five other partners, 120 hectares of vineyards brought from France, and a new winery.
Kendall-Jackson established as a first step a winery--a processing plant--in 1993, and relied on
selected growers for grapes.
Rising with the Tide: Local Family Wineries, Bulk Producers, Enologists, Entrepreneurs
As the price of fine varietal grapes and wines recovered in the late 1980s the list of new
entrants to the industry grew and diversified (Tables 2.11 and 2.13). Several family-controlled
integrated wineries followed Cdnepa's early footsteps: Vifia Santa Monica, a small winery
purchased by a Chilean enologist in the mid-'70s made modest technology investments and began
to experiment with international-style winemaking techniques. The Paredes family that had made
its money in the metallurgical sector and had purchased a winery in 1979 did the same. Most
started with modest investments in stainless steel technology and expanded gradually.
Growers who had previously sold their grapes and wines in bulk to the big four wineries
also found themselves with enough income to attempt independence. Tempted by the low interest
rates offered by European machinery manufacturers, they bought new processing machinery and
integrated forward into bottling and exports. JA. Bouchon was the first to follow this path in 1990.
In subsequent years Vifias Porta/Anakena, Echeverria, Astaburuaga, Cremaschi-Barriga, and
others followed suit.
By the mid 1990s the list of firms starting up projects continued to broaden: the domestic
business group Corpora that had never participated in the wine sector before set aside land from its
other agroindustrial operations and put up vineyards and a winery, Vifia Gracia. Several local
enologists with significant technical and commercial experience started up their own independent
projects in addition to the numerous joint ventures in which they already participated. Renowned
wine expert, university professor, and later president of the Paris-based Organisation Internationale
du Vin (O.I.V.), Alejandro Hernandez, was one of the first with his winery Portal del Alto. Others
followed such as Casablanca Valley pioneer Pablo Morand6 with Viha Morandi , and
Chardonnay/Sauvignon Blanc expert Ignacio Recabarren with Quebrada de Macul.
In sum, despite the increasing concentration of the industry in very few hands in the early
1980s, from the end of the decade on the population of firms diversified noticeably. Given that less
than a third of them are FDI and domestic business group (DBG) projects that often start with
significant capital and access to borrowed know-how, a rising number of medium and small
"boutique" wineries employing less than fifty people rose by the bootstraps. They assembled the
finance to purchase the machinery, mastered the quality-enhancing wine making techniques, found
the export markets, and quickly scaled up to cover the minimum $100,000 costs of the smallest
export marketing department. Quality improved significantly, beyond the export of cheap fighting
varietals. This is visible in the increased number of firms that exported quality DOC wines between
1993 and 1996 (Table 2.14).
Table 2.14
NUMBER OF WINERIES THAT EXPORTED HIGH VALUE ADDED (DOC*) BOTTLED WINE; CHILE 1993-1996
FOB Bottled Wine Export Sales 1993 1994 1995 1996
$10,000,000+ 2 2 3 5$1,000,000-$10,000,000 13 13 17 28$500,000-$1,000,000 4 6 11 10
$150,000-$500,000 16 18 16 11
$60,000-$150,000 8 5 5 6
$30,000-$60,000 7 6 6 7
$5,000-$30,000 17 20 16 14
$1,000-$5,000 14 15 17 14
Total Number of Exporting Wineries 81 85 91 95
% Change 4.9% 7.1% 4.4%
Total Bottled DOC Wine Exports $82,468,500 $91,440,500 $123,585,100 $187,280,600
% Change 10.9% 35.2% 51.5%
Average Exports per Winery $1,018,100 $1,075,800 $1,358,100 $1,971,400
% Change 5.7% 26.2% 45.2%
Biggest Exporters' Average Market ShareA 17.0% 15.4% 12.4% 9.0%
% Change -9.3% -19.5% -27.3%
Source: Based on ProChile data
* In Chile DOC refers to wines made out of specific grapes originating from established geographic areas. These typically retail for no less
than $6 in U.S. stores.
AIncludes wineries with $10 million+ in exports
Average Yearly Growth of Firm Participation: 5.5%
Average Yearly Growth of Total DOC Exports: 32.5%
Average Yearly Growth of Exports per Firm: 25.7%
Average Yearly Drop in Dominance of Largest Exporters: -18.7%
Mendoza's Heterogeneous Restructuring Paths
The Mendozan wine industry's restructuring shows some similarities to Chile's and also
some stark differences. As for the similarities, a group of firms is taking the same "international"
restructuring path, based on the four or five most prized varietals, purchases of world class stainless
steel technology and small oak barrels, and borrowed know-how obtained through the same
international consultants. As in Chile, the industry is also seeing its good share of FDI and joint
ventures that want to take advantage of the relatively low land costs of the province's best locations
for fine grape growing. As for the differences, Mendoza's wine industry has taken at least two
restructuring roads (or even three), depending on how one characterizes them. Considering the
value added per liter that each supply chain generates, those on the "higher road" are the
participants in the "international-style" fine wine restructuring push; those on the "lower road"
are wine supply chains competing in intermediate quality wines, table wines, and in grape juice
processing. By contrast, as was shown in the preceding section, most of the Chilean wine industry
is focusing on export-quality fine wine production; local production of intermediate and table wine,
and grape juice production are comparatively smaller in Chile.
The reasons for Mendoza's peculiar split are several, especially related on the demand side
to the strength of domestic demand for table wine. As important are supply side factors: the
Argentine province has relatively few hectares of the finest varietals and conversely, thousands of
hectares of high-yield intermediate and low quality grapes with high sugar content that grow well in
the hotter eastern provincial plains (Table 2.15). Varietals like Cereza and Criolla Grande have
high sugar levels that are excellent for grape juice concentrate, used in beverages as a natural
sweetener. In addition, processed with the right technology--hyperoxigenation (to quickly remove
solids before fermentation), proper storage (in epoxy-protected tanks to avoid bacterial growth), and
with temperature control (to preserve aromas)--they make good table wines at very competitive
prices. Their enological quality and color can also be improved by blending them with intermediate
quality varietals. As a result, a small but growing number of Mendoza wine supply chains are
currently specializing in the production and export of concentrated grape juice, intermediate quality
wine, and table wine.
Table 2.15
SURFACE AREA WITH VITIS VINIFERA CULTIVARS CLASSIFIED BY QUALITY; MENDOZA 1978-1996
(Hectares)
1978 1985 1992 1996
Major Grapes of High Enological Quality* 9,035 8,474 5,035 8,176
Other Grapes of Medium & Low Enological Quality 136,793 99,201 68,482 67,586
Major Grapes of Low Enological QualityA 107,100 100,400 71,700 68,100
Total Grapes for Wine Making 252,928 208,075 145,217 143,762
Proportion of High Quality Grapes 3.6% 4.1% 3.5% 5.7%
Proportion of Medium and Low Quality Grapes 96.4% 95.9% 96.5% 94.3%
Source: Based on I.N.V. data.
*Includes Chardonnay, Riesling, Sauvignon Blanc, as white grapes, and Cabernet Sauvignon, Cabernet Franc, Merlot, Pinot Noir, and Syrah
as red grapes.
AIncludes Criolla Grande and Cereza grapes.
The "High Road" of International-Style Restructuring
Mendoza's international restructuring hasn't yet achieved the breadth and depth of Chile's
for a number of reasons. An elite of no more than 50-60 wineries has replicated the international
upgrading style of the leading Chilean firms, but has been far more conservative than its neighbors
in the scale of new vineyard and processing plant investments. Since 1992 this group added
roughly 5,000 new hectares of vineyards and 40 million liters of stainless steel storage capacity.
The reasons are several. On the demand side, domestic consumption of table wine did not
plummet as it did in Chile, thus the urgency to adapt to international tastes was not there (Figures
2.1 and 2.2). Argentine per capita table wine consumption in the early 1980s was almost twice as
high as Chile's, and is currently three times greater. Domestic fine wine consumption started to
grow from the early 1980s on, but the wine-making techniques did not change significantly because
most consumers still enjoyed oxidized wines. It was only in the early 1990s that consumers began
to switch to more aromatic, fresh wines. In fact, the international-style modernization that began in
earnest in the early 1990s initially targeted domestic consumers of fine wine, not the export market.
Proof is that as recently as 1996 total fine wine exports still represented only 3 percent of
Mendoza's total wine output, whereas the domestic fine wine market had grown from a few
percentage points in the 1980s to 35 percent of total sales.
On the supply side, there was a significant delay in incorporating stainless steel technology
that leading wineries in California and France had been using since the 1970s. Argentina opened
up to international technology influences five or ten years after Chile, depending on which variables
one measures. During the 1980s the domestic economy remained closed and continued to
experience strong inflation, so that the import and export incentives and uncertainties faced by local
wine supply chains were quite different to those in Chile.
Another factor explaining the modest breadth and depth of the international-style
restructuring is that the provincial wine industry did not shake itself out and concentrate as quickly
in a few well-heeled firms as it did in Chile when it began to downsize in the early 1980s. Even
though wine prices collapsed first in Mendoza (in 1979) before they did in Chile (in 1980), by
1985 the Argentine province still had most of its wineries and vineyards intact (Tables 2.15 and
2.16), and the industry didn't seriously restructure until 1990. A number of public policies delayed
the shake-out (see Chapter 3). (By contrast, between 1979 and 1985 Chile's wine industry lost 52
percent of its wineries and 35 percent of its vineyards.)
Year
1958
1964
1973A
1985
1993
Sources: I.N
large firms e
*The 1973 s
Table 2.16
NUMBER OF WINERIES, EMPLOYEES, AND AVERAGE FIRM SIZE; MENDOZA 1958-1993
Number of Firms Employees Firm Size
Micro Other Total Micro Other Total Micro Other Total
868
968 10,879 11
683 367 1,050 1789 7,419 9,208 3 20 9
969 10,824 11
451 7,361 16
.D.E.C. Censo Manufacturero. Microenterprises consist of firms with 1-5 employees; Other firms include small, medium, and
mploying 6 or more employees.
urvey was broader.
Yet another difference between Mendoza's and Chile's wineries and growers is that the
former did not have the financing available to some of their neighbors. For one, the province
proportionately had far fewer large integrated wineries associated to domestic business groups
(DBGs) than did Chile, with the ability to pull capital out of other activities and finance the new
technology investments. For example, to this day Mendoza still does not have a single publicly-
held winery. The closest equivalent to Chile's largest viiias are a few family-held DBGs like
Pefiaflor, Catena, and Cartellone, but only the first two seriously committed themselves to upgrade
their wines to international quality (Tables 2.17 and 2.18). During the 1980s other wineries such as
IMPSA's Lagarde and Los Andes's Martelin received little support from their DBG owners to
finance a technological conversion. Only in the 1990s did they begin to make upgrades. Catena is
the only DBG that has purchased family wineries in the 1990s and begun to modernize them.
Most of the majority of wineries and growers were family-owned businesses with winemaking as
their principal economic activity, with few alternatives from where to draw capital. After a decade-
long recession it was difficult for them to bootstrap themselves out of their condition.
Table 2.17
MENDOZA WINERY RESTRUCTURING, CLASSIFIED BY YEAR, OWNERSHIP, AND SIZE; 1979.1997*
Year 1979/80
Hectar. Own
Vinevards
1981/82 1983/84 1985/86 1987/88 1989/90 1991/92 1993/94 1995/96 1997/98
Etchart Martins Domingos Cavas Banyuls Simonassi Lyon
Vistalba/ Balbi
Cavexport?
100-200 hect. Escorihuela Orfila
Martelen
Navarro Correas Toso Lagarde Fantelli Coop. Medrano
San Telmo Nieto Senetiner Gonzalez Videla Santa Gimena
La Rural Berruti y Chini Suter
Esmeralda Valentfn Bianchi Santa Ana Coop. Lujan
200-500 hect. Norton Lavaque Patagonia Santa Rita
Saint Valery Goyenechea
Chandon La Agricola L. Bosca Flichman Crotta
Trapiche FeCoVita
500+ hectares
Source: Based on Albarracin 1994, A.V.A. 1997, Foster 1995, and own interviews.
*List contains principal wineries that restructured but may not be 100% complete. Position of wineries is organized according to the earliest date they started upgrading either in production
processes, vineyards, or world class stainless steel equipment. Earliest wineries started with improvements in production processes. Almost all of the new processing equipment was purchased from
1989 on.
Table 2.18
TOTAL STORAGE, STAINLESS STEEL, OAK, VINEYARDS, & PRODUCTION OF PRINCIPAL WINERIES;
MENDOZA 1998*
Winery Type FirmA Total Storage Stainless Steel Oak Barrel Fine Grapes
(Mill. Liters) (Mill. Liters) (Mill. Liters) (Hectares)Q
Trapiche/Pefiaflor DBG 225.0 5.0 0.7 520
Crotta Fain. 18.0 no no 500
Flichman FDI 4.6 1.8 yes 495
Luigi Bosca Ex-Bulk 6.8 03 0.2 480
La Agrfcola DBG 13.0 2.0 0.2 440
Chandon FDI 193 8.0 0.5 476
Vifia Santa Rita FDI n.d. n.d. n.d. 400
S.Valery/Cartellone DBG 104.0 no no 375
Berruti y Chini Fain. 173 no no 300
Lujin Coop. 17.5 no no 295
Valentin Bianchi Joint Vent. 143 2.5 0.1 280
Norton FDI 10.0 4.0 0.5 280
Lavaque Fain. 8.6 0.4 n.d. 272
Nieto y Senetiner Ex-Bulk 13.5 2.0 0.1 250
Esmeralda DBG 10.5 3.0 0.4 250
Gonzalez Videla Fain. 10.1 n.d. n.d. 250
Suter Joint Vent. 7.0 n.d. n.d. 220
San Telmo Joint Vent. 5.0 n.d. n.d. 210
Orfila Joint Vent. 7.0 n.d. n.d. 200
Santa Ana FDI 132.0 1.8 n.d. 195
Lagarde DBG 3.2 1.0 0.2 180
Toso Joint Vent. 10.0 2.0 n.d. 180
Navarro Correas Joint Vent. 5.0 2.0 0.4 180
Fantelli Fain. 5.4 1.0 n.d. 170
Martelen DBG 25.0 n.d. no 166
Vifia Patagonia FDI 2.4 2.4 n.d. 150
EscorihuelaA DBG 19.0 no no 140
Gaete Fan. 7.0 no no 135
Balbi FDI 3.0 n.d. n.d. 100
Martins Domingos Joint Vent. 2.1 0.5 yes 55
Etchart FDI 6.0 n.d. n.d. 52
Domaine Vistalba FDI 03 03 yes 30
Banyuls Fain. 0.5 n.d. n.d. 30
Cavas de WeinertA DBG 1.7 n.d. n.d. n.d.
Medrano Coop. 20.0 n.d. n.d.
Total 754.1 44.0 3.3 8,255
Source: There are no official statistics. Table assembled from various data sources including A.V.A. 1997, Foster 1995,
Albarracin 1994, own interviews.
*Data reflect firms' status sometime between 1996 and 1998.
APubl.: publicly-traded winery; FDI: foreign direct investment; DBG: domestic business group; Ex-Bulk: ex-bulk wine
producer; Enol. Dom.: Chilean enologist; Priv. Dom.: private domestic firm.; Fain.: family firm; Non-Prof. : non-profit.;
Coop.: cooperative.
AAcquired by a DBG in the 1990s.
9 The vast majority of the vineyard surface area consists of four varietals--Chardonnay, Chenin, Ugni Blanc, Torrontds
Riojano, Cabernet Sauvignon, Merlot, Sangiovesse, and Malbeck, with minority participation of Riesling, Sauvignon
Blanc, Tocai, Cabernet Franc, Pinot Noir, and Syrah.
The Family-Controlled Domestic Business Group (DBG) Export Pioneers
Bodegas Trapiche was Mendoza's pioneer fine wine exporter (Tables 2.17 and 2.18). It
was purchased in the early '70s by Pefiaflor, a family-run local business group. It was also owner
of one of the large bottlers/distributors in the monopolistic table wine market, and
producer/distributor of beer, juice, and mineral water. The firm was a pioneer in the provincial wine
industry in several ways: it made an early commitment to become a dedicated exporter of fine wine,
and persisted despite often unfavorable exchange rates. It began exporting the same wine it sold
locally, first, into Latin American markets, and between 1972-1975 to the U.S., where it set up a
commercial office in a consortium with other Mendoza wineries. All these activities were financed
through its profits in its other operations. The consortium failed because of quality control
problems and Trapiche's partners bailed out, but the firm remained steadfast in its export
dedication. In the early 1980s it changed its approach, and much like the Chilean pioneers it began
to export cheap varietals. Much of its early technological learning came from tutelage through bulk
exports of wine to Japanese clients. They sent their own enologists to supervise production in
Mendoza. In the early 1980s Pefiaflor was also a pioneer in the use of "hyperoxigenation"
devices, a technology that quickly separates solids from liquids to improve table wine quality. It
was also a pioneer in the domestic mass-marketing of table wine in Tetrabrik, a carton container
with an aluminum foil core. But it was only since 1990 that the firm moved beyond the cheap
"fighting" varietals and into higher price categories. From then on it hired international
consultants such as Pomerol's Merlot expert Michel Rolland, and New Zealand viticulturist
Richard Smart. Trapiche improved its vineyard operations, made big financial commitments in new
stainless steel machinery and oak barrels, and introduced more sophisticated wine making
techniques. However, by 1997 Pefiaflor/Trapiche had debt levels so high that it lost control of the
company and sold out to a national bank representing a consortium of local and foreign investors.
Credit for being Mendoza's pioneer international-style wine maker goes to Bodegas
Esmeralda. Part of another holding run by the Buenos Aires-based Catena family, it is also owner
of one of the big half-a-dozen bottlers/distributors in the monopolistic table wine market. In the late
1970s and early 1980s two of the Catenas traveled to California, to observe first hand the wine
revolution that was taking place in research at UC-Davis and in Napa Valley's best wineries. Even
though Argentine consumer tastes still favored light, oxidized wines, upon their return to Mendoza
the Catenas made the commercial decision and financial commitment to change to international-
style wine making techniques in anticipation of future changes in those tastes. Bodegas Esmeralda
started with vineyard experiments with two international varietals--Chardonnay and Cabernet
Sauvignon--to improve grape concentration of flavors and aromas. The next major step took place
in 1988 when it hired an experienced California enologist, Paul Hobbs, as a consultant. (Hobbs
also consulted for Vifia Valdivieso in Chile.) Simultaneously it purchased world-class stainless
steel tanks, crushers, presses, and pumps. The investments were significant, and were financed
from profits from table wine operations. As important, the winery adopted statistical processing
techniques, to help it document the results of its mistakes and improvement efforts, and provide
clues on how to do even better. In 1991 Bodegas Esmeralda launched itself into exports. It did
not follow the typical path of starting from the bottom and slowly improving quality. Because it
committed significant resources to finance the learning, it successfully leapfrogged its two varietals
into the low end of the ultrapremium market ($15+), two segments above the popular premium
category where most Chilean pioneers had started ($3-$7).
The Domestic-Market Varietal Pioneers
While Trapiche and Esmeralda initiated Mendoza's exports of quality wines, in the late
'70s several boutique wineries mirrored the shift to varietal wine production, but with domestic
consumers in mind. This was a significant innovation in a market that consisted of almost 100%
cheap table wine. Bodega Navarro Correas, San Telmo, and the multinational Chandon
(established in Mendoza since 1959), were among the first (Tables 2.15 and 2.16). Others like La
Agricola followed soon after. Except for the French multinational, these were wineries run by
creative businessmen coming from other sectors, who were able to look beyond the overproduction
crisis that immersed the wine industry since the early 1980s, and to devise strategies on how to
break out of it. The shift was in some ways radical; even though it did not involve significant capital
investments in new hardware, it required a thorough reorganization of production. To process
varietal wines involved independent crushing and fermentation of grapes (separate from other
varietals), better temperature control, and aseptic conditions to avoid contamination from yeasts used
to ferment other grapes. Also, because many varietal characteristics are typified, by deciding to
produce varietals wineries voluntarily set themselves up to be evaluated against certain standards.
This is not the case with blends, marketed under generic, non-standardized names like Bourgogne
and Chablis, which gave winemakers enormous latitude to mask variations in the results.
The New Dynamic Actors: FDI, Joint Ventures, and DBGs
Aside from the initiatives taken by the handful of pioneers just described, the next round of
dynamic actors didn't surface until the end of the decade, and it came from abroad. The 1980s
were a difficult decade for the Mendoza wine sector. As domestic consumption dropped and wine
prices fell, the regulatory and development agencies belonging to the federal and provincial
governments attempted to distribute broadly the costs of the industry's restructuring with
administrative policies such as price supports and subsidies to eradicate vineyards, rather than allow
the market to determine the collapse of the smaller, less efficient, or less capitalized producers. The
sector downsized gradually from 253,000 hectares to just over 140,000 hectares, much of it towards
the end of the decade. Ultimately there were no clear "winners" with capital to restructure. What
remained was a group of weak firms, some of which were ripe for purchase.
When the economy finally stabilized and then opened in 1991 foreigners moved in (Table
2.19). They gradually set up joint ventures and purchased every available boutique winery that had
a recognized domestic brand. As in Chile, most of these foreign investors already had well-
established international commercial networks and enological knowledge; they simply linked their
new acquisitions to their distribution networks. But in contrast to Chile, all continued to sell fine
wine on the domestic market, and only increased their exports gradually (since the late 1970s cheap
table wine consumption in Argentina dropped systematically, whereas that of fine wine grew
quickly; Figure 2.7). Typically, they quickly incorporated labor-saving technologies, especially in
bottling lines, and subsequently invested in processing machinery and more modestly, in vineyards.
None, however, came even close to match the scale of vineyard expansions seen in Chile.
Table 2.19
WINERIES THAT RESTRUCTURED CLASSIFIED BY YEAR INITIATED AND BY OWNERSHIP; MENDOZA 1979-1997
Total '79/'80 '81/'82 '83/'84 '85/'86 '87/'88 '89/'90 '91/'92 '93/'94 '95/'96 '97/'98
FDI 12 1 2 3 2 2 2
Wholly 1 1 2 1 1 1
Owned
Joint Ventures I I I I
Domestic 26 3 1 1 1 2 6 4 4 4
Private +1 A
Public o
Family +1 *1 2 3 2
Enologist 1
DBG A+2 1 1 1 4 2
Ex-Bulk I I
Non-Profit
Coop.
TOTAL 38 3 2 1 1 4 9 6 6 6
Source: See Table 2.16
ABecame foreign-owned in mid '90s.
+Became joint venture in mid '90s.
*Became DBG-owned in mid '90s.
Figure 2.7
SHIPMENT INDEX OF TABLE WINE, RESERVE WINE,
FINE WINE, AND CHAMPAGNE TO THE ARGENTINE
DOMESTIC MARKET; 1975-1995
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To meet their production targets, these boutique wineries have restarted a grape market in
fine varietals that had been dormant for several decades. The advantage to them was that they could
better control the quality of their inputs without having actually to own the vineyards. Through these
tutelage arrangements they are upgrading close to 1,800 grape growers and 14,000 hectares. The
1990s average share of purchased grapes (first six years) rose 5 percent over the 1980s average,
while that processed by third parties has fallen (Table 2.20). A share of the increase reflects juice
processors that are working closer with high-yield grape growers. With the promise of short-to-
medium-term contracts, higher prices, and guaranteed returns, growers let the wineries specify and
supervise their vineyard practices and learn better grape growing techniques.
Table 2.20
Form of Acquisition of Grape; Mendoza 1950s-1990s
Mendoza Province Decade 1950s Decade 1960s Decade 1970s Decade 1980s Decade 1990s
Own 40% 39% 40% 38% 37%
Purchased 55% 40% 17% 5% 10%
Processed for Third Parties 5% 21% 42% 57% 53%
Source: Based on data from I.N.V., Mendoza
The first purchase was Bodega Norton in 1989, one of the traditional family wineries
founded at the turn of the nineteenth century, bought by a Swiss investor linked to the California
distributor and winery The Hess Collection (Table 2.15). When the Argentine economy liberalized
in 1991 it was followed by a series of acquisitions and distribution agreements by foreign beverage
bottling/distribution giants such as Allied Domecq (Bodegas Balbi), Pernod-Ricard (Bodegas
Etchart), and the CINBA/Cinzano Group (Navarro Correas). In the mid 1990s three of the four
Chilean giants also crossed the border into Mendoza and started their own projects. In 1995
Chile's Vina Santa Carolina acquired Bodegas Santa Ana, one of the strongest competitors in the
lowest rung of the domestic popular premium market. Concha y Toro and Santa Rita followed in
1996. These and California's Kendall-Jackson were the first foreigners to invest in new vineyard
plantations. Simultaneously, entrepreneurs associated with Jugos Chile, another Chilean firm that
had already been in operation in Mendoza for several years in the grape juice processing business
set up its own "virtual" winery. They teamed up with reputed Chilean enologist Pablo Morand6,
rented processing equipment and storage, purchased grapes, and charged Morand6 with the
processing and marketing of the wine.
Most boutique wineries that stayed in local hands and still managed to make investments
were associated with domestic business groups (DBGs) that provided the finance. By the mid
1990s the corporate owners of wineries such as Lagarde, Martelen, and Flichman convinced
themselves that the country's macroeconomic conditions of openness and the trend towards lower
but finer wine consumption would persist, and began to make investments in new technology. (The
latter firm was also eventually purchased by a Portuguese group in 1997.)
As happened in Chile, the rise of fine wine and fine grape prices since the early '90s in
Mendoza created opportunities for a few bulk producers to integrate forward and incorporate new
technology, for example, Luigi Bosca/Arizu and Santa Isabel/Nieto y Senetiner. Nevertheless,
acquisitions continue to be far more common than "bootstrapping". Changes in ownership and
concentration of boutique wineries in the hands of a few corporate players continued through the
mid-'90s. They reflect the bargaining strength of those with access to finance over the relative
powerlessness of cash-strapped traditional wineries to upgrade on their own. The best example is
the Catena Group that has consolidated its presence beyond Bodegas Esmeralda and its table wine
brands with the acquisition and modernization of several well known boutique wineries--Bodegas
Escorihuela, La Rural, Michel Torino, and Santa Gimena. (In 1998 Catena also purchased its first
Bordeaux winery, the famed Cos d'Estournel.) Each winery covers a different segment of the
popular premium market.
The "Low Road" of Table Wine Restructuring
Starting from 1993 on a few of the mid-size Eastern Mendoza table wine producers that
were integrated such as Crotta, Berruti y Chini, and the cooperative FeCoVita introduced some
basic processing and refrigeration equipment to their facilities, and painted their cement tanks with
epoxy. They also availed themselves of new Tetra bottling lines to replace the increasingly
unfashionable demijohn. With very few exceptions, however, they did not make any changes in
their operations: different varietals continued to be processed together, vineyard purity remained an
elusive goal, and yields stayed high. Nevertheless, the results of these changes surprised everyone:
table wine quality increased considerably. In subsequent years these wineries have gone a step
further and begun to make small quantities of the intermediate quality wines.
The Commodity Grape Juice Exporters
Mendoza has always had a grape juice processing sector. Occasionally, grape juice was
exported but most of it was either consumed in the domestic market or blended into table wine to
sweeten it. Towards the end of the 1980s Mendoza's wine production well exceeded its domestic
sales. The public sector had a blockade on most wine stocks to support wine prices. Producers
with grape juice stocks were offered to have the blockade lifted if they could export them. Several
firms like Berrutti y Chini made their first export sales at that time. When the country liberalized in
the early 1990s and international grape juice prices began to rise because of a shortage in
substitutes, about a dozen local producers decided to become dedicated exporters, among them
Gancia, Coarex, Rodriguez, Altarpec, and Santa Ana. Mendoza's first big FDI from Chile was in
fact a grape juice processor Jugos Chile who took over a local processing plant, Jugos Lourdes.
Those Left Out: The Chilean Secano and Eastern Mendoza's Bulk Producers
In both regions, small growers and processors that work with low quality varietals face the
greatest obstacles to participation in the sectoral technological upgrading. While in Chile they are
fewer than in Mendoza, they lack basic irrigation infrastructure that may be only available in the
long term, if at all. This groups remains marginal in sectoral and policy making debates on how to
improve the industry's competitiveness. In contrast, Eastern Mendoza's producers epitomize the
opposite case: they are numerous, and also face structural difficulties such as the wrong
endowments, old equipment, and lack of scale economies. Yet over the years, the region's
producers have always remained very much in the center of public attention and policy making. In
addition, some of the solutions to their problems may come through social mobilization.
At the Margin: The Forgotten Chilean Secano Growers
The breadth and depth of technological upgrading in Chile's wine supply chain is very
substantial. The largest six integrated wineries alone control 14 percent of vineyards (almost 9,000
hectares; Table 2.21), all of them of the highest quality, a surface that will have almost doubled by
the end of the century. In 1996 wine production from these vineyards alone represented roughly a
third of the country's wine exports. Furthermore, when the fine grapes and semi-processed wines
purchased from independent growers/processors and cooperatives are accounted, the six largest
wineries controlled the final processing, bottling, and distribution of 50 percent of the export market
and more than 75 percent of the domestic wine market. Since the late 1980s the upgrading has
extended to another 50 medium and small integrated firms that are also investing in the same new
stainless steel machinery and improving their grape growing and wine making techniques. All
together, in 1996 these wine supply chains directly and indirectly controlled as much as 75 percent
of vineyard surface and 89 percent of total wine production.
Table 2.21
APPROXIMATE SIZE OF EACH INDUSTRY SEGMENT; WINE SECTOR, CHILE 1996*
GRAPES/REGIONS
PRODUCTION
SEGMENT
Low Quality Grapes
Secano (Non-Irrigated) VI/VIII Regions | Irrigated VII/VIII
Rezions
High & Medium Quality Grapes
Irrigated IV-VII Regions
VINEYARDS 10,000-20,000 hectares 8,000-12,000 hectares 31,000 hectares
Total: 56,000 hectares 17-36% 14-21% 55%
Informal Sector Small Growers Small and Medium 6 Largest Integrated Wineries:
5,000-15,000 hect. 5,000-15,000 hect. Independent Growers approx. 8,800 hectares
9-27% 9-27% 14%
50 Medium and Small Wineries
approx. 12,000 hectares
22%
Independent Growers
max. 10,200 hectares
max. 18%
Table & Pisco Grape Processors (Regions IV-VII)
ap5,000 hectares 22%
PROCSSIG Inorml Setor Smal Prcesors, Smal Prc sorsCoos D maxicM. 0,200 hecare
4-11% Table & Pisco Grape Processors (Regions IV-VII)
51 million Its.
13%
6 Largest Integrated Wineries
min. 62 million Its.
14%
48 Med. & Small Integr. Wineries
82 million liters
22%
2 Cooperatives
2 million liters
0.5%
approx. 100-150 Integrated
Wineries & Independent Process.
71 milllion liters
18%
DISTRIBUTION Informal Distribution FORMAL EXPORT MARKET
Total: 388 million liters max. 42 million liters 6 Largest Integrated Wineries
11% 92 million liters
24%
87 Medium & Small Integrated Wineries
90 million liters
24%
2 Cooperatives
2 million liters
0.5%
FORMAL DOMESTIC MARKET
5 Largest Integrated Wineries
136 million liters.
35%
115-145 Medium & Small Integrated Wineries, & Coops.
45 million liters
_________________________________12%
CONSUMPTION Informal Autoconsumption Foreign Fine Wine Exports
Export: 184 million liters max. 30 million liters 184 million liters;
Domestic: 204 million lts 8% 47%
Domestic Table Wine Consumption Domestic Fine Wine Consump.
approx. 124 million liters approx. 50 million lts.
32% 13%
Source: Own preparation based on S.A.G., various tables; company reports; personal interviews. Many of the data are estimations.
*"Regions" refer to the political jurisdictions in which Chile is divided; they are twelve, Region I is in the north and Region XII at the southern
tip of the continent.. The grape growing jurisdictions extend from Region IV through VIII. "Table grape" refers to grapes consumed fresh.
"Pisco" refers to a distillate from various types of Moscatel and Pedro Gimenez grapes, located principally in the IV Region.
The remaining hectares and 15% of total wine production is the "forgotten" group,
unlikely anytime in the near future to participate in the industry's upgrading. Mainly, it is the
output of a group of small growers and processors living in the secano (dry lands) in part of the
VII Region and most of the VIII Region. In the southern areas of the wine country, they have grape
varietals of poor enological quality, no access to water, and consequently very low yields and
unpredictable crops. The secano consists of elevated areas in the rain-shadow of the coastal hills,
where it only rains during the winter and there are no alternative sources of water during the hot
summer months. The reasons are numerous and complex; the most often cited in sectoral and
government reports is that in these areas there is no electric infrastructure to pump water, and in the
few places where there is the water table is too deep to make extraction economical. To make
matters worse, the varietals that these subsistence farmers grow are typically of the lowest quality--
Pais and the somewhat better Moscatel de Alejandria. They are only ones that have adapted to the
rigorous conditions of summer drought. Varietal change, or substitution with other crops is
difficult if not impossible to carry out.
The absence of precise statistics on secano growers suggests the lack of attention they have
received from the wine industry and government regulatory agencies associated with it. Their
numbers are hard to determine, somewhere between 5,000 and 10,000. Their aggregate surface area
lies anywhere between 10,000-20,000 hectares. Clearly, the high number of small, low quality
vineyards suggests the magnitude of their disadvantages (Tables 2.22 and 2.23). Recent sectoral
reports on the successful restructuring of Chilean wine supply chains either don't mention them at
all or make a passing reference to them as in a totally separate category, because their problems are
completely different. The claim is that these producers represent a "deep socioeconomic problem"
that requires a separate integrated approach: their production infrastructure shortages and the high
levels of alcoholism among this population are insurmountable for the regular market mechanisms
or public programs to allow them to bootstrap themselves out of backwardness.
Table 2.22
TOTAL SURFACE AREA, NUMBER, AND AVERAGE VINEYARD SIZE: CHILE; 1995/96
Total (hect.) Number Avge. 0-1 ha 1-5 ha. 5-10 ha. 10-25 ha 25-50 ha 50+ ha
Vineyards Size (ha)
Total Vineyard Area 106,438 14,969 7.1
Wine Grape Area 56,003 11,037 5.1 48% 34% 8% 5% 4% 1%
V Regi6n 1,807 81 22.3 28% 17% 15% 9% 20% 11%
Metropolitan Region 5,904 176 33.5 10% 18% 18% 17% 21% 17%
VI Regi6n 9,173 559 16.4 11% 25% 23% 20% 17% 6%
VII Region 26,010 3,941 6.6 37% 36% 12% 8% 5% 2%
VII Region 13,000 6,270 2.1 60% 34% 4% 1% 1% 0%
Table Grape Area 50,435 3,932 12.8 9% 34 12% 20% 12% 3%
Fuente: Based on SA.G. 1996.
Table 2.23
PRODUCERS IN VII & VIII REGIONS; CHILE 1996
VII Region ViII Region
Total Surface Area (Hectares) 26,010 13,000
Total Vineyards 3,941 6,270
Average Vineyard Size (Hectares) 6.6 2.1
Number of Vineyards Size 0-1 Hectares 1,448 3,743
Number of Vineyards Size 1-5 Hectares 1,426 2,139
% Number of Vineyards 0-5 Hectares 73% 94%
Pafs Hectares 9,116 5,728
Moscatel de Alejandria Hectares 201 5,703
% Low Quality Vineyards 36% 88%
Source: Own preparation based on S.A.G. 1996
Secano growers can't pull their weight with the wine industry, despite their large numbers
and not insignificant aggregate surface area, principally because of their small contribution to
sectoral output. Because of the absence of water, yields are very low, roughly 4,000 kg./hectare
(about 40 percent of the average for low-yield fine varietals, and an even smaller fraction for high-
yield varietals, anywhere between 15,000-50,000 kg/hectare). Low vineyard yields and high levels
of informal Auto-consumption and distribution in local consumption chains, make their
contribution to formal sectoral output very small. Only the output of some of the few large secano
growers makes its way into the larger formal supply chains through a few channels, principally two
of the three remaining cooperatives. As a result, secano growers have never wielded any significant
impact on the price of domestic grapes, to call attention to themselves from the industry and
government agencies, as have for example, producers in Eastern Mendoza.
The Margin as Mainstream: Eastern Mendoza's Bulk Table Wine Producers
Mendoza's upgrading is notable for an industry that had been retrenching for a decade: the
investments made by 60-odd wineries in new machinery, the increasing production of fine varietal
wines, and the rise in exports of intermediate quality varietals and grape juice concentrate are an
awakening. The group of upgrading wineries accounts for close to 60 million liters of fine varietal
wines and another 120 million of medium quality blends. A number of Mendozan growers are
being swept up with them. Those with the best varietals--roughly 1,000 vineyards and 9,000
hectares (6 percent of total vineyards surface area)--are learning improved viticultural techniques to
concentrate flavors and aromas in their grapes. Another 20,000-25,000 hectares (15 percent of total
vineyards) mostly belonging to medium and large growers (15+ hectares), have also upgraded to
become competitive suppliers of the grape juice export industry. They have benefited from the
tutelage of experienced exporters to improve yields, concentration of sugars, and decrease the use of
pesticides (Table 2.24).
Yet when all are counted, the vineyard surface and wine processing capacity undergoing
rapid upgrading is roughly 20-24 percent of the total. The ten largest and most updated wineries in
fine wine making distribute no more than 10 percent of provincial output, compared to over 25
percent by the 6 largest Chilean wineries. Prospects for much of the remaining 75 percent of the
industry (involving 105,000-110,000 hectares) are less certain. Close to 400 wineries--or 87
percent--have incorporated little if any new processing technology. The average processor in these
supply chains produces blended table wine exclusively for domestic consumption, sells it in a bulk
market to oligopolistic bottlers/retailers, and/or serves niche regional markets in demijohns. It uses
intermediate and poor quality but high-yield grapes from the less prestigious, hotter, growing
subregions like Eastern Mendoza (there are approximately 250-300 of them alone.) The enologists
that work at them have little training, most of them technical school graduates with an extended
secondary education. Conditions and prospects for the average winery appear quite dismal--a
shrinking market, poor quality grape endowments, little or no capital to reconvert, and no demand or
supply-side assistance. Compared to the elite firms, wineries in this group are almost "driving
blind," knowing that they have to implement momentous changes to upgrade, but paralyzed by the
uncertainty over how to proceed.
Mendoza has also been unable to match Chile's ability to increase its supply of fine grapes.
In fact, the Argentine province reached its low point in fine quality grape loss only as recently as
1992 (Table 2.15). Between then and early 1996 the vineyard surface of best varietals had grown
by less than 3,200 hectares, especially modest considering that Mendoza's wine industry is more
than twice as large as Chile's. In addition to having only a few thousand hectares of the "big
four" varietals, 2 9 it is hard to assess the market potential of the rest of the grape stock. For one,
Mendoza has a tremendous diversity of varietals, over 120, several times as many as Chile, but
almost half of them have little enological value. That leaves a similar amount of grapes of
intermediate enological quality such as Malbeck and Sangiovese, but little known to most
consumers worldwide. They might become the next "hot grape" once markets for the classic
"fighting" varietals become saturated, but again they may not. A further complication is that
Mendoza wineries are themselves not very knowledgeable on how to obtain the best flavors and
aromas out of some grapes with intermediate potential, for example, the Italian Barbera, because
until very recently they were processing it together with other poor grapes in the same batch. In
sum, part of Mendoza's current grape supply has little value to wineries. The remainder suggests
potential, but requires significant technological and marketing effort by wineries to materialize it.
29 Chardonnay, Sauvignon Blanc, Cabernet Sauvignon, and Merlot.
Table 2.24
APPROXIMATE SIZE OF EACH INDUSTRY SEGMENT; WINE SECTOR, MENDOZA 1995/1996*
GRAPE/REGION
PRODUCTION
SEGMENT
Low Quality
High Yield
Grape Juice & Table Wine
Medium Quality
Medium Yield
Blends
High Quality
Low Yield
Fine Wine
VINEYARDS 93,000 hectares 42,000 hectares 9,000 hectares
Total: 144,000 hectares 65% 29% 6%
% Share Total Vineyards Grape Juice Table Wine
20,000-25,000 hect. 68,000-73,000 hect.
14-17% 1 47-51%
Eastern Mendoza 50,000 hectares 18,000 hectares 3,000 hectares
72,000 hectares 35% 13% 2%
Rest of Mendoza 43,000 hectares 23,000 hectares 6,000 hectares
72,000 30% 1 16% 4%
PROCESSING Grape Juice Table Wine Table Wine Fine Wine Blends Varietal Wines
1,100 million liters 387 million liters Domestic Mkt. Export Mkt. Domestic Mkt. Export Mkt.
35% 450 million Its. 105 million Its. 150 million Its. 29 million liters
4101% 10% 14% 1 3%
Eastern Mendoza approx. 100 Juice 250-300 Medium Bulk Processors approx. 5 Integrated Wineries
Makers (includes approx. 20 Cooperatives) approx. 25 million liters
approx. 250 million liters approx. 250 million liters 2%
23% 23%
Rest of Mendoza approx 5 Juice Makers approx. 150 Large & Medium approx. 40 Integrated Large, Medium
approx. 137 million liters Bulk Processors (includes approx. & Small Wineries
12% 20 Cooperatives) 60 million liters varietal wine
approx. 305 million liters 5%
28% approx. 20 Integrated Large & Medium
Wineries
approx. 114 million liters Fine Wine Blend
__________________ _10%
DISTRIBUTION approx. 10 Juice Makers 10 Largest Bottlers/Distributors 10 Largest Integrated Wineries
897 million liters approx. 300 million liters & Integrated Wineries 128 million liters
23% 480 million liters 10%
37% 50 Medium/Boutique Integrated
Medium Bottlers/Distributors & Wineries
Integrated Wineries 101 million liters
206 million liters 8%
16% 15
CONS MPTION
Export: Wine 134 million
Export Juice: million
Domestic: 1,000 million Its.
Juice Concentrate
Exports
approx. 60,000 tons
23%
Foreign Table Wine Exports
105 million liters
8%
Domestic Table Wine
Consumption
664 million liters
51%
Foreign Fine Wine Exports
29 million liters
2%
Domestic Fine Wine Consumption
336 million liters
26%
Source: Own preparation based on I.N.V., various tables; Mendoza Stock Exchange, Gennari 1991.
*Vineyard surface is based on a December 1996 survey. Several of the statistics are estimations.
A group of 4,000 growers with roughly 30,000 hectares and associated with the province's
cooperative system show uneven performances; most are holders of poor quality grapes. In
addition, some cooperatives are far better managed than others. For almost everyone, small size is a
serious problem: vineyards with 0-5 hectares account for 91,000 hectares, 63 percent of the
provincial total (Table 2.25). Although the average vineyard size does not necessarily represent the
size of the average grower's agribusinesses--many own vineyards in several separate locations, a
diversification strategy against damage from pests and especially from hail3 0--problems of size are
still real for many. Also, the distance between each productive unit makes the use of mechanization
less efficient. Those with high quality grapes and the least need to mechanize--their activity is more
labor intensive--are relatively few.
Table 2.25
TOTAL SURFACE AREA, NUMBER, AND AVERAGE VINEYARD SIZE; MENDOZA 1995/96
Total Number Avge. Size 0-1 1-5 5-10 10-25 25-50 50+
(Hect.) Vineyards (Hect.) Hect. Hect. Hect. Hect. Hect. Hect.
Total Vineyard Area* 144,173 19,058 7.6 15% 48% 19% 13% 3% 2%
Dept.. Lujin 8,745 829 10.5 16% 36% 22% 18% 6% 3%
Dept. San Martin 33,353 3,613 9.2 16% 41% 18% 18% 5% 3%
Dept. Tupungato 3,178 330 9.6 7% 40% 27% 17% 7% 2%
Fuente: Based on I.N.V. 1995 data.
* In Mendoza, viniferous grapes make up more than 98% of total vineyard surface area; table grape vineyards occupy no more than 0.5%.
In sum, those in the wine industry that are having the most difficulty adapting to the new
competitive conditions are the growers with small vineyards and intermediate and low quality
varietals, and the third-party table wine processors that work with them. The latter process the
growers' grapes for a fee, and keep their wine in storage. Together they account for the output of
approximately 65,000-85,000 hectares, or as much as 60 percent of provincial production. Because
they sell their wine as a commodity in a bulk market both groups operate relatively disconnected
from the final processing and commercial part of the business to even know what varietals to graft,
what production changes to implement, or how best to have the grapes processed, even if they could
find the capital to finance the changes. They don't have the requisite knowledge on how to upgrade
their production facilities or improve their processing techniques. What they do know is that they
have to change because profits in table wine processing are getting slimmer, but they are unsure
how to proceed.
The upgrading effort is also unevenly distributed throughout the province: most of the
"success" firms and a good portion of the best vineyards are located in the "First Zone," a micro-
region to the south of the Mendoza River and the province's capital city, and stretching southwest
30 Confirmed by an INTA extensionist in 1996 in a study of producers in the locality of Montecaseros, San Martin.
towards the Andes piedmont.3 ' Less fortunate is the area of Eastern Mendoza, the hot plains to the
east of the First Zone. At 600 meters above sea level, this subregion has remained relatively isolated
from the fine wine export boom. Eastern Mendoza holds half of the province's total grape
production, yet 71 percent of it (51,000 hectares) is of high yield, low quality grape varieties,
undesirable for wine making, and another 25 percent of intermediate quality varietal, used mainly
for the domestic market to improve table wines and blend with fine varietals (Table 2.26). (See
Appendix B for a history of Eastern Mendoza's low-quality high-volume production.)
In 1997 only a handful of Eastern Mendoza's 300-odd wineries--among them Cooperativa
Medrano, La Agricola, and Fantelli--had made the kind of stainless steel purchases and
improvements in wine making techniques that would allow them to export quality varietals. A few
others like Berruti y Chini and Crotta have recently become exporters of improved table wines and
intermediate quality wines to less demanding niche markets in Latin American countries, including
Paraguay, Bolivia, Colombia, and Mexico, and more recently, Chile." But these are the exceptions
rather than the rule: the majority of Eastern Mendoza's wineries do not even bottle the table wine
they process. They supply almost half of a 600+ million liter provincial bulk market to a few major
bottlers/distributors. Only when the price of bulk wine rises does any significant value added
remain in the subregion.
3' At 850 meters above sea level, this subregion is endowed with the best soils, an ideal cool climate for fine grape
growing, and abundant snow-melt water.
32 Eastern Mendoza is not a political jurisdiction but rather a name commonly ascribed to 5 subprovincial
administrative units or "departments" to the east of the capital city: Junin , La Paz, Rivadavia, San Martin, and
Santa Rosa.
" In the last few years Eastern Mendoza has started to supply table wines to the Chilean market because the
neighboring domestic industry is increasingly specializing in exports of fine varietals.
Table 2.26
INTERMEDIATE AND HIGH ENOLOGICAL QUALITY GRAPES IN EASTERN MENDOZA; 1996
(Hectares)
Department Junin La Paz Rivadavia San Martin Santa Rosa Total
High Quality Whites
Chardonnay 96 - 113 95 120 424
Sauvignon Blanc 30 - 79 50 26 185
Riesling 7 - 5 11 8 31
Subtotal 133 0 197 156 154 640
High Quality Reds
Cabernet Sauvignon 151 7 261 347 371 1137
Merlot 72 - 85 213 83 453
Pinot Noir 1 - 2 - 21 24
Syrah 68 - 129 172 142 511
Subtotal 292 7 477 732 617 2,125
Intermediate Quality Whites
Tocai Friulano 93 - 81 288 226 688
Torrontes Riojano 131 4 555 533 326 1549
Chenin 229 1 390 453 321 1394
Ugni Blanc 234 10 272 478 386 1380
Semill6n 31 - 31 22 - 84
Subtotal 718 15 1,329 1,774 1,259 5,095
Intermediate Quality Reds
Malbeck 889 5 949 441 144 2428
Sangiovese 308 7 256 670 152 1393
Bonarda 588 40 1,120 2,094 953 5,795
Tempranilla 248 15 258 1,247 209 1,977
Gibi 81 - 247 528 272 1,128
Bequignol 41 2 27 535 182 787
Barbera 24 - 40 98 61 223
Subtotal 2,179 69 2,897 5,613 1,973 12,731
High Quality Grapes Eastern Mendoza 425 7 674 888 771 2,765
Intermed. Quality Grapes Eastern Mza. 2,897 84 4226 7,387 3,232 17,826
Low Quality Grapes Eastern Mendoza 50,914
High Quality Grapes Rest of Province 5,970
Intermed. Quality Grapes Rest of Province 24,329
Low Quality Grapes Mendoza Province 42,165
Source: I.N.V. December 1996.
If the plight of Eastern Mendoza's growers and processors appears somewhat similar to
that of Chile's secano producers, in fact it is quite different. While the latter remain marginal to the
industry and somewhat forgotten by public officials, with Eastern Mendoza's producers it is quite
the opposite. Because of their large production volumes, if their yields are high prices per liter fall
across the board. They may be the industry's "whipping boy," blamed for the poor quality of the
province's wines, but it is precisely the high volumes they generate, their ability to affect prices and
profits, and their political clout that keeps them in the mainstream of public debate. Eastern
Mendoza producers have a strong sense of identity, born from being the targets of continuous
criticism, especially from some of the First Zone wineries. The capital city's Centro de
Bodegueros, the business association that groups the traditional elite boutique wineries and the
largest integrated firms in the business has been an outspoken critic of Eastern Mendoza producers
for many years. It has characterized them as typical rent-seekers: standard arguments are that they
don't do enough to upgrade their quality when the price of wine is up; they rely on their numbers
and political activism to seek economic redress from provincial politicians in power when wine
prices fall; they are a continuous drain on public resources. Eastern Mendoza producers retort that
their accusers are hypocrites, profiting at their expense. They benefit from the status quo by buying
their medium quality bulk wines at very low prices and fetch high retail prices by blending them
with their finer wines.
Regardless of the degree of truth of claims and counterclaims, what is accurate is that
Eastern Mendoza's producers are at a crossroads. The costs of upgrading low quality vineyards
are high for the income streams they currently generate. Even grafting of finer varieties is relatively
expensive, and eradication and replanting is inaccessible, given that two or more years are required
for vines to start producing fruit, and another five years for them to reach their fullest potential. In
addition, the lack of general guidance from wineries and technical experts on what varieties they
should plant keeps many growers from planning significant investments. On the other hand they
know that inaction will only cement their downslide to bankruptcy.
Conclusion
As a result of the industry restructuring of the last two decades most of Chile's wine supply
chains, large and small, have converged towards an "international-style" fine wine making path (a
small minority has been completely left behind). For a number of reasons, large firms played key
roles in the restructuring. By contrast, Mendoza's growers and wineries have split into two groups:
a few large firms and boutique wineries have followed roughly the same high value-added Chilean
path, whereas the majority are on a low value-added road, competing more on the basis of price than
quality increases.
These differences raise a set of important questions to pursue in the next chapters: Do
market and public sector sources of tutelage adequately respond to the needs of both groups? Or
does the fact that only a few are traveling the same tried-and-tested path to premium varietal
production suggest most of Mendoza's wineries are caught in a poverty trap? Is premium varietal
production the only restructuring path? How do wineries and growers actually determine alternative
upgrading possibilities, and the production standards they need to meet?
CHAPTER 3
The Breadth and Depth of Market Upgrading
Introduction: Opportunities and Limits to Market Tutelage
In this chapter I review the various forms of market tutelage that Chilean and Mendozan
wine supply chains received from machinery suppliers, consultants, international wine buyers, from
wineries themselves, and other market players. Those firms that wanted to move into the growing
fine wine market had some sort of working model to follow. California's and France's big strides
in fine wine making in the 1970s provided Chilean and Mendozan elite wineries a set of guidelines,
what I call the "international-style" restructuring path. Also adopted in the late 1970s by
Australia's wine industry, it involved the purchase of stainless steel technology, the borrowing of
"modern" wine-making and grape-growing techniques, and the use of a handful of so-called
"fighting" varietals that advanced-country consumers were familiar with.3 ' This was the model the
restructuring pioneers like Concha y Toro, San Pedro, and Santa Rita in Chile and Trapiche and
Esmeralda in Mendoza adopted.
By contrast, as domestic consumption of table wine began its steady fall in the early 1980s,
table wine producers did not have the upgrading opportunities and the market tutelage as neatly laid
out for them; in fact they had no clear model to follow and instead faced several impediments. As
processors of intermediate and poor quality high-yield grapes in suboptimal climates such as
Eastern Mendoza, they faced a shrinking market and had the wrong varietals (grapes with far less
acceptance in international markets). The tutelage opportunities that went with them were limited.
In addition, they had little or no capital to incorporate new machinery nor to improve vineyards, and
no specific wine-making and grape-growing techniques. Compared to the former group these
" See Footnote #14 for a definition of "fighting" varietals.
wineries were "driving blind," knowing that they had to implement momentous changes to
upgrade, but paralyzed by the uncertainty over how to proceed.
Yet both types of supply chain ran into their own problems, with tutelage from machinery
manufacturers, consultants, and wine buyers providing only partial help. In some ways fine wine
supply chains faced far more significant learning demands than those confronting table wine
producers; production of fine varietals forced them to benchmark their wines against international
standards, practices, and prices (even if serving only the domestic market) in a relatively short
period. Over time most of them completely restructured the way they organized their businesses
and production itself. The fact that many were able to meet minimum international standards in
relatively short time periods is a truly spectacular accomplishment, showing some of the inherent
strengths of market tutelage. Yet at the same time, just as striking is the fact that fine wine supply
chains have been relatively slow at moving up the learning ladder. The value added per liter of
exports generated by wineries and growers has increased over the years, but still lags considerably
behind that of leaders such as France and "New World" pioneers such as Australia. It suggests
that the standard tutelage instruments have not performed as well in this respect. On the other hand,
it is striking to observe that despite the lack of resources and a model to follow, and relatively less
market tutelage, since the mid 1990s some intermediate and table wine producers are gradually
making a series of improvements in their own wineries and vineyards. Their efforts are amounting
to something that resembles the building blocks or rough outline of a model to replicate.
Immediate improvements for the sector as a whole have come through purchases of new
hardware and borrowing of grape growing and wine-making techniques. Lower labor and land
costs have provided them comparative advantage at the margin. What have remained the hardest to
learn, yet remain the most valuable, are a set of work practices that allow wine supply chains to
continuously improve their capabilities. The key organizing element of these continuous
improvement practices involves incorporating in explicit ways much of the tacit knowledge from
production and marketing experience. Tutelage from suppliers, buyers, consultants and joint
ventures can complement but never replace these practices.
The chapter is organized in five parts. First, I describe in detail the kinds of learning
challenges leading Californian and French wine supply chains faced in the 1970s to improve wine
quality. Second, I provide some quantitative measures and benchmarks of the progress made by
Southern Cone wine supply chains with respect to international competitors like Australia,
California, Italy, and France. Third, I provide evidence on why low labor and land costs offer
comparative advantage within limits; further progress requires more purposeful quality
improvements. Next, I detail the various market mechanisms of tutelage that Southern Cone wine
supply chains have used to date to upgrade their capabilities, to explain the current pattern of
advances and bottlenecks in technological learning. Typical technology transfer has come through
interactions with buyers and suppliers, hiring of consultants and joint ventures. The advances are
uneven, and both fine wine and table wine supply chains face similar needs to make local tacit
knowledge of grape growing and wine processing techniques more explicit, and better integrate
conception and execution. I close with an example of a firm that has successfully implemented the
continuous improvement systems to quickly move up the learning ladder.
The Foundation of Catch Up: Turning Tacit Knowledge into Learning
Californian and French Upgrading in the 1970s
In the 1960s French wine making was in a state of relative decline. Fertilizers and
pesticides were used extensively in Bordeaux vineyards, and wines were brown-colored from worn-
out cooperage. Back in the U.S., market demand for fine wines began to rise. With less respect for
tradition than the French, enologists from the University of California at Davis began to experiment
with stainless steel technology that allowed them detailed control of fermentation processes. They
neutralized unwanted indigenous yeasts and enzymes and introduced those that enhanced the
grape's best flavors, aromas, and color. With this technology they developed a set of winemaking
practices that were a significant improvement over what had been handed down by tradition. The
French started to pay attention, and as they began building wineries in California and imitating them
back home in France, they also taught Californians a few lessons:
"Vineyards had to be located where the soil, climate, exposure and drainage
were well suited to the grape variety, not where the owner's mansion would have a
good view over the valley. Closely spaced vines with low yield produced the most
flavorful grapes. Native yeasts could provide more complexity in a wine. Filtration
often stripped more good things out of wine than bad. The traditional small oak
barrel is the perfect vessel for fermenting Chardonnay and aging Cabernet. ...wine
growers everywhere began to learn that they needed to treat their vineyards with
fewer chemicals and more respect."35
But the real revolution initiated by California's enologists and enhanced by French
viticulturists was only partly in the new machinery and wine-making techniques themselves, and
most importantly in the scientific process by which tacit production information was
methodically made explicit and put to use. Through experimentation in their laboratories and
practical experience in vineyards and processing plants, wine-makers began to document
systematically year after year the behavior of their grapes and wines. With the use of sampling
methods and statistical techniques they created massive relational databases that traced the evolution
of a particular grape through the production process until it was put into the bottle in the form of
wine. Armed with these databases winemakers could trace the quality of each season's wine back
to a particular location down to the acre, the amount of water administered to the vineyard, its
canopy management, sun exposure, and harvest temperature, and the processing conditions--for
example, yeasts, fermentation temperatures, maceration length--to which the grapes had been
subjected in the winery. This allowed them to identify causality in certain independent variables,
3 Wine Spectator, April 30, 1996.
and to implement changes in viticultural and winemaking techniques that directly improved wine
quality.
Those wine supply chains that took this revolution farthest completely redesigned the way
they organized production activities. The traditional division of labor had enologists circumscribed
to the winery and its labs, the agricultural engineers focused on the vineyards, and the marketing
people in the firm's headquarters, often far away from the production facility. Yet the new view of
winemaking encapsulated in the adage--"a good wine begins with a good grape"--suggested that
these divisions were at best artificial, and at worst, seriously conspired against implementing work
practices that could improve quality. For example, as irrigation data showed the risks of
overwatering plants, enologists felt the need to get out of their labs and production facilities and
walk the vineyards with the agricultural engineers, to find the right balance that would concentrate
flavors and aromas and avoid herbal flavors from excessive vegetal growth while keeping the vines
from drying.
As enologists began to relate wine quality with the hours of sunlight exposure the grapes
had received during the growing season, they began detailed discussions and experiments with the
agricultural engineers on how best to train vines, and on what percentage of leaves needed to be
removed to better expose grapes to sunlight without harming the plant. Similar debates emerged
with respect to grape yields. And as the best French viticulturists had hinted, with the help of their
data enologists began to work closer with agricultural engineers to determine what varietals did best
in which locations, and for what reasons. The information they collected from their experiments
helped them rediscover their vineyards; what at first blush seemed like a homogenous green blanket,
in fact was not. Even small changes in elevation, soil conditions, and wind exposure created distinct
grape-growing microclimates, each one imposing a particular character to the wines that came from
it. Greater predictability in vineyard performance allowed wineries to achieve better control over the
consistency in wine quality and continuity in product taste over time.
Californian enologists and agricultural engineers also discovered the importance of jointly
planning the harvest sequence, so that the majority of grapes could be picked at their ideal point of
maturity, when the concentration of tannins and sugars was at its peak. The data suggested that at
all costs they wanted to avoid the harvest trucks' typical long waits at the winery gate; nothing was
worse for quality than to have fresh-picked grapes oxidize and spoil under the hot summer sun, as
they waited their turn at the destemmers, crushers, and presses. Even a couple of hours of wait, they
learned from their data, took a high toll on quality. Nor did they want to process different grape
varietals simultaneously and risk contaminating the yeasts from one grape with those of another. It
was far better, they realized, to stagger their arrival at the processing plant as much as possible.
Thus the explicit knowledge that was extracted from the systematic recording of tacit data forced
enologists and agricultural engineers to work much closer than they used to when all varietals were
processed together, most vineyard locations were viewed as roughly the same, and trucks waited at
the winery gate as many as ten hours before it was their turn to unload their grapes.
By the same token, the enologists also realized they needed to work more closely with their
marketing divisions. They needed to be directly involved in visits to brokers and distributors to
learn what consumers in different markets demanded before they even sat down with the marketing
divisions to determine the production program and marketing campaigns for the year. When the
wineries went to trade shows seeking new clients, the enologists also needed to be there; the brokers
that approached their stands preferred to talk to them before talking to the marketing staff. An
enologist could provide them a better sense of a winery's ability to meet specific production
standards and order sizes. And as certain enologists increased their reputations as skilled wine-
makers their advertising cache increased proportionately. Wineries realized they needed to make
them very visible at the industry trade shows and wine evaluation events, their names and
reputations often as important as that of the wineries they represented.
A decade later Chilean and Mendozan wine supply chains faced similar challenges. They
needed to improve their quality quickly if they wanted to stay in business. To restructure did not
mean that everyone needed to move into fine wine production. Regardless of whether they
competed in this or other market niches--table grapes, grape juice concentrate, quality table wine, or
intermediate quality wine--more important was that they deliver high quality for value. For some,
initial improvements came quickly, yet over time they found out that movements up the learning
ladder turned out to be more difficult than expected.
The Difficult Road to Southern Cone Progress: Catching Up to World Class Producers
Fine Wine Producers
Since the mid 1980s value added and volumes of Southern Cone exports increased
considerably (Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1). These are the result of wine supply chains' investments in
hardware, their borrowing of wine-making and grape growing knowledge, and overall improvement
in quality and production standards.
Table 3.1
VOLUME AND REVENUE SHARE OF BOTTLED WINE EXPORTS, CHILE AND MENDOZA; 1985-1995*
CHILE
Share in Total
volume Exported
(Liters)
Share in Total
Export Revenue
(US$)
Liters
MENDOZA
Share in Total
Volume Exported
(Liters)
Share in Total
Export Revenue
(US$)
1985 6,879,000 67.0% 86.0% 5,599300 28.6% 62.3%
1987 11,163,500 78.4% 87.6% 4,836,100 37.7% 70.0%
1989 19,966,900 72.3% 88.2% 5,354,500 15.2% 66.9%
1990 27,900,300 64.8% 85.9% 5,802,100 7.1% 53.2%
1991 43,400,100 66.2% 83.4% 8,677,200 19.6% 67.9%
1992 56,401,800 76.2% 87.13% 11,171,900 42.5% 74.6%
1993 58,048,200 67.0% 84.0% 16,406,600 66.3% 80.5%
1994 58,860,000 59.2% 82.9% 15,764,000 70.4% 83.6%
1995 85,768,700 66.5% 84.9% 24342,500 12.4% 43.6%
Sources: Based on data from Asociaci6n de Exportadores y Embotelladores de Vino for Chile, and I.N.V. for Argentina. Although data
representing Mendoza are national, the province is responsible for almost 100% of Argentina's wine exports.
*Data do not include sparkling wines.
Year Liters
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Yet at the same time the benchmark per liter value of Chilean and Mendozan exports, a
proxy for industry value-added, remains low especially for Mendoza, and well behind a "New
World" newcomer like Australia (Table 3.2). At least for Mendoza, a good part of the explanation
lies in the growth of exports of cheap table wine to Chile and other Latin American countries. Bulk
wine exports to Spain during a recent drought also account for the lion's share of Mendoza's high
volumes for 1995. But even when cheap exports are factored out of the calculations, the evidence is
still damning. For example, wine exports to the demanding U.S. market, most of which consist of
the finer bottled wines, show Southern Cone wineries lagging far behind the leaders (Table 3.3). In
other words, even the leading wineries and supply chains have substantial challenges of their own to
increase the quality and retail value of their wine.
Table 3.2
FOB PRICES OF WINE EXPORTS OF "NEW WORLD" COUNTRIES.; 1987-1996($/LITER)
Year Argentina* Chile Australia
1987 0.53 1.21
1990 034 1.19 238
1993 0.99 1.48
1996 0.87 1.59 2.86
Source: From I.N.V., U.S.I.T.C. 1993, and I.W.A. 1998 (Fundaci6n Chile February-March 1998).
*Prices are for bottled fine wine only.
Table 3.3
FOB PRICES OF WINE EXPORTS TO THE USA.; 1985-1995
($/LITER)
Year Argentina* Chile Australia Italy France
1985 1.04 1.59 2.38 1.22 3.58
1990 1.42 1.76 4.18 2.59 633
1992 1.96 1.90 3.77 2.98 7.13
1995 2.37 1.98 4.28 2.80 7.77
Source: From I.N.v. and I.W.A. 1998 (Fundaci6n Chile, February-March 1998).
*Prices are for bottled fine wine only.
U.S. retail data for 1989/1990 (Table 3.4) provide a complementary picture beyond the
averages; for that period, no Chilean wine bottle sold for more than $10. Meanwhile, Australia's
best wines sold for more than $50 a bottle, and France's over $100 a bottle. This meant that despite
the more than five years of accumulated production and export experience built since the early
1980s, Chile's leading wineries had been unable to come up with a single wine good enough to
break through the $10/bottle retail ceiling. During the 1990s, prices rose gradually. By 1998 a
handful of the best Chilean wines were retailing in the U.S. at over $20 a bottle, and two had
reached the $50/bottle mark. But in a recent specialized review by a leading industry journal both
of the latter wines had scored below the 90 points and were described as significantly overpriced.36
Table 3.4
RETAIL PRICES FOR VARIETAL 3/4 LITER WINE BOTTLES IN THE USA.; 1989/90
Country Chile Australia U.S.A. Italy France
Varietal Max Min. Av. Max Min. Av. Max Min. Av. Max Min. Av. Max Mi. Av.
Cabernet Sauv. 9.8 3.0 6.0 54.0 5.5 13.1 38.0 5.5 16.6 76.0 76.0 76.0 67.0 8.0 25.7
Chardonnay 7.8 4.0 6.0 20.0 7.0 11.4 24.0 7.0 15.0 45.0 5.0 15.8 135.0 11.8 n.d.
Merlot 6.0 4.5 5.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 20.0 7.0 14.2 n.d. n.d. n.d. 22.0 5.0 10.1
Source: The Wine Spectator, 1989 and 1990; in Fundaci6n Chile, April 1992.
n.d.: no data
The growers involved with the grape juice processing industry have complications of their
own. This market segment is extremely competitive; used as a natural sweetener and with several
substitutes such as apple and pear juice, grape juice is a commodity. It is a low value-added product
subject to intense price fluctuations (Figure 3.2). When, for example, international prices of grape
juice fall as they often do to $900/ton or less, it is only those growers with yields over 30,000
kg./hectare and with 30+ hectares, that can sell for 0 11/kg or less and can still turn a profit (Table
3.5). With the Mendozan provincial average yield fluctuating between 9,100-13,300 kg./hectare and
the average vineyard size at 7.6 hectares, only a select few growers fall into the category of serious
long-term contenders.
Figure 3.2
TOTAL EXPORTS AND VALUE/TON OF GRAPE
JUICE CONCENTRATE; ARGENTINA 1990-1996
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Table 3.5
SENSITIVITY OF THE DIRECT COST OF CONCENTRATED GRAPE JUICE TO THE PRICE OF RAW MATERIAL;
MENDOZA 1997
Total Direct Cost To Make $722 $771 $819 $868 $916 $965 $1,013 $1,062 $1,110 $1,159
Concentrated Juice (U$S/ton)
Base Cost of Grape (U$S/kilo) 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17
Total Direct Cost of Grape $388 $437 $485 $534 $582 $631 $679 $728 $776 $825
Input (U$S/ton)A
Share of Direct Processing 46% 43% 41% 39%
Costs
Share of Direct Cost of Grape 54% 57% 59% 61%
Inputs
Source: Own preparation based on interviews of Mendoza juice processors.
A One kilo of concentrated grape juice requires 4.85 kg. of grapes.
36%
64%
35%
65%
33%
67%
31%
69%
30%
70%
29%-
71%
The point is that movements up the learning curve are not easy to make. Each wine supply
chain faces different challenges depending in which market segment it competes. For example,
superpremium wine producers need to learn grape growing techniques that better concentrate
36 See Wine Spectator October 15, 1998.
flavors in grapes and wine making techniques that best extract them, as well as continuity in flavor
and product quality from vintage to vintage to develop consumer brand allegiance. By the same
token, intermediate quality wineries also seek continuity in flavor, but need to balance quality and
quantity to deliver good value for a reasonable price. In turn, grape juice producers look for high
yields and high sugar content. Despite the differences in the challenges each supply chain faces,
two common threads run through them. The first is that low land and labor costs have provided
Chile's and Mendoza's wine supply chains with a comparative advantage with respect to their
competitors in other nations, but only within certain limits. The second is that steady improvement
in wine quality requires adoption of mechanisms for continuous learning from production and
market experience; purchases of new hardware and borrowing of wine-making techniques help but
within limits.
Limits to Comparative Advantage
Lower labor and land costs are a source of advantage to Southern Cone wine supply chains'
international competitiveness. In the mid 1990s, integrated Chilean wineries could produce
Chardonnay grapes at an average direct cost per bottle of only 16 cents, whereas Napa Valley
wineries had to pay 71 cents, over three times more (Table 3.6). Depending on how integrated the
winery was the actual prices it paid could in fact be much higher. For example, Napa Valley's 1996
average (high quality) market grape price was $1,509/ton, meaning that wineries that did not own
grapes spent approximately $1.89 per bottle." Indirect costs also favored Southern Cone wineries;
Napa Valley growers could pay as much as $120,000 for a hectare of vineyards, whereas Chileans
spent under $50,000, and Mendoza growers somewhere between $12,000 and $25,000 depending
on location. 3s These differences explain why in 1997 one of Concha y Toro's popular premium
wines retailed at $9 a bottle while a Mondavi of comparable quality sold for $14.39
" Wine Spectator, June 15, 1997.
38 For sources see Wine Spectator, Juri and Arjona (1996), Peters (1997).
3 Wine Spectator, November 30, 1997.
Table 3.6
DIRECT COSTS PER TON OF CHARDONNAY GRAPES IN CALIFORNIA, CHILE, AND MENDOZA
Country California Chile Mendoza,
Region Sonoma Napa Monterey San Luis North
Interior
Direct Costs $2,600 $2,600 $2,200 $2,200 $1,900 $529 $738
Tons per Acre 5.2 4.6 4.0 4.3 9.2 4.0 4.0
Cost per Ton $500 $565 $550 $512 $207 $132 $185
Cost per Bottle @ 800 Bottles/Ton $0.63 $0.71 $0.69 $0.64 $0.26 $0.16 $0.23
Source: Based on Grape Intelligence 1994 for California data, and personal consultations with grape growers and wine processors in
Mendoza and Chile in 1996.
Yet at the same time lower labor and land costs could only provide comparative advantage
within certain limits. In fact, different strategies such as degree of vertical integration, vineyard
quality and productivity, allowed California supply chains to compensate for a good part of their
cost disadvantages. Table 3.7 provides a cost breakdown of what consumers pay for wine at
different retail prices. It shows the maximum that wineries can afford to pay for grapes to remain
within each market segment. A comparison of those prices with the direct costs of grape
production (Table 3.6) shows that there is considerable room for strategy. It suggests, for example,
that in the low priced varietal segment a Chardonnay from California's North Interior could easily
compete on a cost basis with one from Mendoza or Chile--provided their quality was relatively
similar--because the former vineyards are far more productive. By the same token, an integrated
Sonoma winery could compete in the $15/bottle segment with a non-integrated winery in Chile,
given that Chardonnay grapes from Chile's best valley, Casablanca, were being sold during the
1998 harvest at the market price of $1.25/bottle. In other words, local improvements in grape
growing, in wine making techniques, and in general work practices could make up for significant
comparative disadvantages.
Table 3.7
COST BREAKDOWN OF A WINE BOTTLE; CALIFORNIA 1994
Relation Low End High End Super
Popular Popular Premium
Premium Premium
(1) Retail Price: $ $5.00 $10.00 $15.00
(2) FOB Vineyard (50%) (1)*0.50% $2.50 $5.00 $7.50
(3) Share Production Costs (Marketing, administration, distribution, 60% 55% 50%
processing, dry costs, grape costs): %
(4) Production Costs: $ (2)*(3) $1.50 $2.75 $3.75
(5) Share Processing Costs (Processing, dry costs): % 61% 58% 53%
(6) Processing Costs: $ (4)*(5) $0.92 $1.58 $2.00
(7) Maximum Available To Pay for Grapes (4)-(6) $0.58 $1.17 $1.75
Source: Grape Intelligence, Chardonnay: An Assessment of Supply and Demand. California, August 1994.
A further cost structure breakdown comparing grape production of different qualities in
Chile and Argentina also shows that because fine varietal vineyards are proportionately less labor-
intensive than medium-quality, higher-yield vineyards, the relative incidence of the cost of labor is
not as high as one would presuppose (Table 3.8). As was noted, one of the ways of improving
grape flavor and aroma concentration is lowering yields. Better quality vineyards are typically given
less fertilizer to control vegetative growth. As a result, tasks such as pruning, fertilizing, canopy
management, and manual harvesting are shorter and less labor-consuming. In addition, the costs of
dry inputs--e.g., cork, bottle, labels, capsule, box--are higher than those intensive in labor (Table
3.9).40
Table 3.8
DIRECT COST STRUCTURE FOR 1 HECTARE OF HIGH AND MEDIUM QUALITY VINEYARDS; ARGENTINA AND CHILE
(US$ 1996)
Argentina Chile
Grape Yield (tons/hectare) 9 tons/hect. 15 tons/hect. 9 tons/hect. 15 tons/hect.
Inputs (High quality grape (Med. quality grape) (High quality grape) (Med. quality grape)
Agrochemicals $215 13% $272 12% $304 26% $474 28%
Machinery $266 16% $268 12% $183 16% $202 12%
Labor (includes manual harvest) $897 56% $1432 64% $456 39% $791 46%
Other (energy, unexpected costs, etc.) $246 15% $275 12% $221 19% $247 14%
Direct Cost for 1 Hectare $1,624 100% $2,247 100% $1,164 100% $1,714 100%
Cost of Grape for 1 Bottle of Wine $0.23 $0.18 $0.16 $0.13
(750 cm3; 3/4 Liter)
Source: Based on personal consultations with grape growers and wine processors in Mendoza and Chile.
* Relatively speaking, however, vineyards inherently require far more working capital than most crops. For
example, one Argentine sectoral report noted that grape growing is unique among primary sector activities in that
vineyards demand sixteen times more working capital (labor + inputs) than wheat and sunflower, ten times more
than corn, almost three times more than cotton, and 55% more than sugar cane (AVA 1986).
Table 39
DRY COSTS OF A BOTTLE OF INTERMEDIATE QUALITY WINE; ARGENTINA AND CHIILE*
(US$ 1996)
Inputs Argentina Chile
Cork 45 mm., intermediate quality $0.19 $0.15
Bottle: Bordeaux style, 750 cm3 $0.21 $0.27
Neck Cipsule: PVC $0.03 $0.03
Labels: Front and back $0.07 $0.08
Subtotal Dry Costs $0.51 $0.53
Source: Based on personal consultations with grape growers and wine processors in Mendoza and Chile
and Juri and Tennerini (1992).
*Estimations based on popular premium bottle that retails at approx. $5-7/bottle. Final prices vary,
depending on size of order.
In sum, wine supply chains could not rely on comparative advantage from low land and
labor costs as a long term basis for competitiveness, even in the lower value-added activities. The
second common thread to the challenges wine supply chains faced is that purchases of new
hardware and borrowed wine-making techniques improved quality, but only within limits. Further
movements up the learning ladder required systematic use of tacit local information.
Help from Machinery Suppliers
Fine Wine Supply Chains
During ISI and through the 1970s Chilean and Mendozan wineries were supplied by
Mendoza's metalworking firms. Wine processing machinery manufacturers in Italy, France,
Germany, and Switzerland were too busy upgrading European and California wineries to want to
sell equipment to Latin American wineries. Evidence is that Uruguay's economy was open for
most of the 1970s and Chile's for the second half of the decade, but it wasn't until the early 1980s
that as advanced-country orders dwindled, European machinery-makers looked elsewhere for new
markets.
The Italian firm Velo was the leader in Chile, signing up its first local dealer, Andr6s Schloss
in 1982, but only starting in Mendoza a decade later. It began supplying stainless steel technology
to the largest integrated wineries, immediately displacing the Mendozan metalworking firms that
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had failed to upgrade their products.4 ' As new boutique wineries emerged in subsequent years the
number of international machinery suppliers expanded to six or seven dealers. All of them sold
more or less the same types of equipment, especially geared for fine wine-making. Most
processing machinery and accessories for tanks were imported directly from Europe and the
stainless steel tanks assembled in Chile. In Mendoza the arrival of international machinery makers
was much slower than in Chile, delayed partly because of the relatively late liberalization (in 1991)
but also because of the initial small size of the targeted market. After a decade of downsizing, only
a few First Zone wineries had the financial capability to purchase significant quantities of stainless
steel machinery.4 2
In less than two decades machinery suppliers sold Southern Cone wineries over 200 million
liters of stainless steel storage capacity and processing equipment, including the most modern
destemmers, presses, filters, refrigeration equipment, bottling machinery, and pumps. The
contribution of European machinery retailers to Southern Cone upgrading was fourfold: first,
before they sold the technology to the Chileans and Mendozans they had collectively spent more
than a decade of product design, research, and user experience with the hardware, enological
products, and techniques for the major varietals. In other words, the stainless steel technology was
well tried and tested in the world's best wineries and ready for use. The hardware itself did not
require significant adaptation to local conditions, and it came in multiple scales to fit different
production volumes. While it was not scale-neutral, neither was it intensely scale-sensitive. In
addition, some of it already came preprogrammed for use. Second, the interest rates at which it was
offered were very accessible. Third, in the process of selling the technology they provided
41 Velo continues to dominate to date. It currently has about 50% of the Chilean market for tanks, filters, and
presses, and 60% of the refrigeration market.
42 With few exceptions, by 1996 the Europeans had all but taken over Mendoza's machinery market. Local
metalworking shops like Gasquet ended up signing representational agreements with European machinery makers
such as Bucher and Pera, and began to provide maintenance and repair services for them. Others closed down directly.
Some of the service agreements did not last long, in part because local shops could not satisfy the quality
requirements of the firms they represented. On the other hand, some Mendozan capital goods manufacturers
downsized or closed down for reasons not always related to their lack of technological capabilities. Working capital
shortages and high interest rates were two of the most common problems. Italian manufacturers were especially
successful because of the low government-subsidized interest rates they were able to offer their customers. See
Cuervo and Lessard (1997) and Walters and Scaraffia (1996).
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extensive technical assistance on its use. Fourth, they invited their major clients' local technicians
to visit European wineries and view first hand the results, thus providing them a holistic learning
experience on how modern elite wineries operated. The leading Chilean and Mendozan supply
chains relied heavily on this hardware to upgrade from production of traditional oxidized wines to
fruity, clean-tasting varietals.
Tutelage from machinery suppliers, however, had its limits, and partly explains the slow rise
in value added of the Southern Cone's wine exports. First, the investments in stainless steel
machinery and refrigeration equipment turned out to be the "easy" part of catch-up. As was noted
in Chapter 2, the hardware per se does not guarantee quality improvements beyond a certain
minimum. A bottle of wine with a retail value of $50 is made with roughly the same technology as
a varietal worth $6. The larger part of the price differential is attributable to the know-how required
to make a complex wine. Second, despite the technical assistance machinery makers supplied, most
wineries did not pick up immediately the full set of lessons on what fine wine making involved.
The Chilean integrated wineries provide a good example; during the 1980s they built processing
facilities almost like factories, and simultaneously planted thousands of hectares of fine varietal
vineyards much like the early Californians had done. But they did not pay much attention to the
suitability of the microclimate to the grape variety, nor did they implement the continuous
improvement practices that were so critical to the success of the model (see also next section).
Clearly, while the new technology was an improvement over the production infrastructure that
existed before, and the general grape growing conditions were good, the wines turned out to fall in
the low-priced "good value" category.
Some critics within the machinery supplier community attribute at least partial fault to
themselves; they note that many colleagues' eagerness to sell equipment too often prevails over the
clients' best interest. In other words, often their enthusiasm for selling the technology may distract
them from ensuring that their clients know how to make best use of it. As an example, one
commentator described the machinery purchases made by Trapiche in Mendoza in the early 1990s
as "poetic". During a plant visit he was especially surprised at the lack of coherence in the
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sequencing of the investments and the poor use that technicians were making of the hardware, at a
great cost to the firm (it had built up a substantial debt). A few years later Trapiche's precarious
financial position had become vox populi in the province, and in 1998 its owners sold it and its
parent company to an outside group of investors. In sum, the elite wineries have learned the hard
way that machinery on its own was not in itself a mechanism of continuous upgrading. Neither
have all suppliers shown to have the requisite skills to help fine wine and table wine supply chains
upgrade.
Table Wine Supply Chains
In contrast to fine wine makers from the First Zone, Eastern Mendoza table wine producers
had no clear model to follow to guide their restructuring efforts. Assistance for them first came in
the late 1980s in the form of increased demand for high yield grapes for juice. But small growers
and their bulk processors were on their own. Because of the bulk table wine industry's precarious
situation, they were initially dismissed as potential customers by machinery makers (these focused
on First Zone elite wineries). In fact relative to the elite wineries they were falling even further
behind technologically, missing out on the intense learning that the interactions with machinery
makers provided. Then in the mid 1990s as the price of wine recovered some wineries started with
modest renewal plans. For example, they painted their cement tanks with epoxy, and a few even
incorporated refrigeration units (to better control fermentation) and the first hyperoxigenator/
floating machines. The latter were stainless steel tanks designed to quickly remove solids in the
grape juice by oxygenating the musts and skimming them off the top as they floated up. This
equipment was supposed to improve the quality of table wines by better preserving their aromas.
But when the first results came even the optimists were surprised with what they tasted: cheap
grapes such as Cereza and Moscatel Rosado were producing some very good wines. This was the
trigger that reopened a string of controversies regarding Eastern Mendoza's productive potential.
To those who felt that the region had always been shortchanged and criticized unfairly for its poor
quality and high volumes it only confirmed their worst suspicions. The fact that wineries from the
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First Zone were going more and more often to the area to buy bulk intermediate wines for their
finer blends while continuing to bad-mouth them seemed like evidence of a conspiracy to keep
prices low at the growers' and bulk processors' expense. To those that were interested in tapping
the region's productive potential it made it only more evident that much more information on local
grapes, vine growing and winemaking techniques were required to uncover them. Unfortunately, no
quick answers could be found at hand. Institutional research biases towards the First Zone and the
lack of funds in Eastern Mendoza would delay this kind of information gathering effort for several
years. The subregion would need to rely on other mechanisms to obtain the kind of localized
knowledge that was required. This is a topic that I pick up in several sections that follow and again
in Chapter 4.
Two other important contributions from machinery suppliers to Eastern Mendoza producers
are worth noting. A lot of assistance has come from Piero Antoniazzi, who has been especially
active in the area. He is an Italian dealer who visited Mendoza in 1989 and quickly realized that the
East offered the biggest long-term potential market. (At the time, however, his opinion could hardly
be considered widely shared.) He returned in 1993 to set up his shop Tiainox in San Martin, the
main grape growing district in that subregion, and set new standards for the quality of service while
still turning a profit. Antoniazzi is not a machinery manufacturer but an intermediator. He ascribes
his success to the fact that he knows the wine business well (as opposed to only wine making) and
is not tied to selling a particular kind of machinery. This gives him the freedom to recommend his
clients what's best for them rather than needing to "get rid" of particular types of machinery
(manufacturers regularly try to "dump" machines on their customers when they have overstocks
that they are unlikely to sell). He helps bulk wineries create multi-year investment plans tied to their
financial possibilities, prioritizing those that are most likely to have immediate impact on quality.
For instance, he notes that white wine producers in the hot east are likely to benefit most from
incorporating refrigeration equipment at an early stage. He also helps wineries obtain the financing
to pay for the purchases.
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A second very active machinery maker that is having a big impact in Eastern Mendoza is
Alfa Laval, a manufacturer of carton container bottling technology, commonly known as the Tetra.
This Swedish company operated in Argentina since the early 1980s under monopolistic conditions.
At the time, Tetra became the container of choice for table wine, replacing glass liter bottles. It was
cheaper than the glass bottle and more efficient to fill and transport. In addition it was well accepted
by consumers. But it was leased exclusively to a handful of the biggest bottlers/ distributors,
among them, Pefiaflor, Catena, and Cartellone, effectively concentrating further a table wine market
that already had oligopolistic tendencies. However, in 1990 International Paper (a U.S. company)
began to sell a similar technology, first to orange juice processors and then to wine bottlers. A year
and a half later Alfa Laval reversed its exclusive licensing policies and began to aggressively market
its Tetrapak machines to several Eastern Mendoza wineries that it had previously stone-walled. The
firm designed a convenient pricing scheme whereby it charged its users a unit price per container
filled, rather than for the expensive packing machine itself. Several wineries such as Berrutti y
Chini and Crotta seized the opportunity and incorporated their own tetra units at no fixed cost to
them. They eliminated unwieldy demijohn bottling lines, a significant improvement given Tetra's
acceptability among consumers. Alfa Laval was also instrumental in 1996 in what turned into a
novel Eastern Mendoza experiment: it organized three firms--Fantelli, Palazzo, and Gomez--into a
consortium to share a single tetra bottling machine. In both examples Alfa's assistance was crucial
to put local wineries on a more equal footing with the big bottlers.
In sum, Eastern Mendoza has not yet received significant tutelage from machinery suppliers
in terms of the volume of new pieces of equipment sold. Roughly only 25 percent of the 250-300
bulk wineries in the area have made any purchases at all. Yet for those in the industry who were
paying attention, the few units of new technology sold have had an eye-opening effect. They have
provided tentative new evidence that Eastern Mendoza has the capacity to produce good wines. In
addition, a few of the traditional demijohn bottlers have also taken advantage of the new commercial
opportunities of Tetra. As will be detailed later, these events have awakened a new confidence in
some of the area's political and economic actors, and mobilized an unlikely set of technical
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professionals. They are attempting to fill in what they perceive as a huge information gaps between
the industry's perception of Eastern Mendoza and the region's productive possibilities.
Buyer-Assisted Technological Learning
Fine Wine Supply Chains
International wine buyers regularly offer their fine wine suppliers abundant advice on what
wine consumers prefer and in what price categories. Winery technicians and marketing managers
who want to travel overseas to get to know their customers better rely heavily on traders to organize
wine tasting sessions and coordinate visits to restaurants and dealers. This is the fundamental
information they need to prepare their marketing and production plans. Another common practice
is for brokers to send wine samples to a winery and ask whether it is interested in replicating it.
After several sample exchanges the broker may sign a purchase contract for a certain quantity.
Many of the recent joint ventures between Mendoza wineries and international distributors operate
this way.
As often, distributors send their own technical experts to work next to local staff. Trapiche
in Mendoza is a good example. Every year since the 1970s the firm hosts a Japanese technician in
Mendoza to supervise the preparation of the types of wines Japanese consumers are demanding that
season. International traders and brokers may also induce wineries to make general plant
improvements in hygiene and safety. To use again the example of Trapiche, in 1997 its English
distributor, the Ehrmans Group, contracted a quality control firm to audit Trapiche's operations.
The auditor inspected everything, from vineyards to processing lines, including hygiene, labor
practices, lighting, safety, and pest control, and made a list of improvements for the winery to
implement. For instance, it asked Trapiche to cover and enclose its bottling line to keep out
potential dust and insects from entering the bottles when they are lined up waiting to be filled.
But even after more than a decade of upgrading and working with international wine dealers
most Southern Cone fine wine producers still have much to learn on what markets to target and at
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what prices. To date most produce a wine first, and after determining its quality place it in a
particular market niche. This was, for instance, how Concha y Toro developed its ultrapremium
Don Melchor in the early 1990s. It wanted to make a very good Cabernet and then worried about
what segment of the market would buy it (it currently retails for $25/bottle in the U.S.).43 Only in
1997 did it change this strategy for the first time. The firm first...
"...determined through market research that a lucrative niche existed, especially
in the United States, for Chardonnays, Merlots and Cabernet Sauvignons priced at
$8 to $10 a bottle. And only then did Concha y Toro go about developing the
wines. 'Our market approach was also different...We wanted a distinctive bottle and
an easy-to-remember name.' The bottle's flat-lipped, svelte shape, the marketing
director candidly concedes, was copied from Mondavi. And 'Trio' was a lot easier
to pronounce in English than Don Melchor, Marques de Casa Concha, and Casillero
del Diablo--other, earlier upscale Concha y Toro wines."
In sum, tutelage from international wine traders and buyers has provided Chilean and
Mendozan wineries key technical and market information on wine making techniques and
consumer tastes, and induced numerous plant safety and hygiene improvements. However, the
breadth of this tutelage has been modest even in Chile that has more of the varietals that
international markets demand, and even narrower in Mendoza that has less of them.
Table Wine Supply Chains
The main beneficiaries of buyer assistance are fine wine supply chains. Intermediate and
table wine producers get far less exposure, if at all, to this kind of tutelage. Foreign supermarkets
have presented one of the few windows of opportunity for intermediate quality supply chains to
export. Most other exports have been bulk sales without continuity, for example, to Spain during
its 1995 drought. Intermediate quality wines typically retail for $3-$4.50 at the store, consisting of
4 See Wine Spectator, November 30, 1997.
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red and white blends. England's Sainsbury's has been one of the most active buyers in the
Southern Cone. Several Chilean and Mendozan wineries have worked with the retailer. For
example, the Chilean cooperative Los Robles became a Sainsbury supplier when it hired an
experienced local consultant, Klaus Schroeder, to help it improve its wines. Schroeder already
knew Sainsbury's wine buyer from his time at Vifia Santa Rita. He helped Los Robles establish
the contact and develop the wine that the English supermarket wanted. Sainsbury also sent its own
enologist to guide production at the Chilean cooperative.
But tutelage from the English supermarket did not always reach producers directly. Eastern
Mendoza's bulk wineries are an example: international buyers that purchase intermediate quality
wines prefer to deal directly with the large integrated wineries. First Zone producers buy Eastern
Mendoza's bulk wines and blend and improve them for export. Their competitive advantage over
eastern wineries is that they offer traders quality guarantees and production experience that the latter
cannot match. For instance, in Mendoza Sainsbury's has purchased intermediate quality wines
through Trapiche's parent company Pefiaflor. The reason is that the winery already has a built
reputation for predictable quality controls. Thus few traders that purchase intermediate quality wine
have directly benefited Eastern Mendoza's bulk producers.
In sum, tutelage from buyers can be significant, helping firms map out different export
market niches, quality standards, and production possibilities. However, for intermediate and low
quality producers the benefits are far fewer, because of the fewer buyers that trade bottled wine of
this type, and because elite wineries may also have advantages as suppliers for their better quality
guarantees. However, the Los Robles example shows that buyers are willing to diversify their
suppliers and work with newcomers as long as someone does provide the valued quality, product,
and business guarantees. In the case of Los Robles that important role was played by a consultant
enologist, the topic to which I turn next.
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Demand-Driven Vineyard Upgrading
Fine Wine Supply Chains
The mixed upgrading record of even the best wineries looks good when compared to the
general difficulties they have faced improving their supply of grapes. Table wine supply chains
have been in disarray for a long time, and they are unlikely to improve quickly in the near future.
But problems are not limited to poor quality grapes; growers of fine varietals, and even in-house
planting efforts, have encountered serious problems of their own. Both Chilean and Mendozan
firms have made poor locational choices for their vineyards, but it is more noticeable in the former
because of the size of the investments. Chilean wineries were partly victims of their own success:
as exports rose and grape prices increased they wanted to ensure some stability in the cost of their
inputs. From the late '80s on most of the large firms began planting thousands of hectares of fine
varietals without paying particularly close attention to the suitability of the soil, climate, exposure,
and drainage to the grape variety.
Wineries' difficulties coming up with respectable white wines are illustrative of this point.
Until the 1970s Chileans used to blend Sauvignon Blanc with Semillon and store it in oak casks
until its fruity flavor disappeared. A good part of the problem was related to the use of the inferior
Semillon varietal, but also related to the fact that most of the 20,000 hectares of white grape
vineyards were located in the hotter Valle Central that runs north-south. This valley is well suited
for Cabernet Sauvignon, but less than ideal for white grapes that need cooler climates. Miguel
Torres was the first who attempted to improve Chilean whites when he introduced cold fermentation
techniques from 1979 on. At that point winemakers realized that much of their Sauvignon Blanc
was in fact an inferior clone, Sauvignonasse that produced wines with more vegetal flavors. Then in
the early 1980s as a result of the wine crisis most of the country's Semillon vineyards were
uprooted, and some of them replanted with Chardonnay. Surface area of this varietal rose quickly
from no more than two hundred hectares to several thousand, a direct result of its high international
demand. Unsurprisingly, Chile's whites remained poor. As one industry specialist noted, the
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results while fruity and inexpensive were no better than cheap fighting varietals from Australia or
California.4
Improvement in whites has come at its own pace. It began first through the Concha y Toro
enologist and viticulturist Pablo Morand6 who after visiting Sonoma County in California in the
early 1980s found that its microclimate resembled very closely that of the Casablanca Valley back
home. Different to the Valle Central, Casablanca opens west to the Pacific and is therefore cooled
by the ocean fogs. Morand6 planted his first few hectares of vineyards in Casablanca in 1982, and
wine trials several years later proved him right. But Casablanca also has its problems:
"During the growing season, from October through March, the region totals
nearly 30 percent fewer degree days (a measure of heat summation) than the Maipo
Valley; the harvest can be a month later. The risk of spring frost is much higher
here, and the melting snow that runs off the Andes and irrigates the Central Valley
vineyards is unavailable, so all the vines must be drip-irrigated."4 5
Still, after meticulous study, by the late '80s most of the big wineries--Concha y Toro,
Santa Carolina, Santa Rita's Carmen, Franciscan's Veramonte, Errdzuriz, and others had started
plantations in Casablanca. By 1995 over 2,000 hectares were in place.
Mendoza's fine wineries faced even greater difficulties. In addition to the locational
challenges, in the early 1990s fine quality vineyards continued to be eradicated as a result of the
industry downsizing of the 1980s. The sectoral loss of quality grapes presented itself as potentially
disastrous for fine wine supply chains in the medium term--down to 5,000 hectares of the best
varietals, most would be left with no inputs to process except their own. Moreover, few wineries
had the capital to aim for self-sufficiency. Mendoza's wineries urgently needed to revert the
vineyard eradication trend, and reach out to the deeply suspicious fine grape growers.
4 See Thomas Matthews, Wine Spectator, June 15, 1995.
4 See Matthews, op cit.
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Suspicion and quality problems went together. The suspicion was a direct result of the
inflationary 1970s and 1980s with relations between grape processors and growers becoming very
strained. Processors would habitually delay payments to growers. By the time the growers
received the second or third of nine monthly installments inflation had completely eaten away its
value. In addition, grape prices had dropped so low that in some years it did not even make
economic sense to harvest. Not surprisingly during the 1980s Mendoza lost almost 100,000
hectares of vineyards including substantial surface area of the finest varietals. To defend
themselves from abuse Mendoza's growers switched to "third party" processing: for a 5-10
percent fee, they had someone process the grapes and store the wine for them. They could then sell
it at their convenience. During those years the grape market practically disappeared. But the
change had consequences far beyond compensating growers more fairly. Wine quality dropped
dramatically because of the increased segmentation of the supply chain. Quality wineries and
growers no longer gave feedback to each other during the growing season and harvest that could
improve the quality of grapes and the wines once they were processed. Wineries limited themselves
to buying semiprocessed wine on the bulk market and finishing it (processing and filtering) before
bottling. In sum, at the beginning of the 1990s the state of Mendoza's fine grape market had
serious problems. Progress for Mendoza's independent fine grape growers has come very slowly
because those who were supposed to be the leaders of the upgrading push were themselves unsure
how to proceed. Here it is worth recounting the experience of one winery, Chandon, that has taken
the lead.
The Chandon Experiment
The French multinational beverage giant, Chandon, opened its Mendoza operations in 1959
and targeted the domestic fine wine and champagne market segments. From the start Chandon
operated as a mostly integrated winery, with its own marketing and distribution team, processing
facilities, and vineyards. It only purchased some grapes for its less prestigious wines. For several
decades fine wine consumption represented a very small portion of total domestic sales. The
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winery was not especially large, with no more than 5 million liters of processing capacity. In a
good year such as 1986 it sold 5 million bottles but then dropped as much as 20 percent during the
hyperinflationary end of the decade. Things changed beginning in the early 1990s when fine wine
consumption increased steadily and the economy stabilized. From then on the winery expanded
quickly, investing $3-4 million a year to expand processing capacity to almost 20 million liters, and
sold an average of 15 million bottles a year during 1996/1997.
Facing a rapidly rising need for fine grapes in the early 1990s even as fine quality vineyards
continued to be eradicated, the winery found itself under significant pressure to make a strategic
business decision. It could either expand its own supply of quality vineyards to become self-
sufficient--and in doing so, have to sink significant financial resources into it--or it could continue
as it had done in the past, producing its own grapes only for its best wines and champagnes, and
purchasing the rest from growers. If it chose the latter path, it urgently needed to revert the vineyard
eradication trend, to reach out to a growing number of grape suppliers, to overcome their suspicions
and upgrade them to meet its minimum quality standards. It decided to take up the challenge.
In 1993 Chandon came up with an upgrading model that has become the industry
benchmark and that few have been able to match. Its first golden rule was to build a reputation for
prompt payment. The test came during the difficult Tequila crisis of 1995;46 Chandon was one of
the few Mendoza wineries that kept its word; growers took notice and increased their loyalty.
Second, because most growers were cash strapped Chandon gave them a package of specific
fertilizers and weed killers free of charge, with instructions on when and how to use them. Third,
growers were guaranteed personalized technical assistance. They were given direct access to
vineyard manager Martin Reboredo's cellular phone. Fourth, Chandon created a three-part point
system by which vineyards and harvested grapes are graded. Growers are guaranteed a minimum
market price for their grapes; good performance is rewarded on top of market price. One part of
the grade, given by Reboredo, reflects the vineyard's general condition before the harvest; strong
* The "Tequila" effect refers to the Mexican devaluation of 1995 that triggered a financial crisis in several other
Latin American countries. In a matter of days Argentina lost several billion dollars of foreign reserves as capital left
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vegetative growth and high yields that dilute the aroma, tannin concentration, and provide herbal
flavors are discouraged. The second part of the grade is given at the time of harvest. As freshly-cut
grapes arrive at the processing plant in boxes, evaluators randomly select a few and objectively
measure quantities of unwanted dirt, leaves and twigs attached to the grapes; the fewer the higher the
score. The third part of the grade reflects the sanitary conditions of the grape; the score is lowered
if there is rot or fungus such as mildew.
In the beginning the growers were unconvinced that these standards in any way improved
wine quality. To persuade them, Chandon organized intense educational sessions at its production
facility. They were shown technical films and asked to taste wines from grapes with and without
leaves and twigs, with more and less concentration, etc. so they could check the differences for
themselves. In Reboredo's own words, Chandon wanted to "make them accomplices of their
objectives." As soon as the growers understood where the improvement was, they were asked to
bring in their foremen and workers, so they would also experience first hand the difference the
changes made. In this way those directly involved in executing the work had a clear understanding
of the consequences of their actions.
Every year after the harvest the winery organizes a big barbecue for its grape suppliers, their
families and staff, in all more than 500 people. The event is intentionally a "circus". The best
growers--those scoring most points--are given prizes such as diplomas, engraved trays and cups (in
addition to the higher prices paid for their grapes). The intent is to nurture in them a sense of pride
in what they do. So far the strategy has paid off; the quality of grapes has improved every year. In
the eyes of some industry observers, Chandon is in a highly vulnerable position; it produces only
10 percent of its grapes and relies on independent growers for the remaining 90 percent. Further
vulnerability comes from the fact that it still signs no contracts and instead relies on an honor
system. (In contrast, the large Chilean wineries regularly sign five-year contracts with their
preferred growers). For the moment the evidence defies the skeptics; even as fine grapes are
becoming scarce, prices have shot up, and elite wineries are stealing growers from each other,
the country for safer havens, thus putting a strain on the banking and credit system. Many firms stopped paying
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Chandon has had no trouble meeting its production targets; the winery has its stable core of
suppliers. A few leave the system every year to sell elsewhere, but there are always new ones
coming in to replace them.
Reboredo believes the model works because growers receive a personalized service from
him--they can even call him at home if they need to. Whenever Chandon changes any of its
policies all growers are called well in advance and the rationale for the new expectations, the
benchmarks they are expected to meet, and the full set of rules on how they will be evaluated,
rewarded and punished are carefully explained to them. Reboredo is always at hand when pay day
comes around to intervene immediately if there is any discrepancy or mistake in someone's
compensation. He often ends up taking sides with the growers against his employer. It is this
socially responsible attitude and utmost respect for his suppliers that has earned the firm their
loyalty.
Chandon's grower upgrading policies have had a significant impact in Mendoza in more
than one way. In 1997 the winery worked directly with 203 growers and 300 vineyards. All of
them have fine grapes, but are not necessarily large. In fact most have between 3-7 hectares."
These are the primary beneficiaries of the research and experimentation carried out in the Mendoza
plant as well as what is transferred from the firm's main headquarters in France. In addition, there
are several important secondary effects; first, other wineries have gradually begun to adopt the
Chandon model. This is a major positive change from a business practice that was as antagonistic
as it was generalized across the sector. Second, many growers who sell grapes elsewhere follow
Chandon-style advice they learn from their neighbors who do work with the winery. Third,
growers and wineries have begun to take notice where Chandon buys grapes. Because it is a major
purchaser, in years of scarcity the winery's staff has traveled far and wide across the province
looking for good vineyards in non-traditional areas. When Chandon buys from a particular
114
their bills. Small firms were especially hurt.
' Among Chandon's suppliers, there are 174 vineyards with sizes between 1-5 hectares, 96 vineyards with 6-10
hectares, 18 vineyards with 11-15 hectares, and 12 with 15+ hectares.
location previously unknown for its quality it sends out a signal to the rest of the sector. This may
be one of the most consequential impacts, a topic discussed in the next chapter.
Unfortunately Chandon's success is the exception to the rule. Currently no more than
fifteen or twenty wineries follow its steps. In Eastern Mendoza only big grape juice processors like
Gancia and Jugos Lourdes provide this kind of tutelage to a select group of high yield growers.
Limited assistance to table wine grape growers has come through some cooperatives and public
sector programs (for further discussion see Chapter 4).
Consultant-Assisted Technological Learning
Fine Wine Supply Chains
In the early 1980s the few Southern Cone wineries which could afford it borrowed much of
the requisite knowledge on modern wine-making and grape-growing techniques from international
consultants and through joint ventures. By the end of the decade, however, a critical mass of home-
grown Chilean experts had developed considerable technical expertise and played a central part in
the explosion of boutique wineries that started in the 1990s. Tentative evidence suggests a similar
process is underway in Mendoza. Industry consultants not only brought with them technical
experience but also had an invaluable supply of market information on consumer tastes and price
categones.
Part of the early knowledge on international-style wine-making came from international
consultants. Many of them visited both wine-making regions, and quite often their expenses were
shared by several wineries. Enologists such as Jacques Boissenot (Vifia Santa Rita, Concha y
Toro), Jacques Lurton (Vifia San Pedro), Michel Rolland (Lapostolle, Trapiche), Paul Hobbs
(Esmeralda, Valdivieso), and ampelographers such as Boursiquot from France and Richard Smart
from Australia have made multiple short trips to the two regions. These were the pioneers who
guided managers in several big integrated wineries with their restructuring plans. Other consultants
stayed for much longer. Especially Chile has received an influx of French experts since the 1990s.
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Enologist Ives Pouzet started advising Vifia Los Vascos in the 1980s and then in the 1990s moved
on to work with a number of emerging boutique wineries such as Chateau Los Boldos, Vifia Porta,
and Torredn de Paredes. Gaetane Carron, trained in enology in France, Australia and Oregon,
started at Concha y Toro in the early 1990s, charged with developing the firm's first
superpremium. She did some of the earliest experimentations with prolonged macerations, hotter
fermentations, and oak barrel aging, French techniques that had not been tried in Chile before. The
wine was a Chilean first in beating the $20/bottle mark in U.S. retail stores. Recently Carron has
moved to Vifia Veramonte a Californian-owned winery in Chile. In Mendoza international
consultants arrived later, the first one brought by Catena for Bodegas Esmeralda in 1988. Paul
Hobbs had made his experience in Chardonnay and Cabernet Sauvignon with California's
Mondavi on his Opus One project. Hobbs was instrumental in helping Esmeralda set up the
experimentation systems to identify Mendoza's best grape growing microclimates and cultivation
techniques. French ampelographers also provided invaluable help assisting growers purify their
vineyards, weeding out plants that did not correspond to the varietal of choice. More recently
Australian viticulturists have been consulted repeatedly on their pioneering vine training methods
that achieve higher yields while preserving concentration of tastes and aromas (Table 3.10).
Table 3.10
SAMPLE OF FOREIGN ENOLOGISTS AND VrrICULTURISTS; CHILE AND MENDOZA
Consultant Specialty Year Started Wineries Worked/Consulted For
Ives Pouzet (France) Enology mid '80s+ William Fevre, Los vascos, Los Boldos, Porta, Torre6n
Jacques Boissenot (France) Enology mid '80s+ Santa Rita, Concha y Toro
Gilbert Rokvam (Lafite-France) Enology mid '80s+ Los Vascos, L.F. Edwards
Michel Rolland (Pomerol-Bordeaux-France) Enology/Merlot mid '80s+ Lapostolle, Trapiche, Bianchi, Lavaque
Paul Hobbs (Mondavi/Opus One-California) Enology/Vitic. late '80s+ Esmeralda, Valdivieso
Gaetane Carron (Australia, Oregon) Enology early '90s+ Concha y Toro, Veramonte/Franciscan Vineyards
Richard Smart (Australia) Viticulture early '90s+ ChileVid, Asociaci6n Exportadores, AVA
Paul Monck (Australia) Viticulture early 90s+ ChileVid, Asociaci6n Exportadores, AVA
J.M. Boursiquot (France) Viticulture early '90s+ Asociaci6n Exportadores, Profo Vinos del Maule
Claude Vallat (France) Viticulture early '90s+ Asociaci6n Exportadores, Fundaci6n Chile
Brett Jackson (New Zealand) Enology 1994+ San Pedro
Brian Bicknell (New Zealand) Enology 93-'96 Errdzuriz
Source: Own research, based on conversations with firm owners, enologists, sectoral specialists.
Towards the late 1 880s an elite of local Chilean technicians had acquired enough experience
of their own in the pioneer integrated wineries to begin offering their services as consultants for the
emerging boutique wineries. All had tertiary training from one of the two main universities and
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some had further postgraduate training from Bordeaux, Montpellier, and Davis. Increasingly, they
were participating in harvests in France, California, New Zealand, and Australia during the off-
season where they picked up additional know-how. They became the agents of change that spread
the accumulated knowledge and commercial experience of the leading integrated wineries far and
wide. The group that was most active had graduated around the 1970s. Among them was San
Pedro's Aurelio Montes who split to form his own winery with three associates in 1988. Over time
he became consultant to approximately a dozen wineries, including La Fortuna, Viu Manent, Santa
Inis, Echeverria, and Bisquertt to name a few. Felipe de Solminihac first worked for Undurraga
and Cousiflo Macul and then began his own winery Aquitania and simultaneously consulted for
L.F. Edwards and Dofia Javiera. Ignacio Recabarren has been one of the most prolific; he has
worked for Santa Rita, Santa Carolina and its affiliate Casablanca, and consulted for Caliterra,
Errdzuriz, and La Rosa. He has also been involved as an associate in Cono Sur and Porta. He has
his own winery Quebrada de Macul (Table 3.11).
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Table 3.11
SAMPLE OF DOMESTIC TECHNICIANS: EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCES; CHILE
Enologist Domestic Certificate Other Major Examples of Permanent Examples of Consultancies
Education Enology* Education Positions
Alejandro PUC pre-1970 Post-grad. Professor PUC; President OIV; Balduzzi
Hernandez Bordeaux San Pedro, Portal del Alto,
Millahue
Goetz von Trained pre-1970 Concha y Toro La Rosa, JA. Bouchon
Gersdorff abroad
Alejandro Parot PUC pre-1970 Post-grad. Vifiedos del Maule J.A. Bouchon, Valle del Maule
Montpellier
Philippo PUC 1971-1973 Post-grad. Spain, Professor PUC Balduzzi, Santa Inds
Psczcz6lkowski Montpellier
Aurelio Montes PUC 1971-1973 Undurraga, San Pedro, La Fortuna, Viu Manent, Santa
Discover Inds, Echeverrfa, Bisquertt
Mario Geisse PUC 1971-1973 Manquehue, Moet-Chandon Bisquertt, Casa Silva
(Brasil)
Sergio Correa PUC 1971-1973 Santa Carolina Gracia, Cremaschi
Edmundo Bordeu Uch 1971-1973 Post-grad. Professor PUC Balduzzi, Santa Eugenia
Bordeaux,
doctorate UC Davis
Fernando Ureta PUC 1971-1973 Post-grad. Cdnepa Segi 0116, Carta Vieja
Bordeaux
Klaus Schroeder Trained 1971-1973 Concha y Toro, Santa Rita Los Robles, Domdnico Correa
Germany
Ignacio PUC 1971-1973 Courses @ UC Santa Rita, Santa Carolina, Caliterra, Errdzuriz, Porta, La
Recabarren Davis, New Casablanca, Quebrada de Rosa, Cono Sur, Concha y Toro
Zealand Macul
Ernesto Juisin PUC 1971-1973 Courses France San Pedro, Errdzuriz, Torre6n Santa Laura
de Paredes, Cdnepa
Pablo Morand6 Uch 1971-1973 Post-grad. PUC Concha y Toro, Villard Fine
Wines, Morand6
Maria Elena PUC 1971-1973 San Pedro, Santa Rita, Santa
Quezada Carolina, Cdnepa, Tarapaci
Juan Pedro Uch 1971-1973 Post-grad. Spain Professor Concepcion,
Sotomayor Researcher INIA
Fernando Torres Uch 1974-1979 Concha y Toro, San Pedro, Astaburuaga
Vifiedos del Maule
Rafael Sanchez PUC 1974-1979 Los Robles J.A. Bouchon, Balduzzi,
Loncomilla
Pablo Vergara PUG 1974-1979 Santa Emiliana Tarapaci
Carlos Andrade PUG 1980-1988 Cdnepa, Itata, Francisco de
Aguirre
Andr~s Ilabaca PUG 1980-1988 CVnepa, Santa Rita
Alvaro Espinoza PUG 1989 Undurraga, Domaine Oriental,
Carmen
Source: Based on data from National Association of Agronomist-Enologists of Chile and own conversations with firm owners, enologists, and
sectoral specialists.
*Enological certification requires a 5-year professional degree in Agronomy and standardized testing in basic enological knowledge and
practices. The test is administered by the Chilean National Association of Agronomist-Enologists.
Yet the continued borrowing of knowledge through consultants is not an unambiguous sign
of progress, and should be interpreted with caution. For one, consultancies can be expensive. The
best charge over $1 ,OOOCday and run up substantial additional expenses for travel and
accommodation. Few could afford tutelage at this cost. Second, because of grapes' sensitivity to
local growing conditions, knowledge is only transferable to a certain extent. For instance,
recognized Merlot expert Michel Rolland and Chardonnay specialist Paul Hobbs began working in
Chile and Mendoza with limited knowledge on local conditions. They only learned about the
regions' microclimates over time through their clients, Trapiche and Catena. Third, international
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consultants have less expertise on varietals that are particular to some locations, as are for example,
the Torrontds Riojano and Malbeck (this grape is native of Bordeaux but paradoxically produces
far better wines in Mendoza). Thus they cannot be counted on to provide quality advice precisely in
those varietals that may provide a particular region a comparative advantage.
Unfortunately, the low value added per liter of exports, and the fact that to date even the best
Chilean and Mendozan wineries continue to rely heavily on foreign know-how and joint ventures to
move up the learning curve, are signs of the difficulties most have to develop reliable in-house
learning capabilities.4 8
Table Wine Supply Chains
Mendoza's viticultural diversity presents a serious challenge even for local technical experts
because it has close to one hundred and twenty different varietals. Most have very specific growing
needs and behave in distinct ways when processed. In contrast Chile has no more than twenty five
different varietals; furthermore, 91 percent of the surface area consists of five major fine varietals
and two low quality varietals. In addition, four of the five major varietals are the most studied by
international enological laboratories, wineries and researchers across the world. Eastern Mendoza's
table wine producers face further difficulties in that most viticultural and enological knowledge in
the province resides with First Zone fine grapes. This is where most of the main wineries and the
public sector research facilities are stationed.
Thus, while the learning demands put on local elite knowledge professionals in Chile and in
Mendoza's First Zone have been many and their accomplishments quite spectacular, they also had
it much easier than their less sophisticated colleagues in the majority of table wine producing firms
in Eastern Mendoza. As was noted, until recently conditions and prospects for the latter firms
seemed quite dismal--a shrinking market, poor quality grape endowments, little or no capital to
4 Joint ventures are one of the most common forms of knowledge acquisition, such as the 1997 agreement between
Concha y Toro and France's Mouton-Rothschild to develop a top Bordeaux-style Cabernet Sauvignon in the Maipo
Valley. Their commitment to the project is between $5-6 million, to be shouldered 50-50 with their French
partners. Another example is a joint venture between Robert Mondavi Winery of California and Vifia Errdzuriz of
Chile.
119
reconvert, and no demand or supply-side assistance. Compared to the former group, these
enologists and their wineries were "driving blind," knowing that they had to implement
momentous changes to upgrade, but paralyzed by the uncertainty over how to proceed.
Professional managers in elite wineries were assigned significant budgets for technological
upgrading, whereas enologists in the other firms have found it far more difficult to persuade risk-
averse owners to invest in new machinery, especially because they have little knowledge to what
market they can sell the improved wine and recoup their investment. In addition many of them still
have no working models to follow on how to upgrade their production practices. The enological
laboratories have fewer tried-and-tested products for intermediate and poor quality varietals as they
do for the fine varietals used by elite wineries that are the same across the world. The invaluable
assistance that demand- and supply-side actors can provide enologists to help structure an
upgrading process simply have not been available to them. They are unsure how to improve their
wine, and they do not even know what new market segments they can target, what standards and
benchmarks they need to set themselves, nor how to sequence a set of work practice improvements
to progress from one step to the next.
To date some of the most basic microbiological questions important to Eastern Mendozan
producers remain unresolved. For example, one of the problems wineries face is that three months
after harvesting and processing, red wines from intermediate quality varietals such as Bequignol,
Bonarda, and Tempranilla lose as much as 50 percent of their color, sometimes even more. Some
of these wines could be turned into Beaujolais or vin de pays as in France and command good
prices, but wineries on their own do not know how to enter these markets in such a knowledge
vacuum. A serious organized discussion on the market, production, and microbiological
possibilities of these grapes remains to be initiated.
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An Example of Successful Upgrading: Vifiedos y Bodega La Agricola
One Eastern Mendoza firm epitomizes the best of the lessons that Californian and French
producers established in the '70s. While its business model is not necessarily the one that most
Chilean and Mendozan wine supply chains might be able to follow, it is the approach that they can
aspire to imitate.
La Agricola was established in Eastern Mendoza by Alberto Zuccardi in 1964, an engineer
whose family owned a successful local construction firm. Zuccardi was one of the first to use the
tax breaks offered by the federal government to firms that expanded into the eastern part of the
province. La Agricola started with some 380 hectares of vineyards in Santa Rosa, deep in the
provincial east, and four years later set up its wine processing plant. This was the heyday of volume
production when what mattered only were high vineyard yields, not quality. La Agricola planted
the most productive varieties such as Criolla and Cereza on parrales, the high-yield orthogonal
vine training systems developed in the province not long before. Until 1980 the firm was a bulk
producer of cheap table wines and sold them to the province's largest private bottler/ distributor,
Greco. When domestic consumption peaked and began to fall in the late 1970s and with the
bankruptcy of Greco in 1980, the province's wine industry boom finally came to a resounding end.
Firms like La Agricola that once were the archetypal Eastern Mendoza successes became the
industry's whipping boys, blamed for all its failures and problems.
There was, however, a difference between La Agricola and most of the other 250-300 table
wine bulk producers in Eastern Mendoza that found themselves immersed in a crisis. The firm had
a savvy business leadership and the resources to implement rapid changes. That leadership
disbelieved that Eastern Mendoza was too hot for fine grape growing; in fact, the area of Santa Rosa
had a microclimate that was somewhat different from the average for the region, with abundant
winds that dryed and cooled the vines. Furthermore, the soils were also somewhat better than the
average, less acidic, more sandy and loose, so that vine roots ventilated quickly. Instead of
eradicating its vineyards and dismantling the by-now infamous parral training system as most of
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the quality-peddling critics demanded they do, the firm decided to withhold judgment and began a
methodical series of experiments on how to improve quality with what it had. Agronomists and
enologists worked together to try different ways of improving grape quality on the parral. For
example, in the past a large portion of grapes would grow clustered close to the main trunk of the
vine, so much so that they often rot for being too close to each other. Technicians moved the buds
away from the center of the trellis system, to better ventilate the grains and expose them to the
elements. They experimented with various foliage removal techniques, varying them according to
the varietal, and played around with the yields. They also changed their varietals, not only to fine
quality grapes but included some of intermediate quality and medium yield such as Tempranilla,
Sangiovese and Bonarda. In addition, they changed the width of the parral from 3 meters (10 feet)
to 5 meters (16.7 feet) to allow mechanical harvesting. Each of these changes was painstakingly
documented to allow them to compare what worked best and what didn't. As they fine-tuned the
vineyard and processing improvements they began to obtain wines of very good quality with
intermediate varietals at yields anywhere between 12,500-25,000 kilos/hectare. These yields were
much higher than those recommended by the "experts" and consultants who advocated replacing
the parral in favor of the curtain training system (espaldera), replanting vineyards with the best
international varietals, and lowering yields to no more than 8,000-10,000 kilos/hectare. La
Agricola's wines turned out to be a great success in certain markets such as England. Because of
the much higher yields, their prices were extremely competitive. La Agricola also found that in fact
the parral was far better suited than the curtain training system for growing white grapes in Eastern
Mendoza, because the greater leaf growth created a shady canopy that protected them from the hot
summer sun. In this way the whites grapes preserved all their aroma, ideal for making young fruity
wines also preferred in British markets.
Rodolfo Montenegro, La Agricola's university-trained enologist and a key player in the
firm's success is critical of the industry's leadership. His comments illustrate some of the larger
ideological and practical struggles that are emerging in Mendoza, between those who more or less
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adopt without question the "international" wine making model and those who would like to follow
a more "indigenous" approach:
"The policies that encouraged the eradication of parral-trained vineyards during
the 1980s were disastrous. Instead of eradicating them one had to improve them.
The domestic industry never had a global vision. La Agricola is one of the few
firms that is doing well because it takes its work seriously. Most of the others were
so poorly handled that they were bought out by foreigners. ...Mendoza has yet to
develop an Argentinean model. Catena's is the international model. What Catena
(Esmeralda) makes Mondavi makes, and everyone makes; they are no different
from each other. ...Most of the elite firms and their enologists in Mendoza are still
focused too much on the First Zone, ignoring the productive potential of areas like
Eastern Mendoza. There is still a lot of arrogance."
To date La Agricola continues to overturn every conventional wisdom in provincial wine-
making folklore. For one, the winery does not have one hectare of vineyards that is not parral-
trained, despite the continuing demonizing rhetoric against it. Nor does it buy any grapes of other
growers but relies exclusively on its own supply. It is one of the most aggressive firms in the
domestic market, having recently introduced a line of wines in the thinly-served intermediate value
category ($2-$4), the lowest end of the popular premium markets. In fact, a few of the leading
wineries like Norton, Lopez, Trapiche, and Escorihuela are beginning to target this market segment
and to set up their own parral vineyards. Montenegro also noted that the leading Chilean wineries
that built a reputation for adopting international approaches and standards to wine-making also have
parrales for their good value wines, even though they do not actively volunteer the information.
Second, La Agricola continues supplying its demijohn market, even when most of the
industry has dropped the container in favor of the compact, light, and attractive Tetra box or the
traditional 3/4 liter wine bottle. La Agricola justifies its decision on the fact that it has a core group
of consumers faithful to the 5-liter demijohn. Rather than sell "inputs"--e.g., 6 bottles of wine, 6
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corks, 6 labels--that added up are often more expensive than the wine itself, its philosophy is to save
consumers their money and give them more value--one bottle, one cork, one label, and six times
more wine.
Third, La Agricola is just as successful in its exports to the good-value market segment,
competing head to head with the best Chilean wineries in that niche. But what is even more striking
is that the winery is by no means caught in an "intermediate-quality trap" unable to move beyond
$4-5/bottle. Its top line of oaked varietals has been rated as one of Mendoza's best in the
specialized magazines. Wine Enthusiast magazine's '98 "Top 100 Best Buys of the Year" list
(defined as those with a U.S. retail value under $10/bottle) had La Agricola's Santa Julia 1996 Oak
Reserve Chardonnay for $9/bottle in fourth place (with 4 others) at 90 points, a truly outstanding
score.49 The next best Mendozan wine on the list was sixth-placed Santa Julia 1996 Malbeck-
Cabernet Sauvignon (with 10 others) at $6/bottle and 88 points. The closest Mendozan competitor
was Trapiche 1994 Oak Cask Cabernet Sauvignon, also sixth-ranked and valued at $9/bottle." In
all, La Agricola had three out of the six Mendoza bottles that made it to the list.
Montenegro participates in all sectors of the firm's supply chain. For several years he has
monitored carefully the behavior of each hectare of vineyards. His knowledge is good enough that
he can now recognize the flavor of the wine each one produces, an advantage in helping him decide
to which market he should send it. He continuously experiments with different fermentation
techniques, and currently uses indigenous yeasts for his best reserve wines rather than the more
standardized preselected yeasts sold by the enological labs. For several years now he has kept a
database on his computer where he documents for each varietal the exact source of the grapes, the
yeasts he used to process them, and the flavors and the aromas that resulted. This provides him
clues as to what works best under what conditions. He recommends working without prejudices,
through taste testing, and by avoiding copying models without ensuring they are an improvement
49 As a point of comparison, Concha y Toro's top of the line Don Melchor Private Reserve 1994 Cabernet
Sauvignon sold in the U.S. for $25/bottle, and was also awarded 90 points in Wine Spectator's November 1997
ranking.
* Consider that Trapiche has more than 20 years of export experience, whereas La Agricola only started to export in
1994.
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over what existed. He does not think it is easy to copy La Agricola's business model, first, because
the skepticism among many of the industry leaders is still so strong, and second, because to do so
requires a very integrated implementation of mechanisms of continuous improvement that few firms
are able to carry out.
Conclusion
In this chapter I provided evidence on the extent to which market tutelage--help from
machinery suppliers, international buyers, wineries and consultants--induced, broad, deep,
continuous upgrading in Chilean and Mendozan wine supply chains. The results are more even in
Chile than in Mendoza, with those wineries following an "international-style" restructuring
receiving most of the assistance. They were able to tap into more than a decade of accumulated
experience of European and Californian wine making, in machinery use, enological product design,
and grape growing and processing techniques. With the exception of an elite of commodity
exporters and the growers that work with them, producers in wine subregions such as Eastern
Mendoza where resource endowments are less well known internationally--and prejudices against
them strong--were also less benefited by market sources of tutelage. These did not have the
requisite knowledge, interest, or expertise to provide assistance tailored to Eastern Mendozan
producers' particular needs.
Paradoxically, despite the advantage of fine wine producers over the table wine producers
and the fact that many Chilean and Mendozan fine wine supply chains have made substantial
progress since the early 1980s, even the most resourceful have found steady movements up the
learning curve very laborious. In some ways both types of supply chains face a similar type of
problem, that of implementing mechanisms for continuous improvement. Because grape growing
and processing is especially sensitive to local conditions these mechanisms need to be based on the
systematic use of tacit information from local production and market experience.
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CHAPTER 4
Failures and Successes of State Tutelage and Beyond
Introduction: State Tutelage, Bootstrapping. and New Learning Institutions
In the first part of this chapter I review the role of the state as a source of tutelage for the
wine sector, then in the second part I examine a pair of initiatives that somewhat inadvertently
suggest how a patchwork of programs can come together with coherence, of the kind that advocates
of integrated approaches fantasize. In the 1980s Chile's and Mendoza's public sectors had a
significant impact on the course of the wine industry restructuring. In the former country different
line agencies of the central government completely modified the industry's regulatory environment;
in Mendoza, the interventions were at least as complex, involving multiple agencies and two levels of
government, federal and provincial. On the other hand, the spirit of the reforms was very different
in each region, Laissez-Faire until the mid '80s in Chile, highly interventionist in Mendoza. Yet
despite the starkly different approaches, there was one key similarity to them. None of the policies
provided explicit support for the kind of help local wine supply chains needed most: the
formulation of a realistic set of achievable, incremental standards that could serve each different
wine supply chain as a road map to eventual international competition, and that could be scaled up
into a broad sectoral strategy.
In fact, for several years such a goal wasn't even a subject of debate. Things began to
change first in Chile in the mid 1980s when the state shifted away from its laissezfaire approach to
the economy. Gradually, it introduced a series of programs designed to help wineries obtain new
exports markets, solve technological bottlenecks, and carry out technical visits to competitor
countries. Very recent export promotion programs in Argentina and Mendoza attempt similar
goals; some provincial programs have also been introduced to facilitate technical catch up in certain
primary and processing segments. Typically, these initiatives were designed independently of each
126
other, and were not the product of any coherent plan. In fact, lack of coherence and little learning
about their effectiveness are often-heard criticisms leveled at these public programs.51 Integrated
policy approaches and program learning have remained elusive goals.
In the second half of the chapter I review a pair of initiatives that somewhat inadvertently
suggest how a patchwork of programs can be given coherence, of the kind that designers of
integrated policies fantasize with. The two examples of learning institutions to which I refer are not
extensions of established organizations such as existing business associations or public sector
development agencies, but a new combination of market and public sector elements. The key
feature and strength common to both examples is that they are fora for the discussion of tacit and
received knowledge that help formulate a sequence of targetable production standards. One is a
consortium of wineries in Chile's VII Region that organized to export jointly. With public funds it
first formed a quality evaluation panel to benchmark its members' wines and document what
improvements each one needed to make. It hired a manager who tapped various sources of funding
and private assistance to coordinate the group's upgrading activities. In this way it availed itself of
a set of independent consulting services in a sequential and coherent way. One grafting technology
generated for the group has already been copied extensively throughout the region. The other is a
wine evaluation committee in Eastern Mendoza. Organized by a group of local enologists,
enological labs, and bulk wine businessmen, they have organized a set of subregional events also
centered on benchmarking of local wines and discussion on how they can be improved. Based on
this knowledge, the committee is also availing itself of numerous funds and experts from the private
and public sectors, and coordinating services they have identified in demand. In so doing they are
also changing outsiders and employers' perceptions about themselves.
The fact that enologists have played an important hand in both these initiatives and that the
institutions surfaced where they did, does not seem accidental. Enologists' key coordinating
position in wine supply chains is privileged in that they can synthesize information on production
and market experience better than anyone else. In addition, enologists' group activism and their
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51 See Dussel et. al. (1996) for Mexico.
identities with particular locations may have deep historical roots, the social product of long-
postponed expectations for public recognition. These have combined to trigger their activism.
First Wave of Public Policies: Extreme Approaches and Big Mistakes
In both countries the first wave of public sector reforms consisted of very broad policies,
better known for their failures than for their successes.
Chilean Laissez-Faire
Chile's wine sector restructuring began in the mid 1970s with a sequence of major policy
failures. In what local analysts widely view as its darkest hour--at least with respect to the
processing sector--the state's rapid and indiscriminate deregulation of the industry in the mid
1970s was blamed in large part for the grape and wine overproduction crisis that erupted in the
early 1980s.52 Among the major problems, first, was the timing of the deregulation plan: as in
Europe, it coincided with rapid productivity improvements in vineyards precisely at a time when
aggregate demand was falling and changing to better quality wines. This problem was exacerbated
with a second one: in 1980 the state granted processors permission to use remainders of export-
oriented table grapes to make table wine for local consumption, thus further increasing the supply
of grapes--in years like 1992 by almost 50% (Table 4.1)."
52 The Chilean state began to deregulate the wine sector in 1974 by repealing caps on planting of new vineyards and
on wine production, in place for the preceding four decades, and eliminating requirements on growers and producers to
report their production volumes to the internal revenue service. In 1976 it also added an internal alcohol
consumption tax thus raising incentives both for the expansion of exports as well as that of an internal black
market. In 1979 it repealed the ban on the use of table grapes for wine. One of the most controversial policies was
the 1979 repeal of the ban to plant hybrid varietals. This ban was subsequently reimposed in 1985 (Pszcz6lkowski
1991, 1997).
' Table grapes had been used illegally for wine making as early as the 1970s. Their use was legalized in 1980 but
no official statistics were recorded until 1986.
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Table 4.1
GRAPE SOURCE AND WINE PRODUCTION STATISTICS; CHILE 1986-1996
Year Share Wine Share Table Share Pisco Total Production
Grapes Grapes Grapes (Million Liters)
1986 86% 14% 420.0
1988 84% 16% 463.0
1990 91% 7% 350.0
1992 67% 33% 316.6
1994 77% 23% 359.8
1996 87% 12% 1% 387.8
Source: Gross Consultores Asociados. December 1997. "Situaci6n de la Vitivinicultura
Chilena," mimeo. Chile, Ministry of Agriculture-ODEPA.
Third, it increased the domestic alcohol tax significantly, even above and beyond what other
alcoholic beverages such as beer paid, so that wine competed unfairly with them. The high tax
stimulated a black market in wine trading and various illegal production practices (such as diluting
wine with water) that only served to decrease wine's popularity among consumers. Tax evasion
grew at an alarming rate, jumping from 3% in 1978 to an estimated 69% in 1983 (Table 4.2).
Table 4.2
TAX EVASION IN CHILE'S WINE SECTOR; 1978-1986
Year Production Estimates (Liters) Production (Liters) Estimated Tax
Ministry of Agriculture Accounted for by Tax Evasion
(SAG/CORFO) Bureau (SII)
1978 606,200,000 588,000,000 3.0%
1983 533,500,000 165,200,000 69.0%
1984 485,000,000 228,400,000 52.9%
1985 436,500,000 228,100,000 47.7%
1986 349,000,000 190,400,000 45.5%
1987 390,000,000 315,000,000 19.2%
Source: I.R.E.N. 1979, and Gemines. 1988.
As the crisis unfolded, the state stepped aside and made few if any attempts to reduce or
redistribute the cost of restructuring." For example, it provided some compensatory resources and
technical assistance to wine cooperatives without any success--almost all of them eventually closed
down." The result was a decimated industry, with small firms being the group that suffered most
firm deaths (Table 4.3).
' The Gemines (1988) study ordered by the Chilean government noted that the high taxes levied on wine
consumption were regressive, inefficient, and were hindering the sector's development. It recommended repealing the
tax and unifying it with those of other activities. The government chose to ignore the recommendations.
s For example, in the mid '80s a few cooperatives were involved in a project managed by Fundacion Chile, to
upgrade their wine processing technology. Some also were advised on improved viticultural techniques through the
national agricultural research and extension agency I.N.I.A.
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Table 4.3
NUMBER OF WINERIES, EMPLOYEES, AND AVERAGE FIRM SIZE IN CHILE; 1975-1995
Number of Firms Employees Firm Size
Year Small Medium+ Total Small Medium+ Total Small Medium+ Total
1975 20 35 55 437 3,359 3,796 22 96 69
1979 102 36 138 1,931 3,960 5,891 19 110 43
*Census '79 235 36 271 2,345 3,960 6,305 10 110 23
1985 43 23 66 866 2,733 3,599 20 119 55
1990 26 20 46 578 3,312 3,890 22 166 85
1995 22 21 43 503 4,073 4,576 23 194 106
Sources: I.N.E. Annual Manufacturing Survey of firms with more than 10 employees. Small firms are those with 10-49 employees;
medium+ firms are medium and large enterprises with 50+ employees.
*The "1979 Census" is actually a very broad survey that also Includes microenterprises with 5-9 employees in the small firm category.
The Chilean state did far better in other respects, creating certain "wrong" prices,
reminiscent of the government activism associated with late industrializing countries,56 but allowing
private sector agents to provide the market discipline. As did the European nations, it stepped in to
restructure the primary sector providing subsidies to encourage growers to switch from vine grapes
to various stone fruits and table grapes, exports that were extremely profitable and dynamic at the
time. These initiatives were successful in large part due to the active role of fruit trading companies
directly connected to the market, that coordinated much of the necessary technological effort."
During the '80s total vineyard surface with wine making varieties dropped from over 100,000
hectares to less than 60,000 hectares.
Mendozan Micro-Mismanagement
In Mendoza the public sector took a very different approach to Chile's. In attempting to
appease several pressure groups, it wanted to restructure the industry through administrative fiat
rather than market forces with the aim of distributing as widely as possible the downsizing costs.
The federal government enlisted its sectoral regulatory agency, the Instituto Nacional de
Vitivinicultura (INV) to come up with a restructuring plan. The INV's first strategy was to use
public development banks to finance the construction of new storage capacity. It was hoped that an
* See, for instance, Amsden (1989).
5 See Jarvis (1992). Researchers formerly with public agencies recruited by the trading companies participated
actively in this technological effort.
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increase in stocks could buy the industry the needed time for consumption to recover or supply to
fall by its own means (Figure 4.1).
Figure 4.1
MENDOZAN VINEYARD SURFACE AREA, NATIONAL WINE
PRODUCTION AND WINE STOCKS; 1966-1997
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When in 1982 wine stocks rose to over twice the national yearly production more drastic
measures were implemented, principally a plethora of regulations on the market and the product
itself to control the supply and price of wine at any time. Market controls were enforced through
support prices, production controls (quotas), sales blockades (bottling restrictions), and date
regulations (also to block the release of wine). Product controls were imposed by changing on a
need basis the minimum alcoholic content definition of wine, the definitions of what constituted fine
wine and table wine, and the closing date of the harvest.58 Subsidies to eradicate vineyards
followed, and a tight regulatory control was maintained over the remaining ones. Most subsidies
were used by growers to switch to cash crops and fruit production for the local market; these
initiatives did not have the success that they did in Chile because no commercial traders were
involved to provide the market discipline.59 Nevertheless, over the decade vineyard surface in
Mendoza also fell spectacularly from 250,000 hectares to just over 140,000 hectares. In parallel, the
provincial government attempted to use the large integrated firm Bodegas y Viliedos Giol it had
owned since 1954 to guarantee growers' and cooperatives' minimum incomes with purchases at
' See Juri (1992) for an extensive description.
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support prices. This winery's market power was considerable; for example, in the 1987/1988
harvest it processed 262 million liters, 15 percent of the province's production and equivalent to 67
percent of Chile's entire production for that year. 0
The degree of success of these policies is questionable at best and the subject of deep
controversy in Mendoza. For example, the Giol winery ran deficits for most of its existence as a
government-owned firm, surviving only because it was covered by general revenue raised by
provincial taxpayers. Between 1983 and 1989 its deficit never fell below the $19 million mark and
reached $70 million in 1988. The winery was finally privatized in 1988/89. By the same token the
INV gained a reputation for being a bloated and corrupt bureaucracy, used by politicians and
various groups to pursue their personal interests. It employed 1,700 people and its budget was
large by any means, coming directly from a 7% tax on national wine sales. 1 It was eventually
reformed in 1991, its budget and responsibilities drastically reduced as part of a sweeping first wave
of public sector downsizing.62
Second Wave of Public Policies: Activism Through Discrete Initiatives
After having toyed for almost a decade with an extreme form of liberalism in Chile, and an
acute market control program in Mendoza, the public sector changed tracks in both countries.
What triggered the change in Chile was the deep 1982 recession; conversely in Mendoza it was the
federal government's move in 1991 to liberalize the economy and to downsize the public sector.
Both comprehensive approaches--extreme liberalization and extreme market control--were shelved.
What followed was a patchwork of discrete initiatives to provide particular forms of assistance to
certain wineries and supply chains. For example, in Chile the largest producers were offered
specific market assistance to encourage exports; another program targeted a number of medium-
size wineries for a technology upgrading course on modern wine making techniques. In Mendoza,
5 Many of the varieties planted did not transport well, thus were unsuited for export (U.C.I.M. 1993).
*Juri and Mercau (1990).
61 I.I.E.R.A.L. (1990).
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the only "jewel" (albeit jaded) left in the public sector's crown was the state-owned Giol winery.
Once the integrated winery was privatized and the INV's controls were dismantled, the initiatives
offered to the sector involved limited marketing assistance for export-oriented elite wineries, and
agricultural research and extension support to certain wineries and medium-size growers.
Especially striking about these initiatives is that they were examples both of the
improvement that careful targeting represented over the broad-brush approach of the past, as well as
of its inherent limitation in terms of outreach. The initiatives were useful in that they filled in
specific gaps in the 'road map' that wine supply chains needed to make the difficult transition from
backward producers to quality exporters. But they were also limited in that they could not close all
the knowledge gaps that existed. They provided real assistance for some economic agents, but
could not reach out to all potential beneficiaries. This assistance was a real patchwork, gathering the
greatest successes where the missing links and components in the road map could be filled in
simultaneously by other means. Following I provide a few examples of these initiatives, describing
in what ways they succeeded and how they failed.
Revised Chilean Neoliberalism
By the mid 1980s and recovering from a recession, the state moved decidedly away from its
hands-off approach and began a period of earnest engagement with the private sector to promote
exports, first with large wineries and in the early 1990s with their smaller counterparts.63 The
Chilean government first organized a sectoral consortium of the largest wineries, those already
associated in the Asociacidn de Embotelladores y Exportadores de Vino, and began to work with
them to develop Chile's international image as wine producer. This initiative came from one staffer
at ProChile, the central government's export promotion agency. It began modestly with no more
than half a dozen wineries and a work plan to organize advertisements around the theme "Wines of
62 Jun (1991).
63 The state also stepped in to restructure the primary sector with subsidies to encourage growers to switch from vine
grapes to various stone fruits and table grapes, exports that were extremely profitable and dynamic at the time.
During the '80s total vineyard surface with wine making varieties dropped from over 100,000 hectares to less than
60,000 hectares.
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Chile" in advanced country markets. ProChile created "wrong" (artificially low) prices with
significant subsidies offered to firms that advertised in certain foreign markets.64 In exchange,
wineries had to comply with a set of advertisement design standards to provide the campaign with a
unified fagade. Until then, wineries had never marketed anything together; in fact, cooperation was
rare. Yet the timing was propitious: in the early 1980s modest wine exports of the cheapest varietals
to debt-burdened Latin American markets had all but collapsed and export managers were
especially predisposed to try anything that might help them meet their sales quotas. Domestic
tastes were changing away from table wine, and competition from beer, soft drinks and mineral
water was intensifying. ProChile coordinated and cofinanced the publicity campaign as well as a
series of trade shows and missions of trade specialists to Chile to sample first-hand the country's
wines. Until then, Chile had been better known for its dictatorship than for its wine; ProChile's
efforts began to put the country on the wine map as a supplier of good value.
ProChile's work was invaluable in that it encouraged the large wineries to wean themselves
away from the "easy" Latin American consumers, and accelerated their exposure to more
demanding markets and standards. The wine export committee helped generate a debate among a
producer elite on what market segments they could compete in, and helped them formulate a
marketing strategy on how to get there. On the other hand ProChile's effort was incomplete in two
ways. First, in being a marketing program it was not designed to make explicit the particular
technical standards that were required to compete in each market segment, and the technical
solutions that would get them there. It was a forum for export managers; enologists were not
present in these discussions. It was left to each winery to figure out on its own what the technical
requirements might be. As was noted in Chapter 3 the 1980s were a time of experimentation
through trial and error, where many mistakes were made planting vineyards in unsuitable
microclimates. Second, in efficiently targeting the wine elite--those with the greatest financial and
business resources to buy technology and pay consultants to acquire the knowledge, ProChile
neglected the rest of the industry.
" Wineries were reimbursed $1 for each case of wine exported per year or 50% of their advertisement costs in foreign
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In the early 1990s ProChile opened up its assistance to a group of smaller wineries that had
been pressuring for some time for access to its programs. The idea was initially resisted by the
large firms and paradoxically, by some of the same staffers that had launched the program in the
1980s. Their concern was that small wineries would not meet minimum quality standards and
might be tempted to free-ride on the quality image they had created through a lot of hard work.
ProChile staffers that supported broadening the assistance finally prevailed. What broke the
stalemate was the realization that small and large wineries did not compete in the same markets.
This endorsement turned out to be key for the small wineries: CORFO, the central government's
development agency provided them with seed capital to form a business association--ChileVid--and
hire an export manager to promote their exports. To date, the association has had considerable
success, facilitating the promotion and access of small wineries to export markets.
Fundacidn Chile's Technological Upgrading Efforts
A technology transfer non-profit organization established in 1976 with a $50 million
endowment from ITT, in 1984 Fundacion Chile (FC) launched a small technology upgrading
project involving no more than twenty wineries from the central region. At the time the sector was
in the midst of its overproduction crisis and the largest wineries were carrying out their first
purchases of stainless steel equipment and experiments in international-style wine making. To
broaden the spectrum of firms involved in this incipient restructuring effort Fundacion Chile
targeted a segment of medium sized wineries which did not have the financial resources to imitate
the large ones but were nevertheless interested in upgrading. These included three cooperatives
from Talca, Cauquenes and Quill6n. Since none of these firms could afford to make heavy
investments, FC's proposal was to start with modest improvements in wine making techniques that
did not involve big infrastructure expenditures. FC proposed to work with the wineries on two
conditions. One was that they operate "cleanly", and eliminate the use of chemicals. For example,
because many storage tanks were made of regular metal rather than stainless steel, oxidants blended
media, whichever was lower.
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into the wine. Enologists would typically remove the oxidants by adding chemicals to precipitate
them. The precipitation was filtered out later. Instead, wineries were now directed to paint their
storage tanks with epoxy to avoid oxidization and fungal growth. Second, they were also asked to
set aside a section of their vineyards to experiment with different grape management techniques and
harvesting dates. Rather than harvest when sugar levels were high as they usually did, they were
encouraged to monitor tannin levels and harvest only when these reached a high level of
concentration.
The program continued for a few years, and some of its participants improved their quality
levels significantly. But the overall results were modest and the initiative was considered a failure.
For instance, cooperative growers refused to lower their vineyard yields because the higher reward
for better quality did not compensate adequately the loss of production. Wineries were also
encouraged to introduce refrigeration units for white wine processing but few could afford them. In
a sequel to the initiative several of the participant wineries banded together and hired a manager to
sell wine for all of them. This effort also failed because the participants became immediately
suspicious that the sales manager was working more for one than the other. On a more positive
tone, several of the firms that participated in this program, among them Santa M6nica, Portal del
Alto, and La Fortuna, banded together several years later. Once wine prices began to recover, they
began to make hardware investments and became part of the boutique winery export association
ChileVid.
Despite the poor results FC did not leave the wine sector. Its next major sectoral initiative
was the purchase of a piece of land in the south of Chile's VII Region in 1989 to plant Chardonnay
vineyards and build a state-of-the-art winery. Named Itata, this was a demonstration project to
show the wine sector that the cooler southern part of the wine region was ideal for planting white
grapes. Until then, most Chardonnay plantations had been mistakenly made further north in the
Central Valley, and since the late 1980s in the cooler Casablanca Valley. The south had been
ignored as a potential area for fine varietals because it was typically associated with the small
subsistence farmers and low quality Pais grapes. The project was a substantial success; it produced
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a varietal Chardonnay and a reserve that were recognized widely for their quality. By the mid 1990s
the integrated wineries were purchasing grapes in the area and starting their own large-scale
plantations. More recently, FC has sold off its vineyards and associated with another winery in the
VII Region to produce an ultrapremium. In another landmark joint venture it is planning to produce
intermediate quality varietal wines based on Moscatel de Alejandria for the domestic market. This is
one of the grapes that impoverished secano growers of the VIII Region grow. FC is attempting to
show the economic opportunities that this area holds and hopes to attract investment to the region.
The Giol Privatization
One of the Mendoza government's most successful actions in steering the industry's
restructuring in productive directions may have been the privatization of Giol. Its bottling,
distribution, and marketing division were sold to a federation of 37 provincial cooperatives,
FeCoVita, set up as a 'second-order' marketing cooperative that buys bulk wine from its members
and bottles it for them. In the early 1990s the province of Mendoza had approximately 4,800
growers affiliated in cooperatives, 80% of which were members of FeCoVita. If not in surface area
or grape quality --it included some of the smallest, more impoverished growers, with the lowest
quality grapes--this group represented 20 percent of the provincial total, and was more numerous
than that participating in the fine varietal upgrading push. Given its size and organization,
cooperative growers had historically been somewhat of a "thorn" in the side of the provincial
government, vocally expressing discontent and seeking economic redress whenever the price of
grapes and wine fell. Their economic welfare was of concern to the public sector.
Giol's main competitive asset was not its bottling facility--all of its plants were
technologically outdated--but rather the established brand name of some of its wines. This asset
was key to the cooperatives' needs because it solved one of their strategic weaknesses: marketing.
Although the sale appears to have been less than perfectly 'transparent'--FeCo Vita was the only
bidder and was widely believed to have paid less than the full price--the provincial government's
sale of the Giol business unit was strategic. Rather than continue to provide remedial assistance as
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it did through the 1980s, it gave the cooperatives a valuable asset that complemented their own, and
exposed them to the discipline of the market. Since its inception FeCoVita has been a commercial
success; it currently holds roughly ten percent of the country's market share of table wine. The
cooperative has also made significant investments in new machinery and has begun to export.
On the other hand FeCoVita and its affiliated growers still have a long way to go to catch up
to modem wine-making times. In fact in some ways the federation has also become a sort of
poverty trap for them. Even though FeCoVita is a commercial success in the domestic market, its
grower members have neither seen a large share of the profits nor have they received assistance
from it to upgrade their vineyards. The reasons are several and point simultaneously to the need for
and the difficulty of implementing integrated upgrading strategies in complex organizations where
interests are many and often not aligned with each other. An integrated approach suggests the need
to assist FeCoVita both from the bottom up to improve the quality of grape inputs, and from the top
down to improve wine-making techniques and marketing. Both types of programs exist in
Mendoza, but their use by the cooperatives is modest. First, the leadership of most of the federated
cooperatives has preferred to reinvest wine profits in processing and bottling facilities rather than
return them to the growers. Second, the federation has done little to encourage grape quality
improvement in its members in large part because the firm does not sell quality wines in the
domestic market nor for export, so it has few incentives to reward its members with price
differentials for better quality grapes. All its purchases from member coops, regardless of quality,
are at the prevailing market price for table wine. If the wines need improvement they can always be
reprocessed at the federated winery before bottling. In this way FeCoVita's leadership captures a
higher proportion of value added.
An integrated approach suggests the need to assist FeCoVita break into the domestic fine
wine market or into varietal exports to better align members' interests with those of the leadership.
In fact, FeCoVita did begin to export bulk wine to Spain during the 1995 European drought, giving
hope that things would change. But change has been slow to arrive because the exports were
opportunistic and did not require significant commitments to quality improvement from the seller.
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In addition, FeCoVita's agreement with its members' cooperatives is that it is not compelled to buy
from them. This clause has been critical to the federation's success because it disciplines members
to produce at a minimum market quality standard and price. But at the same time it reduces the
stake FeCoVita has in upgrading its grower members. If it needs better quality wines it can always
buy them on the local bulk market.
Attempts to correct this incentive misalignment have made modest progress. The very small
minority of FeCoVita growers with better quality grapes has taken the 'exit' option of selling them
outside the cooperative system. But the majority with low quality grapes have fewer alternatives,
beyond exercising their less-than-perfect right to 'voice'. One of the few options available to them
is to enlist INTA, the federal agricultural research and extension agency to help them upgrade. In
fact INTA has an extension program, Cambio Rural, that in theory fits their needs very well,
specifically designed to help groups of producers improve their production technology. But
progress through this approach has also shown mixed results, in part because some cooperative
leaderships are generally unwilling to have extension agents organize their members and challenge
their authority. In addition, INTA and its program Cambio Rural have problems of their own, as
will be seen next.
INTA's Achilles Heel
Founded in the late 1950s, INTA (Instituto Nacional de Tecnologia Agropecuaria)
spearheaded for many years the country's agricultural research effort and was responsible for
many of the plant adaptation successes that made the Argentine pampas the nation's agricultural
economic powerhouse. Through several decades the agency had remained relatively insulated from
political turbulence, its engineers protected by the technocratic shroud of its mission, and its budget
determined not by the Argentinean Congress but financed through a direct tax on agricultural
exports. The agency's greater weaknesses were in the unevenness of its extension services--
technicians typically prefer basic research in the clean lab than the "messier" extension work--and
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a client bias in favor of big agribusiness with cutting edge techniques rather than small farmers with
traditional technologies.
INTA's regional experimental station in Mendoza that specializes in viticulture and (to a
lesser extent) enology was no different. During the 1980s the agency's technicians were involved
in two projects critical to the province's long term pretension to launch its industry into the
production of fine varietal wines. The two projects were actually quite basic, illustrative of the state
of "backwardness" of the industry at the time. The first project, in the hands of the
ampelographers was to map the region's 120 varietals and clarify the enduring confusion and
misnaming of vines. For example, the fine Italian grape Barbera D'Asti was routinely confused
with the Bonarda grape, of intermediate enological quality; Chardonnay and Chenin vines were
usually misrepresented as Pinot Blanc, a varietal that didn't even exist in Mendoza. The same
confusion reigned in wine making, where local wines labeled as "Chablis" had not a grain of
Chardonnay, the mainstay of that French region; and Burgundy wines had not an ounce of Pinot
Noir, the main red grape from the latter French locality.
The second project, equally important, was a mapping of which varietals did better in which
microclimates. At INTA's Center for Enological Studies (CEE) the agency's enologists began a
systematic comparison across the nation. These studies confirmed scientifically what the more
experienced enologists already knew about the best grape growing areas in the First Zone, but they
also provided some big surprises. Somewhat predictable but still a challenge to conventional
wisdom, Cabernet Sauvignon did quite well in Eastern Mendoza; so did Sangiovese and Syrah, all
red grapes that are relatively good performers in hotter climates. But even white varietals such as
Chenin and Tocai Friulano that prefer cooler temperatures did well. And some samples of
Chardonnay and Sauvignon Blanc that typically do much better in the higher piedmont areas
showed promise. These results were extremely valuable, published in an INTA report in 1987.65
But the scope of the project was very small and the results had little diffusion in those areas like
Eastern Mendoza where historical prejudice against it as a quality producer were strongest. For the
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65 See Catania and de del Monte.
effort to have any practical value it would have required far more detailed and extensive micro-
regional experimentation to understand under what conditions fine varietals did well in these non-
traditional areas. Furthermore, it would have required lengthy experimentation with grafting
techniques, a technology more accessible to cash-strapped small growers than complete eradication
and replanting, the preferred modus operandi in better financed projects. It would also have
demanded intense grower involvement to raise their awareness of what varietals to graft in their own
vineyards; and it would have required winery support to assist with the finance of the graft or to
provide a sales outlet for the grapes. Unfortunately none of these conditions were in place; INTA
had greater incentive to work in the preferred First Zone where most of the technological
upgrading--and the financing--were located, and there were few if any wineries in Eastern Mendoza
that had the hardware, know-how, and interest in fine wine production to be willing to work with the
growers.
To wine supply chains located in the less propitious grape growing areas and competing in
table wine and intermediate-quality market segments, INTA's work was also of little help in that its
typification experiments did not focus on the intermediate- and low-quality grapes they used, for
example, Bonarda, Criolla, Cereza. These grapes were the work-horses of their business and were
far more representative of the province's production than were the fine varietals. In sum, INTA's
research work was of greatest benefit to an elite of leading wine supply chains with the best varietals
located in the prime grape growing areas.
Political operators in the presidential Secretariat for Agriculture, Livestock and Fishery were
aware of INTA's shortcomings. By then, the agency was already weakened by several years of
reduced budgets, and was nowhere close to the cutting edge of viticultural and enological research.
In fact, it had been unable to develop the cloning technology that became so popular with
viticulturist in the 1990s and instead favored propagation by masal selection.66 In 1991, under the
mantle of public sector downsizing, INTA political operators moved to reorganize the agency and
" Refers to a multiplication approach that is distinct from cloning. The assumption is that one plant alone cannot
hold all of the best features of a varietal. These are more likely to be obtained by multiplying and mixing a small
group of plants each one likely to , several
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design a program, Cambio Rural, to make up for its deficiencies. The program specifically targeted
the technological upgrading of small and medium farmers.
The Cambio Rural Program
Cambio Rural (CR) was implemented in 1993, following three major blows leveled at INTA
in 1991. First, the reformist political wing in the agency's top directive council won a power
struggle against the career technocrats to alter its mission towards greater extension service
provision. Second, the Minister of the Economy stripped it of its financial autarchy, reduced its
budget, and changed its income source from a tax on exports to one on imports. Personnel was
fired or retired and research posts were eliminated. In parallel, the office of the presidency created
the CR program and offered it to INTA to be its service provider. This was the final blow in that
INTA had no control over the purse strings and little control over program design. Nevertheless the
CR program was accepted because it was the only way INTA could bring in extra funds to make up
for the imposed budget cuts.
CR was inspired by the CREA groups (Consorcios de Experimentacion Agropecuaria) that
originated in the Argentine pampas. These were producers that periodically got together to share
their experiences in technological upgrading (and the occasional costs of a consultant), to exchange
tacit information on production experience that could help like-minded colleagues move up the
learning curve faster. The CREA groups were a home-grown response to INTA's weak extension
services. If they had any shortcoming, it was that they were only a channel for information sharing;
they were not known for fostering joint initiatives such as group purchases of inputs or marketing
of their products. Several CREA viticultural groups existed in Mendoza, but in all they involved no
more than 70 producers medium and large, mostly associated to the elite wineries. CR was
designed to reach a different population, small and medium farmers that were technologically very
backward and disconnected from the market. CR wanted to improve on the CREA group design by
encouraging joint action beyond information exchange, whenever group members felt inclined to do
so. The basic program design had producers spontaneously forming groups and approaching CR
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for support from an extension agent. The extensionist's salary would be paid by the program in
the first year, with group members gradually paying a greater share in the second year, and all of it
after the third year. The extensionist would draw from INTA's expertise, take the technology to the
producer, and implement productivity-increasing changes in the groups' vineyards--better pruning,
vine training, canopy management, weed management, varietal changes, etc. This would be carried
out with monthly site meetings at one or more of the participants' vineyards to discuss changes and
share information on the results. The expectation was that the extra income from the improvements
would more than offset the costs of the extensionist. The initial program design also had a credit
component to fund some of the technological improvements but this was dropped because of lack
of financing.
The program was not difficult to implement in Mendoza. In the early 1990s the provincial
government had provided some modest finance for a similar project targeted at small grape growers,
involving INTA's extensionists. Therefore the organizational structure was roughly in place to
scale it up several steps. By 1996 Mendoza's CR had roughly 103 groups involving 1,250 farmers.
Of these, 154 were grape growers, half of them with less than 15 hectares of vineyards. Another
192 producers had both vineyards and fruit orchards. In all, the program's outreach involved 344
grape growers, an improvement from previous efforts but still limited given the province's universe
of 19,000 vineyards. CR was nevertheless successful in reaching out to an audience that was
different to that of CREA and with some exceptions did not overlap with those involved with the
elite wineries in the fine varietal upgrading push. Still, it was unable to involve the smallest
producers, those with 1-5 hectares for the most part commercially nonviable, involving somewhere
between 15-63 percent of vineyard owners. The average CR beneficiary had 25-30 hectares of
vineyards.
Despite the lack of credit, with CR growers have improved their vineyard practices in many
important ways. For example, at the start of the growing season a farmer would typically pass with
his tractor and plow up and down each vineyard row four times to remove weeds and drop fertilizer.
But in so doing he would often damage his vines' roots with the plow. CR has taught them to cut
143
down the number of passes to 1 or 2 by introducing them to a herbicide that requires no plowing.
Growers have also learned to redesign their surface irrigation systems. Many of them used to take
water from the canal from one corner of their property. But it would take six hours or more before
it reached the other end of the vineyard, with considerable maldistribution of water and loss to
evaporation and ground absorption. Those vines close to the source received far more water than
the rest. Instead, CR technicians recommended carrying the source to the center of the vineyard and
then distributing it up and down each row. This simple change made water use far more efficient.
Pruning was a third area of improvement: in the past growers used to prune all their varietals in the
same way, regardless whether the plants had different vigors or needs. With CR growers also
began to improve these practices, becoming more familiar with the characteristics of each varietal.
Despite its limited outreach and the absence of a line of credit, CR has generally been well
received among Mendoza's growers. The strengths of the program are clear and suggest ways in
which it can be improved. The more obvious benefit is that it supplies an extensionist at a modest
cost to a grower population that had never been serviced in the past. But more important, the
program is based on the sharing of tacit knowledge from production experience among growers
under the organized tutelage of a supervisor. They learn from each other's mistakes and successes
on what works well and what does not. The same principle applies to the supervisors, who now
have a block of time to themselves to exchange experiences learned from their individual groups.
They are able to discuss and rework the information into explicit knowledge on which they can all
agree. Unresolved technical questions that may have arisen in individual group meetings are aired
and worked out at the supervisor gatherings or with INTA researchers back at the experimental
station.
The strength of CR also suggests its weakness and how it can be reversed. The CR
program does not seek explicitly to integrate growers with processors. In some instances growers
already have a long-term relationship with a particular winery, as many do with Chandon (Chapter
2). However, if they do not, growers and the technicians themselves miss the valuable tacit
knowledge-generating experience that the vertical interaction provides. This is also confirmed by
the preliminary evidence from an ongoing evaluation carried out by CR managers and evaluators.67
Groups that have functioned best--where producers have actively upgraded their cultural activities in
the vineyard, have planted fine varietals or grafted them on to their existing vines, and have begun to
shoulder an increasing share of the extensionist's salary--are those (1.) where the disparities
between growers are smallest, in terms of grape varietals, vineyard size, and capabilities; (2.) where
the growers are most integrated with wineries, and (3.) where their buyers reward them for their
quality improvement efforts with better prices. Growers are more willing to change if they know
that the investments they make are the "right" ones, i.e., those that they could recoup in the not too
distant future. Clearly, the direct involvement of an experienced winery improves the likelihood of
this happening.
As important, the extensionists also perceived the CR program as better than the preceding
services in that there was a budget and time to "train the trainers". Extensionists received weekly
training sessions where they learned new technologies presented by INTA researchers, they
discussed and critiqued each others' opinions on the more challenging cases they reviewed, and
coordinated uniform policy approaches to certain standard problems. In the extensionists' opinion,
the CR program had increased their credibility vis a vis the growers because they had literally
brought the technology to the grower and reworked it to suit their needs. Because improvement
depended on a social process--the ability of the extensionist to coordinate discussions among
growers and among technicians--the evaluations all confirmed that the quality of the extensionist
was key to group success. Among those most involved with their groups, some had gone into
business with them. For instance, one technician who worked with 10 growers, members of the
Medrano cooperative, had his salary paid directly by the winery.
In sum, in its strengths and weaknesses the CR program suggested what the conditions for
successful learning might be: technological upgrading involved active discussion within
communities of like-minded growers and professionals and between them, in ways that brought
67 At the time that I carried out this research CR program directors were involved in a systematic evaluation study of
their program. My comments reflect their early impressions, not published results. To double-check their opinions,
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tacit information from production experience to bear on received knowledge, and reworked it to
increase its usefulness to all, growers and wineries.
New Economic Development Institutions
In different degrees market tutelage and some forms of state support have facilitated
technological innovation in Southern Cone wineries. But market tutelage has been uneven,
especially for producers that are not following the international restructuring path. In turn, public
sector support efforts to increase breadth and depth risk collapsing into a multiplicity of narrow
programs difficult to coordinate, and whose effectiveness is hard to gauge.
But some initiatives that I observed during my fieldwork suggest how a patchwork of
tutelage services might possibly be knit into a coherent whole without running into the coordination
challenges of the integrated approach. Following, I provide two examples that resemble what might
be called a "continuous learning institution". These are not extensions of established
organizations such as existing business associations or public sector development agencies, but a
new type combining market and public elements. The strength of both examples is that they are
fora for the discussion of tacit and received knowledge. One is a consortium of wineries in Chile's
VII Region that organized to export jointly. It first formed a quality evaluation panel to benchmark
its members' wines and document what improvements each one needed to make. It hired a
manager who tapped various sources of public funds and private assistance to coordinate the
group's upgrading activities. In this way it availed itself of a set of independent consulting services
in a sequential and coherent way. The other is a wine evaluation committee in Eastern Mendoza.
Formed by a group of local enologists, enological labs, and bulk wine businessmen, it has
organized a set of subregional events centered on benchmarking of local wines and discussion on
how they can be improved. Based on this knowledge, the committee is also availing itself of
numerous funds and experts from the private and public sectors, and coordinating services for
I also interviewed some of the beneficiaries and talked to extensionists of the more successful groups and their
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which it has identified a demand. In so doing it is also changing outsiders' perceptions about the
subregions' wine quality and shifting the balance of power between technical professionals and
their employers.
Proyecto de Fomendo (ProFo) Vifiedos Valle del Maule68
The first example is a consortium of wineries interested in upgrading from low quality to
fine varietals. The group sought the support of a ProFo to find new export markets under the
umbrella of a common firm. The ProFo is an economic development program implemented in the
early 1990s by the Corporaci6n de Fomento de la Produccidn (CORFO), the Chilean central
government's main economic development institution. The program was designed to support
interfirm cooperation initiatives, to provide solutions to competitiveness problems and bottlenecks
that individual firms could not resolve on their own. Since the program's inception and until 1997
CORFO had supported three wine sector group initiatives.69 This associative initiative, Vifiedos
Valle del Maule, was the second one supported by CORFO in the wine sector. It involved eleven
Chilean wine businessmen from the Talca area, in the south of Chile's wine producing region.
The experience is an excellent example of an indigenous form of bootstrapping because
when the group got started it seemed an unlikely case to succeed. At the time of initiation the
members represented the average table wine producer with no future in fine wine making. They
mostly owned high-yield low quality Pats vineyards, enologically the worst quality; just a few had
some hectares of fine varietals. Furthermore, only one of the eleven members of the association had
the necessary processing technology to make quality wines. The group's technological
backwardness was very significant, and they had no road-map showing them how to proceed, other
supervisors.
* See CORFO, September 1997.
69 Perhaps the most successful and best know is the first, ChileVid, an association which began with 12 small
integrated wineries that got together to jointly promote exports. Each company handles its sales independently, but
they cooperate in presenting a unified front at trade shows and expositions at home and abroad. Since ChileVid's
inception in 1993 and until 1996 the association grew to 23 members and from $10 million to $39 million in
exports. ChileVid wineries are small and medium boutiques, some foreign owned and others joint ventures, as well
as recently integrated ex-bulk producers of fine wine (they used to sell to the large wineries) and wineries owned by
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than an abstract understanding that it would require better varietals, stainless steel processing
technology, new wine making techniques, and a market to which to sell. In addition, their goals
were extremely ambitious in that to market and sell wine as a group each and every member had to
achieve the same standards of excellence. It required only one laggard or free-rider to pull everyone
down and derail the initiative.
With the financial support of the ProFo, Valle del Maule's first activity was to organize an
internal wine tasting event to which the members invited three recognized Chilean enologists. They
formed a wine tasting panel and completed it with two experienced enologists from their own firms,
Alejandro Parot and Cristian Cremaschi. The panel did a rigorous tasting of wine samples from all
11 member firms. So as not to offend sensibilities and induce prejudice, the samples were
anonymous and only identifiable by numbers. The panel failed more than 90% of them because
they did not meet the minimal quality standards they knew were expected in international markets.
Parallel to the wine tasting, the panel members visited the winery and vineyard of each member,
evaluated their individual technological capabilities, diagnosed their deficiencies, and recommended
ways in which these could be overcome. What the panel effectively did was to provide its members
the first tangible roadmap, laying out a set of benchmarks, and indicated to each one where they
stood and how to make progress. Furthermore, because some group members had greater ability
than others to finance the changes they needed to implement, they agreed that each one would do
them at his/her own pace, but following the same set of criteria. They appointed an internal
enological commission to monitor each one's progress, especially the supply of export-quality wine
they had to offer. This commission became the key mechanism for continuous improvement.
In addition, the technological upgrading plan worked out in the ProFo agreement earmarked
funds to pay for a set of technical consultancies, cofinanced by Valle del Maule members. The
French ampelographer J.M. Boursiquot from the famed University of Montpellier was flown down
to visit each and every one's vineyard and winery. Boursiquot helped them understand which
varietals they actually had in their vineyards. He identified varietal impurities that needed to be
DBGs. Most came to the business with significant technological capabilities and resources, so that marketing was
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removed, and suggested varietal changes through cheaper grafting techniques rather than the
expensive standard eradication and replanting. All these services were invaluable additions to the
"road map" because they provided incremental solutions, in this case technological alternatives for
the more cash-strapped participants. Also notable was the involvement of the central government's
agricultural research agency INIA, at that point called in to help develop a grafting technique of fine
varietals onto Pais stems. The grafting experience was so successful that it was quickly spread to
other vineyards outside the ProFo group.
To the public sector's credit the ProFo program provided the right incentives to "crowd in"
investments and other demand-driven support such as INIA's. In four years of existence, the
group has spent more than $4 million in processing machinery alone, including six pneumatic
presses, four pneumatic filters and 5.5 million liters in stainless steel vats. For example, Cristian
Cremaschi, head of Vifia Cremaschi Barriga, noted that his firm overcame the fear of making
investments in new processing technology after Valle del Maule's group manager came back from
a commercial visit to Canada in 1994. He had met distributors interested in buying their wine in
bulk, on condition they made the necessary machinery investments first to achieve certain standards.
Without guarantees but with the expectation of achieving those standards and making the sales,
Cremaschi purchased the machinery he needed. By 1997 he was exporting 50 percent of his
production.
Valle del Maule was also successful in other more conventional ways. The group jointly
purchased a mechanical harvester and shared export promotion costs. But it was this joint
establishment of benchmarks, unprejudiced discussion of production experience, and laying out of
a road map on how to achieve specific targets that actually provided the tools to induce this unlikely
group of wineries to succeed.
Valle del Maule is much more than another example of a ProFo program. Other program
beneficiaries have organized for different activities. The ProFo framework provides the private
sector the flexibility to design institutions such as Valle del Maule, but it is the Maule participants
their main focus of concern.
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that take full credit for the specific character of their consortium. The key element of their initiative
is the quality evaluation panel, around which public and private sector assistance has been
organized.
Scaling Up: Mendoza's wine evaluation committees
Starting in 1989 three organizations--CLEIF, CdeB and FEDB--teamed up to organize
Mendoza's first sectoral event to improve wine quality. The CLEIF (Centro de Licenciados en
Enologia y Frutihorticultura) is the organization that represents Mendoza's university-trained
enologists (licenciados); the CdeB (Centro de Bodegueros) is the traditional business association
that organizes the interests of the largest table wine producers and retailers, and the oldest boutique
wineries; FEDB (Facultad de Enologia Don Bosco) is the only institution providing university-
level education in enology in the country. EVICO (Evaluacion de Vinos de Cosecha), as the event
was called, is a similar but larger scale version of what the Valle del Maule ProFo carried out in
Chile: a panel of recognized wine experts blind-tastes and evaluates wines and provides constructive
feedback on how to improve them. In this case the panel was composed of widely respected
enologists from different organizations, including the elite wineries, the federal government's
research and extension agency INTA and the industry's regulatory agency INV, enological
laboratories, and the FEDB. The purpose of the event was not to award prizes but rather (1.) to
benchmark the general quality of the harvest against preceding ones, and (2.) to suggest to the
participants ways in which the wines could be improved during and after processing. The samples
were numbered to ensure a blind tasting. Under these conditions of anonymity the event provided
the conditions for a lively, unprejudiced discussion of production experience on different wines,
opinions that were the product of a group debate and that the community of professionals
respected. The audience was composed of the region's aspiring and top winemakers, thus it turned
out to an invaluable source of learning and technical information on a variety of different wines.
The yearly EVICO evaluation events also had one big shortcoming: despite the anonymity
of the submissions, they became events for the wine industry's elite, attended mostly by the top
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wine makers and owners of the First Zone wineries. Those from Eastern Mendoza's bulk wineries,
responsible for 50% of the province's production, didn't even want to be seen at these events
because they felt uncomfortable in a crowd that had always criticized the East's poor quality
production. Another important reason for their lack of interest was that the wines presented and
discussed at EVICO were based on the finest varietals, not the kind of intermediate and low
enological quality grapes that the Eastern Mendoza wine supply chains worked with. Therefore
there was little useful knowledge to be learned at these events.
Things remained much the same until 1995, when fine grape prices began to rise and the
frequency with which First Zone wineries purchased Eastern Mendoza's intermediate quality wines
for blending increased significantly. A diverse group of knowledgeable local enologists, laboratory
owners, and wine traders decided it was time to do something to revert the subregion's poor image,
which they became convinced was increasingly unjustified. They created their own subregional
version of EVICO, named CODEVIN (Comision de Evaluacion de Vinos). Their intent was to
replicate the learning mechanisms of EVICO, but also to show that even with modest technological
innovations, already some local wineries were producing much improved wines. Furthermore, their
personal experiences told them that even though Eastern Mendoza was generally considered a very
hot area, less than ideal for fine grape growing, there were some microclimates within this vast zone
of 70,000 hectares that offered far better conditions. The problem was in that this knowledge was
personal, and it needed to be disseminated widely. CODEVIN could serve as a tool to transform
this tacit knowledge into a more explicit measurable format.
CODEVIN's popularity increased significantly since 1995. From a few dozen samples
submitted in 1995 it expanded to more than 150 two years after. The event has become a great
success in several ways. Panel tastings have shown wineries that even some of the most ignored
varietals can produce outstanding wines if processed correctly, and they have discussed the
technical processes involved in detail. Second, the events have been especially important in
confirming to reticent winery owners that the work that their enologists are doing is valuable, and
that their recommendations to improve facilities and work practices should be heeded. Third,
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recognition of Eastern Mendoza as a producer of quality wines is not only important to boost
insiders' egos but especially to show outsiders--i.e., elite wineries that come to buy grapes and bulk
wines from Eastern Mendoza--that they are worth more than they have been paid so far. Fourth, the
event has also helped rediscover the better microclimates within Eastern Mendoza. As Bodegas y
Vifiedos La Agricola discovered several years ago, the subregion of 70,000 hectares was until
recently perceived as one homogenous hot territory, unsuitable for fine grape growing. The
evidence from the evaluation event suggests it is actually a "collage" of grape growing areas of
different characteristics.
In sum, the collective initiative of enologists has begun to provide marginalized wineries
with concrete advice and guidance on what works and what doesn't in their productive realities, and
on the market segments, standards, benchmarks, and upgrading paths that are appropriate to each
firm. Elite enologists started the practice of organizing small wine tasting discussions with their
colleagues, visiting each other's wineries to sample and comment on their work. These discrete
conversations were later broadened with the organization of yearly wine evaluation events. The
subregional evaluations have become so popular that now there are several in Mendoza. But they
are hardly separate conversations from each other; in fact, many enologists from elite wineries are
often invited to be judges in the tasting panels, and are active supporters of these local initiatives.
By the same token some technicians in the much criticized INV regulatory agency are invited to
participate. Evaluation events try to improve or outdo themselves from one year to the next, thus
stimulating a constructive institutional competition. In addition, these events have helped shift the
focus of attention of former rent-seeking wine business associations, now far more involved in the
discussion of quality and production issues.
In addition to mapping out the production standards that firms need to meet, EVICO and its
various clones are a new breed of institutions in that its participants cut across boundaries of several
organizations--firm owners, wine traders, technicians, researchers, and personnel from state
regulatory agencies. EVICO brings together like-minded individuals who can temporarily suspend
their institutional identities.
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Professional Technicians' Activism
In both these initiatives and in many other ways, previously unrecognized local knowledge
experts figure prominently, helping introduce innovations and build learning institutions that go far
beyond their job descriptions, their professional environments, and the technologies available in
their firms.
Literature debates on strategies for firm upgrading have typically been silent on the
circumstances and conditions in which technical experts, responsible for the production of critical
knowledge and standards, can influence the pace of local firm upgrading. In fact they typically
portray a static view of production arrangements. This misrepresentation may obscure some of the
strategic levers available for upgrading. One strand of the literature on professional expert agency
is on technology sharing through workforce mobility. This is the traditional Marshallian external
economy effect.7 0 Well documented success cases include mobile engineers in Korea's chemical
and steel industries, and trained labor movements in the Arab construction industry.' One study in
Taiwan documents the movement of skilled labor from export processing zones to run-of-the-mill
manufacturing exporters.7 But there are also examples where labor mobility has not spread
technical learning to local firms. One is reported from Mexico, where the movement of skilled
labor has tended to be from one maquiladora to another and not to other domestic exporters." But
even in the cases of success the spillover effects are portrayed as incidental, with technical experts
responding passively to opportunities to move elsewhere, and having no particular say or control
70 Refers to Alfred Marshall's (1929) notion of involuntary technological spillovers, one form of external economy
that firms can benefit from when they cluster closely together in a same geographic region. It is based on the
understanding that firms typically are unable to recover the full cost of the knowledge and on-the-job training their
employees gain on the job when they move to other firms. Externalities are by definition market failures that in
extreme formulations, can lead firms' to seriously undersupply on investments that have strong "leakage" effects.
70 Categories of production, investment and innovation activities are drawn from the technology capability-building
(TCB) literature. See, for example, Westphal et al. (1985).
7 See Enos and Park (1987) for the movement of engineers in Korea's chemical and steel industries, Zahlan (1984)
for trained labor movement in the Arab world.
72 See Tchiang (1991).
' See Brannon et al. (1994).
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over the pace of local firm upgrading. Part of the reason for this neglect may be that the
technological capability-building (TCB) literature has the firm, not the expert, as the center of
innovation. And it is the various capabilities that firms need to build up, not the relative capacities
of particular actors within the firm to execute the innovations, that receive attention. Even accounts
that refer directly to the important contribution of skilled professionals such as engineers in Korea
circumscribe their role to the confines of the modern industrial enterprises where they work."
In the next sections I suggest why in Southern Cone wineries the increased role, autonomy,
and collective action of knowledge experts are not accidental, to help think about ways of inducing
similar processes elsewhere through policy design.
Origins of Southern Cone Enology
Before the 1980s, enological knowledge, education, and skills in Chile and Mendoza were
modest. Major technological change had begun in Southern Cone wineries in the mid-1800s, after
three centuries of colonial rule with few if any advances. Period accounts refer to the importation
from Europe of the finest grape varietals, to the exchange of fine root stock among the two Andean
wine regions, as well as to the presence of local and French enologists and viticulturists trained in
the famous wine schools of Bordeaux and Montpellier. They migrated south in the latter part of the
nineteenth century as a result of the phylloxera that progressively destroyed European vineyards
and left them jobless. Yet as domestic consumption of cheap table wine rose steadily and the wine
industry grew spectacularly in Mendoza through the two World Wars and until the 1970s, progress
in wine-making knowledge stalled and the quality of inputs and outputs deteriorated drastically after
4 See U.N.C.T.A.D. (1996) for a review.
7s One of the few theories that directly refers to skilled professionals is Amsden's. The agent of expansion in all
late-industrializing countries--Chandler's (1977) modem industrial enterprise--the argument goes, has had to catch up
based on "learning", the improvement of borrowed technology on the shop floor: "Salaried engineers are a key figure
in late industrialization because they are the gatekeepers of foreign technology transfer. The protagonist of
industrialization has shifted from the entrepreneur in the late eighteenth century, to the corporate manager in the
nineteenth, to the salaried engineer in the late twentieth." (Amsden 1989:9).
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the first decades of the twentieth century.76 The investments in new vineyards, processing plants,
and storage facilities were designed mostly to increase volume rather than improve quality.
Enologists During Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI)
The post-war era in the Southern Cone was one of expanding tertiary education and
professionalization of engineering activities in manufacturing. Yet in both Chile and Mendoza the
French enologists were long gone, and those who replaced them were technical school graduates
with an extended secondary education. Contrary to the dearth of vocational training programs
typically ascribed to developing countries in the human resource literature, until the 1960s and
1970s in both Chile and Mendoza there was no lack of high schools churning out students with a
"technical" degree. In fact, absent in Chile and Mendoza in the early import-substitution years was
a tertiary-level educational program in enology; these would come later in the 1960s and 1970s.7 7
Formal instruction gave enologists a general understanding of the operational activities of a wine
processing plant, its mechanical components, and the sequence of processes involved in wine
making, but little if any insight into organic chemistry.7' Beyond a superficial knowledge of how
sugars in grapes converted into alcohol, they were ignorant of the biochemical processes in
winemaking, and were unable to manipulate in a scientific way the fundamental variables that
affected its quality. With a very undemanding and thirsty market there was little or no need for
skilled enological labor and few incentives to elevate the existing stock of human enological capital.
The average enologist worked for a table wine producer in a processing plant of considerable size,
and was not expected to do more than write standardized "prescriptions" in his lab for foremen to
execute. His responsibility was limited to the production plant, disconnected from marketing or
vineyards. Even though some of these technicians had years of empirical experience behind them it
76 See accounts by Foster (1995), Hernandez (1996), Marzo and Inchauspe (1967), Mathiss (1997).
7 In Mendoza, where data are available, even agricultural engineers were scarce in the early 1950s. The census at the
end of the decade showed that a province whose economy was basically agroindustrial, had only 255 agronomic
engineers, whereas professors numbered 912, medical doctors 864, accountants and economists 560, lawyers 634,
444 civil engineers, 228 obstetricians, and 226 odontologists (Marzo and Inchauspe 1967).
78 Several of the technical high schools in Mendoza were opened up by French-trained professionals who believed
their graduates needed these operational skills to quickly enter the workforce.
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was hard to transfer that accumulated knowledge from person to person in a scientifically rigorous
way.
The first signs of serious professionalization of enological activities came from Chile in the
early 1950s, when a group of French-trained local enologists organized an association, the
Asociacidn Nacional de Ingenieros Agranomos Endlogos de Chile (A NJ A.E.). They
simultaneously redesigned the two existing professional degree programs in agricultural
engineering, one at the Pontificia Universidad Cat6lica (P.U.C.)--the university run by the Catholic
Church, the other at the state-financed Universidad de Chile (U.Ch.), and introduced a
specialization in enology.7 9 To gain actual certification as enologists and join ANIAE, graduates
from these agricultural engineering programs needed to take a further standardized test provided by
the association. Between the mid-1950s and the early 1970s, these two programs produced a
generation of agricultural engineers with a solid scientific background in basic enological
knowledge and techniques, who would play a key role in the Chilean wine sector's turnaround in
the mid-1980s and 1990s (Table 4.4). In Mendoza tertiary enological education was initiated in
1965 at the Universidad Juan Agustin Maza belonging to the Catholic Church. The Technological
Faculty of Enology and Industrial Fruticulture was known as the Don Bosco School located in one
of Mendoza's suburbs. Graduates received their degrees as Licensed Enologists in five years.
Most of the current enological leadership at Mendoza's best fine wineries graduated from Don
Bosco (Table 4.5).81
7 Ruy Barbosa Popolisio was the founder of the U.Ch. program, as well as the A.N.I.A.E. in 1952, whereas Raul
Durand Caubet did the same at P.U.C.
80 Emilio de Solminihac, Alejandro Hernandez (later to become president of the Organisation Mondiale du Vin--
O.I.V.), Jaime Rios, Sergio Daneri, Alejandro Parot, Oscar Bustos, Phillippo Pszcz6lkowski, Aurelio Montes,
Mario Geisse, Sergio Correa, Edmundo Bordeu, Ignacio Recabarren, Ernesto Juisin, Pablo Morand6, and Felipe de
Solminihac, to name a few, would become household names in the late '80s and '90s. Understandably the
profession lost much of its attraction during the recession of the 1980s but quickly recovered adherents in the 1990s.
81 These include Rodolfo Montenegro from La Agricola, Julio Montenegro from Roddn, Ricardo Gonzalez at
Lagarde, Edgardo Ibarra at Balbi, Valentin Bianchi at Bianchi, Pablo Rodriguez from Chandon, Victor Marcantoni
from Etchart, Juan Carlos Rodriguez at Flichman, Claudio Sosa and Daniel Fernandez at Lavaque, Susana Balbo at
Martins Domingos, Alfredo Despous at Navarro Correas, and Walter Brescia at Nieto & Senetiner, and Angel
Mendoza from Trapiche. The high number of graduates during the 1980s shows the delay in the wine sector's
restructuring. The slump in the number of graduating enologists in the 1990s reflects the relatively slow pace of
winery upgrading in Mendoza compared to Chile.
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Table 4.4
AGRONOMIST-ENOLOGISTS; CHILE 1970-1997*
Period/Year Graduated Active^ Retired Average/Year
-1970 129 19 28
1971-1973 78 27 51 26
1974-1979 61 21 40 10
1980-1988 50 23 6
1989 1 1
1990 6 5 6
1991 8 6 8
1992 16 14 16
1993 9 6 9
1994 8 8 8
1995 9 9 9
1996 16 16 16
1997 25 25 25
Source: Based on data from National Association of Agronomist-Enologists of Chile and P.
Psczcz6lkowski
*To become an agronomist-enologist requires a five-year professional degree in Agronomy
and standardized testing in basic enological knowledge and practices.
AAs of 1997.
Table 4.5
LICENSED ENOLOGISTS; MENDOZA 1971-1977*
Period/Year Graduated Average/ear
-1970 0 0
1971-1973 20 7
1974-1979 61 9
1980-1988 157 20
1989 5 5
1990 2 2
1991 3 3
1992 5 5
1993 6 6
1994 4 4
1995 3 3
1996 5 5
1997 1 1
Source: Based on data from Colegio Don Bosco, Rodeo de la
Cruz, Mendoza.
*To become a licensed enologist requires five-years of
tertiary specialized education in addition to a high school
degree. A degree in Agronomy is not a prerequisite.
Currently licensed enologists have no standardized testing in
use.
Through the 1970s, however, the few enologists with university-level training played modest
roles. They typically worked for wineries serving fine wine niches, but the rustic machinery
available to them severely limited their ability to control wine quality. Despite continuously
prodding their bosses to invest in new technology, professional enologists were basically ignored.
Winery owners were risk-averse businessmen, partly due to macroeconomic turbulence associated
with ISI, and partly because steady demand for relatively cheap wine dissuaded them from making
big changes. Not surprisingly, enological jobs had nothing of the professional glamour often
associated with French enologists working at elite chateaux. Instead, these professionals often self-
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described as "trench" workers,8 2 held positions with little recognition and power within firms and
the industry. Curiously, while as a professional group licensed enologists remained marginal, they
nevertheless nurtured a sense of entitlement bred out of the prestige their profession was accorded
in other parts of the world. This sense of entitlement and desire to enhance their status would later
be one of the drivers of their collective activism.
Spanning the Value Chain
As knowledge becomes more important to industrial competition in general, the individuals
and groups that carry this knowledge also grow in importance. With wine technicians it is
especially true and partly explains their increased role. As producers purchase new technology that
allows better control of production processes the importance of knowledge-bearing professionals
grows. But typically the complexity of production processes means that specialized knowledge is
spread out over a large number of different knowledge-bearing groups, such as public
administrators, scientists, engineers, and technically trained workers, and over different public
agencies and private organizations. This puts a premium on their ability to combine different types
of knowledge that together may lead to innovations (Ziegler 1997). But wine technicians appear to
be strategically positioned in the value chain to induce innovations: the best of them carry
knowledge that spans the whole range of wine-making activities, from vineyard management
through processing and into marketing, including the knowledge on restaurant and wine store
consumer tastes. Wine-making's particular knowledge demands rewards those that gain a strategic
understanding of all these segments for the simple reason that product quality is so tied to the
quality of inputs.
Thus, when from the late 1970s on Chilean and Argentine domestic consumption of cheap
table wine began to fall quickly and that of fine wine rose, fine wine makers started paying attention
to what their skilled enologists had been recommending for some time. Enologists immediately
began to expand their knowledge base through the technology search activity, especially when they
82 Noted by several practicing enologists during interviews in 1997 and 1998, especially in Mendoza.
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were put in charge of the effort and invited to visit foreign wineries to see the new stainless steel
machinery in operation. During these and other interactions with international wine specialists they
learned that wine quality began in the vineyard. Increasingly they began to venture far beyond their
production plants and laboratories, to engage the agricultural engineers in a conversation on how to
improve wine. In learning about vineyard management they debated with them how best to
concentrate aromas and flavors, and from there on became deeply involved in the supervision of
grape production. This led them to implement work practices until then unheard of in Southern
Cone wineries such as creating massive linked databases of the vineyards from which they
harvested grapes, to trace the quality of each season's wine back to a particular vineyard locality
down to the hectare, amount of watering administered, canopy management, sun exposure, harvest
temperature, yeast utilized in fermentation, etc. They also switched to processing different varietals
independent from each other (rather than all together as in the past), thus requiring careful
scheduling so that yeasts used for one grape did not blend with those of another. By the same
token they become involved in forward linkages, working closely with retailers and visiting
restaurants abroad to understand the specific tastes of different types of consumers, and how to
obtain them back in their vineyards and production plants. There strategic technical knowledge
allowed them to identify changes they needed to implement all along the value chain to make their
products more competitive. Thus university-trained enologists became leaders in the reconversion
of elite wineries' production facilities and vineyards.
An Enabling Environment
Chilean and Mendozan enologists that have demonstrated most autonomy are typically
those that started with strong practical training at some of the pioneer export-oriented wineries.
There they not only acquired hands-on experience on how to make international-style wine but they
also established numerous professional contacts with wine traders, and with international machinery
suppliers and consultants. An increasing number of them are now availing themselves of these
contacts to broaden their training in the off-season in northern hemisphere wineries and acquire
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further expertise in fine wine making independent of their own firms' activities. Through their
network of professional acquaintances they typically secure a seasonal job during the harvest at a
foreign winery of repute. There they may specialize in a particular kind of grape, gain exposure to
new varietals, or learn different wine making skills, and absorb practical knowledge from watching
and working next to other experts. Chile's Ignacio Recabarren, for example, built a reputation as
the country's premier Sauvignon Blanc and Chardonnay specialist after a stint working in new New
Zealand with these white grapes. A stint in a foreign winery is currently becoming commonplace
in Chile, even for new graduates with little practical experience. Mendoza's professionals are
following suit if at a slower pace.
Exposure to foreign professionals and work practices is also reshaping Southern Cone
technicians' self-conceptions of their role and status in wineries. As they acquired confidence and
expertise they began to consult for upstart wineries that wanted to launch themselves into exports.
Enologists provided not only the technical knowledge but also the contacts with European and
American buyers. In some instances, their reputations became so well established among buyers
that their name alone served as a certificate of quality for otherwise unknown new wineries. In
these and many other ways, elite enologists have become the central coordinators of the Southern
Cone wine-making revolution.
In each country they have participated in different ways in the sectoral catch-up effort. As
was noted in Chapter 3, in Chile individual technicians have brought attention to themselves for their
individual efforts. For example, Morand6 identified the Casablanca Valley with especially good
grape growing conditions; Recabarren advanced local knowledge on white wine making with his
harvest experiences in New Zealand, France, and Australia. Several have also become successful
entrepreneurs, heading new wineries alone or with associates. By contrast, Mendoza's enologists
have been less visible for their individual efforts, but especially active as a professional groups,
organizing collective activities as noted below.
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Financial and Technical Support from Laboratories
Laboratories that sell enological inputs--enzymes, yeasts, filters, testing services, machinery,
etc.--have been key sources of technical information and eager supporters of enologists' collective
activities. Until the mid 1980s, both in Chile and in Mendoza enological laboratories used to sell
very basic implements to the wine industry. For instance, Mendoza's Laboratorio Zeballos used to
sell glass bottles, basic drugs, and other inputs that were commonly used in winery laboratories.
Some of the enological laboratories also represented input suppliers such as Portuguese cork
manufacturers. But for the most part they provided simple services and operated through a
multitude of small salesmen, none of which had very specific technical expertise. All in all, the
laboratories played modest roles as generators of innovations for the industry.
Things began to change first in Chile in the mid-1980s and towards the end of the decade in
Mendoza. The first big step was when a number of local laboratories signed representational
agreements with international yeast and enzyme manufacturers. Canadian giant Llalemand signed
up Mendoza's Rodin and Chile's Raab-Rochette. Perdomini, one of Italy's main suppliers of
nitrogen, chemical products, various other inputs, filters, and flotation devices, signed up
Laboratorios Libertador in Mendoza. The sector gradually shook itself out with the strongest
laboratories being those that had representation of specialty inputs and technical support from
international manufacturers. As wineries purchased better technology the laboratories persuaded
them to use selected yeasts and enzymes to better control their fermentation processes. Whereas in
the late '80s hardly any wineries used specialized inputs--Trapiche was one of the pioneers in
Mendoza--by the mid-1990s close to 90% of them did, and there is no longer any debate about
their usefulness. Enzymes improve wine's color; they reduce the percentage of solids in the wine,
making it easier to extract liquid from the grape must. Enzymes were accepted more quickly than
yeasts because they could be used with older technology. Yeasts help preserve aromas. By
contrast with enzymes, they have diffused more slowly because they require stainless steel or epoxy
containers to ensure a controlled fermentation. They also require controlled temperature
infrastructure so that grape musts can ferment between 16-22 degrees centigrade.
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Currently enological laboratories are important sources of technical support for local
enologists. Theirs is not a traditional customer-client relationship but rather a dynamic two-way
interaction. On one hand, laboratories "indoctrinate" enologists on the benefits of their products
to create a steady demand for them. On the other hand, every year laboratories like Rodin that are
interested in testing the usefulness of new products provide enologists with free inputs to carry out
industrial-scale experiments with them. Once the results are documented and evaluated in wine
tastings, the laboratories make a decision if they will market the product widely or not. In fact, the
laboratories replicate at a very small scale some of the mechanisms for discussing tacit knowledge
mentioned earlier. They engage enologists in discrete conversations and experiments and then pull
together the tacit learning from production experience to draw more general lessons. For the
laboratories, the enologists are the key links to the wineries, both as clients to sell them their
products and as sources of information on what works and what doesn't.
Thus it is not surprising that the laboratories go out of their way to support enologists in
their activities. When Mendoza's First Zone enologists turned to them for funding for their elite
wine evaluation committee EVICO, they did not hesitate to support them. When Eastern
Mendoza's evaluation committee CODEVIN began to operate in 1995 they also did not hesitate to
fund it even though the purchasing power of the subregion's wine producers is much lower. In
sum, laboratories have provided enologists a financial inducement to do things collectively, with the
view that these events help diffuse knowledge on new wine-making techniques and products.
In sum, enologists' increased role is partly to be expected; as knowledge becomes more
important to industrial competition in general, individuals and groups that carry this knowledge
grow in importance. With wine technicians it is especially true, since they carry knowledge that
spans the full value chain of wine-making, from vineyard through processing and into marketing,
reaching all the way to the consumer in the restaurant and the wine store. Second, enologists that
demonstrate most autonomy generally started with a strong practical experience at pioneer export-
oriented wineries, where they also established numerous professional contacts with traders and
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international suppliers and consultants. An increasing number of them are now availing themselves
of these contacts to broaden their training in the off-season in northern hemisphere wineries. The
importance of this enabling environment to their autonomy cannot be overstated.
In turn, what seem to be important conditions for their collective activism are the financial
and technical support for group activities they get from other industry participants, mainly
enological laboratories. In addition, Southern Cone enologists' long history of unfulfilled
professional expectations has also become a motivator for collective action that enhances their
status. Even though until recently licensed enologists played marginal roles in wineries, their
professional self-conceptions nurtured a sense of entitlement bred out of the prestige their
profession was accorded in other parts of the world, especially France. Moreover, especially in
Mendoza strong subregional identities are also motivators of collective activism.
Conclusion
State-supplied tutelage has not provided firms with the help it needs most, the formulation
of realistic incremental standards that can serve as road maps for upgrading. Moreover, in the
current constrained liberal policy environment where initiatives tend to be many but discrete--e.g.,
assistance to obtain new export markets, funding for technical visits to clients and competitors in
foreign countries, credit for machinery--rather than integrated, it is difficult to make any sense from
this patchwork of programs which initiatives work and which do not.
On the other hand, in Chile and Mendoza two spontaneous experiments involving firms,
knowledge professionals, and the state suggest how "learning" institutions can be built and how
they can overcome some of the typical shortcomings of current assistance programs. Both these
institutions are unprejudiced fora for the discussion of received knowledge and the formulation of
useful production standards firms can use to gradually increase their competitiveness. In both
cases participants have coherently availed themselves of other sectoral resources and public sector
programs, based on the recommendations and strategic plans of action proffered by the panels.
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Knowledge professionals play an important hand in these organizations given that they carry
strategic knowledge of the whole value chain.
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusions:
Implications for Development
Introduction
This dissertation examined two decades of industrial adjustment in the Southern Cone wine
sector to shed light on a set of linked questions. First, why are knowledge gaps between industrial
and developing countries with opening economies are not closing as rapidly as they should with
economic liberalization? Second, what can be done to close the gaps? Gerschenkron (1962)
hypothesized that backward countries could leapfrog from backwardness to the technology frontier
by drawing from best practice in other countries. Unfortunately, data on productivity and incomes
have proved him right only with respect to a limited number of advanced economy countries.83
Meanwhile, as the World Bank notes, the balance between knowledge and resources has shifted so
much towards the former that it is fast becoming the single most important determinant of standards
of living; more than land, labor, and machinery. The paradox is that since the collapse of the
governance and economic development mechanisms associated with ISI in liberalizing developing
countries and the disillusion with highly interventionist approaches, the current policy environment
seems unable to produce the alternative mechanisms that firms need to induce a broad, deep,
continuous catch up.
A Few Central Ideas in the History of Thinking on Technological Catch- Up
That knowledge gaps are hard to close is not new. In the 1940s and 1950s a number of
development economists studying technological change within a political economy framework
pointed to the problems of knowledge transfer. Technologies generated in mature industrial
83 See Abramowitz (1986), Baumol (1986), DeLong (1988).
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countries, the argument went, fit poorly with factor endowments, market sizes, and basic needs of
third world markets.84 International trade theory recognized the significant transfer of technology
from advanced to developing countries, but the drivers of the transfer were postulated as residing in
the economics of innovation of the product itself in the advanced countries, providing little comfort
to its recipients.85 Multinationals were viewed as the chief means of technology transfer and
accused of overcharging for it, as well as bundling it with financial capital, managerial know-how
and marketing capabilities, with contractual provisions that were disadvantageous to the purchaser.86
Thus the research focus was on the imperfections of the technology transfer.
Starting in the early 1970s, a neoclassical reaction brought the attention back to
fundamentals; upgrading was more likely to occur, the argument went, when public supply side
policies such as trade, industrial, labor and financial regulations were kept to a minimum so that
competitive forces in full could unleash an industry's static and dynamic efficiency. Competitive
pressures typically came from three sources: from other producers in the domestic market (internal
competition), from foreign producers selling in the domestic market (import competition) and from
foreign exporters competing with domestic exporters in third world markets (export rivalry). All
three competitive pressures induce firms to adopt new technologies, cut waste, realize scale
economies, allocate resources more efficiently, and generally reduce costs. If domestic markets are
small, exports can provide an opportunity to make full use of scale economies if they exist. Import
competition can also keep oligopolistic structures from realizing excess profits. While these
changes are marginal, competitive pressures can also induce more significant industrial
restructuring such as when firms shed outdated operations, introduce new product lines, and search
for new markets.87
By the 1970s, and early 1980s development economists' thinking on technology had also
evolved, thanks in part to improvements in the understanding of how innovations take place at the
14 U.N.C.T.A.D. (1996:4-5) cites Furtado (1972) as one student of the imperfections of technology transfer.85Veon (1966).
6 Baranson (1970) discusses the model of technology transfer through a wholly owned foreign subsidiary. See, also
Radice (1975) on negative views of international firms. See Marton (1986) for a detailed discussion of the claims.
7 See World Bank (1991:23-25).
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firm level. The findings affirmed that developing country firms could innovate and improve
borrowed technology with in-house know-how and resources. This research focused the attention
on learning from production experience. 8 The research agenda on the choice of technology that
had grown out of the appropriate technology debates gradually faded--increasingly, capital goods
suppliers and consultants operate internationally, so that more countries are acquiring the same
technologies--and what increased was an interest in what a firm does after securing it. The rise of
East Asian exporters intensified the interest in understanding the innovative capabilities of
technology "borrowers" or "late industrializers". The Latin American and East Asian
experiences suggested that the flow of technology from abroad remained very important to
developing countries, but that the domestic challenge was actually to build internal technological
capabilities in firms. A broad research effort generically named the "technology capability-
building literature" (or TCB) grew out of this interest, documenting how firms built internal
technological capabilities in production, investment, and innovation. It used analytical categories
such as learning ladders, intra-enterprise learning, and learning networks. 9
At the same time these studies generated far more controversial debates on the extent to
which the state needed to "subsidize" learning to move the private sector from simple to complex
manufacturing. One hypothesis that might explain persistent productivity differences between
advanced and developing countries and justify a more activist role for government is that poorer less
developed countries may benefit to a relatively small degree from the public good properties of the
innovations and investments of other more developed nations if their product mixes and educations
are different:
"A less developed country that produces no cars cannot benefit from the
invention and adoption of a better car-producing robot in Japan...Lack of education
" Katz (1984, 1987) summarizes a set of case studies on Latin American firms in different sectors that adapted and
improved imported technologies with in-house know-how and resources.
89 See U.N.C.T.A.D. (1996) for a review.
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and the associated skills prevent both the presence of high-tech industries and the
effective imitation (adoption) of the Japanese innovation."90
The TCB literature has helped focus policy interest on the need to improve developing
countries' supporting national research and development (R & D) institutions and infrastructure in
which firms operate, to move them away from basic research only, and to make them more
responsive to firms' needs. It has also sparked debate on the need to strengthen intellectual
property rights in developing countries. On the other hand, the research on the East Asian
experiences has unfortunately more often than not polarized debate between advocates of
government intervention and those of free market policies rather than help shape a policy consensus
on topics such as industrial policy, infant industry protection, and sectoral targeting. Thus, in
today's more conservative policy environment, the policy tools that might have emerged from the
TCB literature remain somewhat elusive. The repertoire of instruments available to liberalizing
governments to provide assistance to firms are few and discrete, because the very idea that the state
might play a hand guiding the economy remains under question.
The desire to move beyond the state versus markets debate, and the growing
internationalization of trade, transportation, and communications in the last twenty years has
refocused the attention of analysts on FDI, even when it remains a small component of total capital
formation. 9' Now the interest is in the tutelage opportunities that global supply chains offer. One
argument is that the global economy has created the context for the emergence of a new set of
international manufacturers and retailers that operate in the form of global commodity chains
(GCCs). Under certain conditions supply chains and subcontracting relationships provide useful
market and technical information as well as product quality and delivery standards, that may flow
upstream from buyer to supplier and facilitate upgrading. 9 2 Unfortunately the empirical evidence
9 Baumol (1986:1081-2).
91 See ESCAP, 1990; as cited in Amsden (1992:64).
92 One of the best examples is the case of the Singer Sewing Machine Company in Taiwan, required by the national
government to set up a network of local subcontracting firms. Soon thereafter most parts were being manufactured
locally, creating the conditions for the subsequent take off of domestic sewing machine exports (Schive 1990). See
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shows that the development and upgrading prospects of late industrializing countries are hardly
guaranteed, even when their firms do get connected to GCCs. They are conditioned in large part,
the argument goes, by how transnational manufacturers and retailers incorporate them into their
organization of production. This is determined by the way they administer their flows of
investment capital, technology, goods, services and people to particular regions and countries, and
the extent to which local capabilities are used and built up. These differences are reflected, for
example, in a study of the Dominican Republic's export processing zones,
"....East Asian projects were found to contribute more jobs, bigger investments,
higher levels of local value added, and a greater utilization of skilled labor than the
assembly oriented sewing operations by other foreign firms." 93
Several other studies confirm that there is significant variability among multinational
enterprises not only in the extent to which they subcontract locally, but especially in the degree to
which these relationships serve local firms as learning ladders to more sophisticated
manufacturing.94 Similar mixed accounts exist in the literature on contract farming, suggesting its
vulnerability as an instrument for upgrading. 95 Ultimately, demand-driven supply chains may
provide learning ladders only for a minority of select firms. The relatively small share of FDI in
developing country economies, and the uncertainty in the learning outcomes suggests that
governments can hardly expect GCCs to provide lifesavers to the population of firms. Policy
makers need to take further complementary action to induce a broader, economy-wide upgrading.
The recognition of broad, persistent knowledge gaps between advanced and developing
economies in the 1990s has recently led the World Bank (1999), the mainstream voice in
development thinking, to define the problem as one of "market failure". In a sweeping review it
also Egan and Mody (1992) on how importers, wholesalers and manufacturers of bicycles and footwear provide
substantial and varied information on market segmentation, trends, product specifications, delivery standards, etc.
9 United States International Trade Commission (U.S.I.T.C.) (1989:5-6) reported in Gereffi (1995:50).
* For example, one study attributed the lack of skilled labor and financial capital for the dearth of backward linkages
from Mexico's maquiladoras to local firms (Watanabe 1983). Another identified managerial/corporate office
behaviors that discouraged local souring (Brannon et al. 1994). See also Gereffi (1996).
9 See Glover (1984, 1987).
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suggests that to close knowledge gaps not only must developing countries provide public goods
such as universal basic education, lifelong learning, support for tertiary education, and basic
telecommunication infrastructure, etc., to acquire, produce, absorb and communicate knowledge, but
they also need to resolve a number of market failures. For one, because knowledge has public good
characteristics--it is nonrival and nonexcludable--and therefore likely to be undersupplied,
government may have to strengthen IPRs, provide monetary incentives, or be the provider itself.
For another, information problems (or knowledge about "attributes") need to be overcome for
certain markets to function properly. Especially important are those that involve the collection and
dissemination of information that has to be generated on the spot and continuously refreshed (e.g.,
credit reports, product standards).
While few observers would quibble with the fact that most developing countries have
imperfect educational systems, weak infrastructure, and absence of certain key information-
processing institutions, the laundry list of solutions identified by the World Bank for closing
knowledge gaps looks more like a set of outcomes than of preconditions for development. While
the suggested improvements are necessary and are certain to help close knowledge gaps, it remains
unclear how these policies might provide immediate assistance to firms and industries in the midst
of a restructuring process. In addition, if one is willing to suspend the assumption behind the
Bank's diagnoses and recommendations that all knowledge is explicit (and therefore it is the flow
of information that needs to be improved), and consider that production and market experience are
required to pick up the portion that is tacit, the mechanisms to bring about this kind of learning may
be quite different.
Summary of Main Findings of this Dissertation
The research undertaken for this dissertation seeks to provide some useful insights to the
general problems that restructuring firms in liberalizing economies face. First, it challenges the
conventional views that market institutions and state tutelage automatically supply the kind of
knowledge that firms need to achieve technological world standards. Assistance from market
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agents is quite often incomplete, and on occasions very difficult to find. The public sector's ability
and enthusiasm to provide help in an integrated way and "subsidize" learning--in a literal sense--
by taking on a significant financial responsibility is constrained. Furthermore, firms cannot wait
until all the structural preconditions of education, communication infrastructure and information-
processing institutions are put in place. Moreover, a broad credit program to finance learning is
improbable to be attractive either to suppliers or to its potential beneficiaries; there is unlikely to be
an abundance of consultants with the requisite specific local skills waiting in the wings to be
summoned.
The hypothesis advanced in this study is that what are required are alternative learning
institutions that can generate a broad, unbiased discussion, reworking and improvement of received
knowledge on the basis of collective tacit experience from production and marketing. Another part
of my hypothesis is that the sectoral evaluation committees I have observed in Chile's and
Mendoza's wine industries are precisely good examples of the requisite learning institutions, and of
how to induce them. They "subsidize" learning in more than a literal sense by providing the
conditions for groups of firms to proactively seek to solve common problems together. It is not
only the subsidy obtained from the public sector that is of importance, but rather the nature of the
interactions between the participant firm owners, managers, knowledge professionals and suppliers
that generates the learning. The result is a knowledge creation effort where aggregate tacit
experience is converted into explicit knowledge in the form of standards and benchmarks that firms
can actually aspire to meet.
A final part of my hypothesis is that knowledge professionals are key players in these
learning institutions. This is to be expected given that industrial production is becoming more
knowledge intensive. The greater their knowledge of the full value chain, the more able they are to
identify how required product changes at the end of the supply chain feed back into, and modify
each stage of conception of production, and the more valuable is their contribution to an organized
discussion with colleagues.
171
The evidence on the importance of knowledge professionals is robust. They have played
important roles in two different countries and in several different value-added market segments in
the same industry. To be sure, several preconditions needed to be in place to allow them to take on
these important roles: foremost, the liberalization of input markets allowed the importation of
specialized machinery and processing inputs. The knowledge base required to make use of these
specialized inputs was much greater, thus creating a demand for knowledge professionals where
before there was close to none. Another reason for the increased demand for knowledge
professionals is domestic producers' interest in becoming internationally competitive. Especially in
Chile, this was triggered by the collapse of internal demand, rather than a long-standing desire to
enter export markets. By the same token, the availability of local tertiary-level trained professionals
much before firms attempted to upgrade into international-quality production made the transfer of
technology much easier.
The Findings in the Current Policy Context
My characterization of the two paths that the Southern Cone's restructuring wine industries
are taking--leaning towards a high value-added road in Chile and a low value-added road in
Mendoza--are crude simplifications of reality. For one, there are multiple alternative possibilities
between the two extremes. For another, certain wineries and their supply chains compete in both
high value-added and low value-added markets. In other words, firm owners and managers do not
view their restructuring options as limited to one choice between two hard alternatives. Third, grape
growing for low value-added products such as intermediate quality wine and grape juice is not that
less knowledge-intensive than grape growing for high value-added products such as premium
wines; the more important distinction is that it requires a different kind of knowledge.
But the bipolar characterization is nevertheless useful to set the findings on the wine
industries in the context of current policy debates. For some time, there has been wide acceptance
that developing countries' "easy export" phase based on low value-added natural resources is
inevitably short-lived because of instability in volume and prices, and because world trade of these
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products is growing at a slower rate than trade as a whole.9 6 Rising real exchange rates and wages
in both Chile and Argentina during the early 1990s has also taken away their competitive edge in
sectors where productivity is low. But to raise productivity, the argument goes, investments must be
made in human resources and the machinery that allows them to be more productive. One should
therefore expect to see an increase in capital investment as well as in resources earmarked for
training at the shop floor level. This is the thinking behind the public sector's and the multilateral
lending agencies' (such as the Inter-American Development Bank) interest in directing their
assistance to job training.
The paradox is that despite the attractiveness of these policy suggestions in the early 1990s
several studies found that even when firms did buy new machinery, they invested surprisingly little
in human resources. 97 What is inconsistent is that in both Chile and Mendoza managers
complained in my conversations with them about the shortage of skilled labor. One possible
explanation is that this is no paradox at all but a standard case of market failure. In fact the World
Banks recommends that countries provide incentives to encourage firms not to underinvest in
training. 8 But even more puzzling and reflective that this may be more than a case of market
failure is the finding that most of the training that Chilean firms provided in the 1980s and early
1990s through a tax break--the kind of incentive the Bank recommends--was directed toward
management rather than blue-collar workers, the latter group being the one that supposedly that
needs it most.99
One hypothesis that could explain this puzzle is that not all machinery purchases require
additional skills. For another, managers may be somewhat resistant to spend on workers for fear
that it may uproot established firm hierarchies and reshape relations between them. Furthermore,
' See, for instance, Rosales (1993), cited in Humphrey (1993).
' For instance, see Humphrey (1993:5) and Wormald (1995).
98 In the Bank's view, the problem is one of market failure; firms may underinvest in job training when they cannot
capture the greater part of their training dollars, for example, as when personnel with improved skills are lured to
other firms with better salary offers. One solution is that the state provide incentives--such as tax breaks--to
encourage firms to supply the right amount of job training. Alternatively, it can provide the training itself (WDR
op. cit.).
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investment in labor may generate pressure to raise wages.100 But these hypotheses are not entirely
convincing. For one, if the new machinery does not require additional skills then managers should
not be concerned with skill shortages. For another, if new machinery does raise labor productivity
(as it should), then wage increases should pay for themselves.
This study on the wine industry may provide a more persuasive explanation for the labor
training paradox. It suggests that the increased focus on job training by policy makers and donors
alike during the 1990s may need to be complemented with greater attention paid to assisting firms
identify how they should rebuild. The reality is that quite often firms that want to upgrade face
deep uncertainty. Even when managers know they need to change, it is far more difficult for them
to identify their training needs if they are unsure what direction the firm should take. If
restructuring requires not only machinery upgrades but also production experience, the policy
implication that follows is that the public sector may do better by helping firms set up the learning
institutions that facilitate the sharing and reworking of tacit into explicit knowledge.
Promoting the Knowledge Professionals or the Firms?
How can learning institutions be induced and reproduced? If local knowledge professionals
are key to their functioning, to what extent should they or the firms for which they work be the
direct targets of the promotion programs? Evidence from the two examples of learning institutions
reviewed so far suggests that while knowledge professionals need not be the direct targets, their
participation in promotion initiatives is likely to be important to their success.
In Chile, the state development agency CORFO has designed a broad economic
development program--the ProFo--designed to support interfirm cooperation, to provide solutions
to competitiveness problems and bottlenecks that individual firms cannot resolve on their own. The
funding is to finance the salary of a manager for a period of one year, with co-payment by
participant firms beginning in the second year until they can bear the full cost of the manager by the
* Humphrey (op. cit.) cites studies by SENCE and CODELCO. Similar findings come out of the U.S with firms
showing little interest in broad retraining programs for current employees or apprenticeships for their successors,
especially puzzling since skill is viewed as a precondition of a "high-road strategy." See Sabel (1995).
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end of the third year. CORFO has supported three different ProFos in the wine sector, the first of
which is ChileVid, an export association formed by small and medium integrated wineries, and the
third being an association of growers that want to integrate forward by jointly building a modem
stainless steel wine processing plant. Yet among the three, it is only Vifiedos Valle del Maule that
initiated its upgrading strategy with the creation of an evaluation panel to benchmark its members,
lay out the road map and standards all members needed to meet, and monitor their progress.
Members of the ChileVid ProFo also occasionally engage in discussions among themselves on
benchmarks and standards, and share tacit information, but they do not structure these
conversations as systematically as does the Vifiedos Valle del Maule group.
Further evidence that knowledge experts, rather than the particular development program,
play an important role in these learning institutions comes from Mendoza. In fact in the Argentine
province there is no specific program to finance the wine evaluation panels. Panel organizers obtain
funding from a variety of sources, mainly the enological laboratories, and in small amounts from the
Fondo Vitivini[cola, a fund managed by the regulatory agency I.N.V. for general wine promotion
purposes. The provincial government also provides sporadic assistance to some of the evaluation
panels by allowing them to use public property free of rent for some of their gatherings and events.
For example, CODEVIN organizes some of its wine tasting courses in a building that belongs to
the provincial government. But it is the resourcefulness of the knowledge professionals, not the
conditionality of the funding itself, that allows the evaluation committees to operate they way they
do.
Additional evidence that knowledge professionals give a particular impetus to these learning
institutions is the fact that in Eastern Mendoza the new investments in machinery that generate a
demand for knowledge have come in very slowly. But knowledge professionals have not waited on
the side lines, and instead gone ahead and organized their own subregional wine evaluation events in
anticipation of the technology investments that are likely to be made in the area in the years to come.
" See Wormald (1995:76).
175
In sum, programs that want to reproduce learning institutions of the type described in this
research may not necessarily need to target knowledge professionals directly. As in Chile, they
may be generic programs designed to promote interfirm collaboration. However, the key insight is
that in some capacity they must include the knowledge professionals that have a strategic command
of the value chain, and involve them in a systematic organized discussion of their experiences.
A Research Program on How to Rebuild Firms and on the Role of Knowledge Professionals
The final consideration is with the generalizability of the findings of this dissertation to
other economic activities. Do knowledge experts play the same strategic roles in other sectors?
What are the policy lessons for developing country sectors that do not have a homegrown supply of
knowledge experts in a particular activity? What might a desirable research program look like
based on the current findings from the wine sector?
Two brief comments are in order. First, there is tentative evidence from other sectors that
suggests knowledge professionals play similar important roles elsewhere. For example, in a
different agroprocessing activity, Chile's tomato paste industry, engineers in competing firms have
somewhat similar if less structured mechanisms--"learning networks"--to discuss and share
received and tacit knowledge from production experience. Professional ties between these experts
are strong; many of them studied together in the same department at the University of Chile and
worked in the same pioneer firms in tomato processing before being hired away by new firms
entering the sector.O This may partly explain their willingness to interact and exchange
information with each other. Learning networks are not uncommon in the development literature,
suggesting there may be other examples where knowledge professionals have "scaled up" and
systematized their interactions in the form of learning institutions described in this document.
Second, the point is not to prove the activism of a particular professional group but to
understand the conditions that enable firms to map out alternative restructuring paths to rebuild
themselves from situations of significant technological backwardness and become internationally
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101 See Perez-Aleman (1996).
competitive. In most developing countries the scarcity of tutelage opportunities through FDI and
GCCs gives greater urgency to the search for alternative learning institutions. If the supply of local
knowledge professionals is thin, it is likely to be far more difficult to generate the kind of
homegrown bootstrapping effort identified in this research. Needless to say, that is a hypothesis
that needs to be tested more broadly.
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Appendix A
The Different Origins of Chilean and Mendozan Poor Quality Wines
Initial Differences in Endowments: Chile's Elite and Mendoza's Immigrants
The Chilean and Mendoza wine industries' developmental paths ran roughly parallel to each
other for their first three centuries of existence until the mid-i 850s. From then on the path and
pace of technological progress--i.e., the gradual change from quantity- to quality-production--
diverged. As we shall see, one factor in particular, differences in the mix of vines planted in each
region, partly shaped the fortunes of the industries more than a century later.
Though period accounts are sketchy, Southern Cone wineries appear to have experienced
little technological change in their first three centuries under the rule of Spain. Part of the
explanation resides in that wine production on both sides of the Andes remained small in volume,
mostly directed to local consumption because of trade restrictions imposed by the Spanish crown
on its colonies.10 2 By far the most consequential aspect of this humble start was the introduction
by Spanish conquistadores of grape vines of poor enological quality from Spain into Central Chile
and Mendoza. Prominent among the introduced varieties was the "Criolla " grape (as it was known
in Mendoza, "Pais" in Chile), a vine that diffused widely because of its high yield per hectare.
This varietal would prove to be the workhorse of the wine industry during ISI, contribute to its
undoing during the 1980s, and paradoxically turn full circle to become the lifesaver of many
Mendoza growers in the early 1990s.
The first significant technological change in Southern Cone wineries began from the mid-
19th. century on, and it marked an initial separation of paths between Chile's and Mendoza's wine
industries. It was first in Chile where progress was notable: the greater financial capacity of the
actors involved, the better resources they tapped, and their better access to markets, explain why.
Starting in the 1850s, the by-now independent country's aristocracy and businessmen saw
winemaking as a source of status, and were willing to spend liberally to import French vines,
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machinery, and even enologists, to start up fine wine production locally at an industrial scale.103 By
the 1880s the industry showed considerable size (Table A.1). One of the key decisions made by
these elite pioneers was to import vines of the highest enological quality--Chardonnay, Sauvignon
Blanc, Cabernet Sauvignon, and Merlot--considerably improving the country's grape stock. This
turned out to be their most enduring contribution: more than a century later vineyards descended
from these original high quality stocks provided Chile's leading wineries with the appropriate grape
"launch pad" for varietal exports. 104
Table A.1
SURFACE AREA WITH VINEYARDS; CHILE AND MENDOZA 1880-1940
(Hectares)
Year 1850 *1880 *1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940
Chile n/d 10,000 20,000 40,000 n/d n/d 80,000 102,000
Mendoza 400 2,000 9,000 21,000 45,000 72,000 98,000 84,000
*Data for Chile are estimates based on statistics in Hernandez (1996).
Source: SAG, Hernandez (1996) for Chile; I.N.V., Martin (1992), Marzo & Inchauspe (1967), for Mendoza, Argentina.
In contrast, in the 1850s Mendoza's wine industry didn't experience any auspicious
technological take-off as it did in Chile; it took almost another 50 years for the sector to accelerate
its growth, and it did so in a quite different direction. As noted, the distance to markets, the
resources available, and the financial capacity of Mendoza's economic agents were quite different to
those of their Chilean counterparts.
More than 600 miles west of Buenos Aires (the country's large population center) and
separated from its neighbor by the Andes mountains, in the mid-19th. century Mendoza remained
considerably isolated from the rest of Argentina. Its wine sector was small, producing mostly for
local consumption because it was difficult or impossible to supply Buenos Aires, let alone
102 To protect its domestic producers, in the late 18th. Century the Spanish crown prohibited wine trade among its
colonies and restricted their production (Mathass 1997, Peters 1997).
103 Many among this elite had made their fortunes in mining (Hernandez Mufloz 1996, Mathass op. cit.).
4 When Europe's vineyards were devastated by a phylloxera attack in 1860, Chile's elite wine producers also
benefited immediately by launching into a highly profitable export trade by ship along the Pacific coast. By 1900
Chilean vineyards occupied 40,000 hectares (Hernandez Muioz op. cit., Mathass op. cit.).
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export.1"5 This was true even at a time when market conditions were extremely favorable for
domestic wine producers given that wine imports became increasingly expensive.1 06 Other limiting
production conditions were Mendoza's natural resources, quite modest compared to the fertile and
water-abundant pampas. In fact the province was mostly a desert, with settlements strung along a
few snowmelt-fed rivers and canals. Even though Mendoza's landed elite had capital to purchase
machinery and build storage facilities, and finer varietals also found their way into Mendoza from
Europe and through Chile itself, their scale did not compare with the size and quality of the
investments in the neighboring country (notice the time delay in the vineyard expansion as shown in
Table A.1). In contrast to Chile's booming fine wine export trade, Mendoza's wine industry
remained in relative obscurity through the late 1800s, its quality questionable, its ability to expand
its vineyards constrained by the pace of parallel irrigation projects and by the growth of local
demand--most wine consumption in Buenos Aires continued to be supplied from Europe.' 7
Conditions began to change in the 1880s in ways that accentuated the difference between
Mendoza's and Chile's wine industries. Already from 1875 on, Mendoza's provincial authorities
began aggressive but selective recruitment in Buenos Aires to entice people to migrate west. Those
targeted were not the rich landed pampas elite but rather immigrants mostly from Spain and Italy.
They were viticulturists and viniculturists in their home lands, willing to move to get away from the
phylloxera attack that was devastating European vineyards. These colonists were selected because
of their grape growing and wine making skills, knowledge that Mendoza's elite understood as
crucial to the province's economic future once the proposed railway connection to Buenos Aires
was completed. Predictably, as soon as the railway line opened in 1885 and transportation costs to
15 With a surface area of roughly 151,000 km2 , in 1880 the Mendoza province had a population of only 84,000
people. In 1863 wine imports represented 10.67% of all imports. Ten years later the value of Mendoza's wine
production was still insignificant, 7.43% of the total of the nation's wine imports (Martin 1992:63).
1 This was due to the action of the phylloxera aphid inadvertently introduced into France from the U.S. in 1862,
gradually devastating Europe's vineyards, including close to a million hectares in France itself. The destruction was
gradual at first but extended itself broadly from 1875 on, so that supply constraints increased wine prices.
107 Wine imports fell only after the turn of the century, to 11% of total consumption in 1910, and 1% in 1918
(Martin 1992).
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mass markets on the east coast began to fall, the local wine industry boomed.108 Wine shipments
from Mendoza to the east increased spectacularly, from 2 million liters in 1885 to 48 million liters
by the end of the century, to 340 million liters by 1915, a magnitude almost equal to Chile's yearly
production during the 1980s.
Who was behind the Mendoza wine industry's economic boom? While local land-owning
elites had large wineries, much of the expansion reflects the emergence of a petite bourgeoisie of
these Italian and Spanish immigrants that started small and gradually built up their firms.109
Reflection of this bottom up growth is the fact that the number of wineries in the province jumped
from 334 in 1884 to 433 in 1895 to 1,398 in 1914, about three times as many as there are today."
Undoubtedly these were a different breed of entrepreneurs from those that grew Chile's wine
industry in the mid 19th. century. Despite the fact that the Italians and Spaniards arrived with grape
growing and wine making skills, their knowledge of varietals and enological processes was more
modest compared to those that Chilean entrepreneurs had been able to purchase with their
investments in high quality vineyards and wine-processing equipment, and their hiring of the best
French enologists of the time."' And as crucial to Mendoza's future technological growth-path,
the immigrants brought with them a wide variety of vine cuttings from their countries of origin,
most of them of far inferior enological quality to those imported into Chile by the local elite. Add
to it a rising demand for wine from a growing Buenos Aires population, and a 40 percent tariff on
wine imports imposed by the federal government in 1878, the conditions were created for the rise of
a sector that produced extremely uneven if not decidedly poor quality wines. Despite the high
profitability of the business the industry could not grow fast enough to satisfy demand, so that
incentives to prioritize volume over quality were considerable, often leading to tampering, watering,
108 As noted in Table A.1, in response to the opening markets of Buenos Aires, between 1890 and 1910 vineyard
surface area in Mendoza increased approximately 5 times.
im See Martfn (1992:58).
"o In 1914 86% of all wineries were very small, processing less than 500,000 liters and responsible for 33% of total
production; wineries processing between 500,000 and 5 million liters represented another 13%, accounting for 45%
of total output; only 10 wineries (1%) processed more than 5 million liters each, 22% of total volume. Average
winery size has increased considerably over the years, from 300,000 liters in 1914 to 2.3 million in 1993 (average
for the province's 451 wineries).
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and falsification of wine. During the late 19th. century complaints about Mendoza's wine escalated
to the point that provincial authorities had to intervene to enforce various dumping and quality
control policies." 2
In sum, the shortage of water for irrigation, the uneven grape growing and wine making
skills, a grape supply varied in its quality, the scarce capital and machinery with which most
entrepreneurs started in the business, and the incentives to prioritize volume over quality, set
Mendoza's wine industry on a different trajectory to that of Chile's. In the latter country, the
principal grape varieties turned out to be very few, with the best French varietals occupying a
prominent position; in contrast, in Mendoza the diversity of grape vines introduced to the region
was greater, including numerous Italian and Spanish strains of medium and low enological
quality.' 3 Furthermore, French enologists seem to have arrived later in Mendoza than in Chile, and
in smaller numbers; while some historical accounts make general references to their presence in
Mendoza in the immediate years after phylloxera first hit Europe (1862), other sources note that it
was only at the end of the 19th. century that the Argentine federal government invited them to
Mendoza to improve local enological knowledge.' '4 The latter hypothesis seems more credible
given the region's comparative isolation until the end the century.
Events in the 20th. century would contribute to narrow the technological gap between the
two wine industries, unfortunately not because Mendoza's producers improved but because quality
upgrading in Chile stalled, but the differences in grape endowments persisted through time.
Turbulence, Adjustment, and Quality Loss in the Early 20th. Century
Between the 1900s and 1940s, Chilean and Mendoza wine industries faced a series of
similar overproduction crises, yet they resolved them differently. Chile's elite wineries struck a deal
with government to limit production in exchange for a cap on new entrants to the industry.
"' The confusion among Mendoza growers with respect to the varieties they have in their vineyards continues to this
day.
112 See Martin (1992:65).
"3 Today Chile has no more than twenty varietals with 50+ hectares, whereas Mendoza has 55 varietals with 50+
hectares out of a total of 120 grape varieties.
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Mendoza's wineries instead agreed to eradicate vineyards to limit supply. Both policies had flaws,
and in the two regions led to the first stage of decline in the quality of wine production.
As noted above, at the turn of the century the wine industries in Chile and Mendoza were at
quite different developmental stages: in the former country, elite wineries had modem and well-
designed wine-processing and storage facilities with quality vineyards planted with the finest
French grape varieties, and French technicians that supervised wine operations. In contrast,
Mendoza's growers and wineries were more varied in size and endowments. Many of the earlier
ones had started as backyard operations, for personal consumption. But as immigrants from
European countries with strong wine drinking traditions flooded into Buenos Aires they created a
significant demand for wine. From the late 1880s on Mendoza wineries linked themselves by
railway to the eastern seaboard and began to serve those markets. Knowledge on improved cultural
practices spread, and the sector began to grow and shake itself out with new larger scale operations
taking over production, but with a more mixed-quality supply of French, Italian, and Spanish grapes
than in Chile.
The first difficulties began on both sides of the Andes in the early decades of the 20th.
Century with cycles of overproduction that became all too frequent. Detailed accounts from
Mendoza, for example, note that crises occurred between 1900-03, 1911-12, 1929-31, and the
longest between 1933-38; similar events took place in Chile between 1909 and 1931. During these
periods, grape and wine prices fell well below their production costs.,15
As it turned out, initiatives to reduce these grape and wine price fluctuations took very
different paths in each country. Crucial to understand what happened in Chile, at the turn of the
century there were negative signs that the industry was falling into disfavor in the eyes of the
governments of the period. In fact, in 1902 Chile established its first "Alcohol Law" (#1515) that
applied taxes on wine and distillates. In 1933 winery owners complained at their First National
Wine Congress in Santiago of restrictive legislation and discriminatory taxes applied against the
industry. Finally in 1938 Chile's wine sector struck a deal with a left-dominated national
"4 Foster (1995: 10).
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government that viewed wine as "poison" for the masses. In this second Alcohol Law wineries
agreed to cap production at 60 liters/capita/year in exchange for a government ban on the expansion
of vineyards (102,000 hectares at the time), hence limiting competition. In addition to a prohibition
on new vineyard plantings, it was agreed that existing vineyard surface could only be transferred to
poorer-quality agricultural land." 6 The elite thought it had struck a good deal , and it had, at least in
two ways: first, for the next 43 years and until 1982 there were no more overproduction crises,
except for one year, 1962, when supply outstripped demand. In fact, during certain years vineyard
surface dropped below its 1940 levels (Table A.2). Second, wine-making became a highly
profitable, non-competitive activity. Yet the agreement came at a tremendous cost to the industry's
early quality edge: growers and wineries felt less of a need to improve their products because the
domestic market was likely to absorb the sector's output, regardless of its quality. This became a
perverse adverse selection mechanism: wineries could now meet the same production targets with
lower-quality, higher-yielding vineyards.' 7 It made more sense for the industry to supply itself
from these high-yield vineyards in marginal land and leave the better agricultural areas to other
profitable crops. Thus the balance of vineyards shifted from fine, lower-yielding varieties on better
agricultural land to higher-yielding varieties in marginal agricultural areas. As one period account
described the shift,
"Winemaking as an elite activity run with a competitive spirit disappears, and
transforms itself into a speculative business; money is made by purchasing wisely
from producers; wholesale merchants emerge... developing a revolutionary
marketing strategy, still current today. One at a time, traditional wineries lose
ground, close, or change hands, no longer run by proud families. These maintain
11 Marzo and Inchauspe op. cit, Hernandez Mufioz op. cit.
116 Hernandez Muioz and Contreras (1993), Hernandez Mufioz op. cit.
17 Higher yields are generally associated with poorer enological quality. Yields vary depending on the variety, but
especially in relation to the amount of water provided to the plant during the growing season. Well-watered
vineyards produce poor quality grapes because they dilute aromas, tannins, and colors, and enhance unwanted herbal
flavor due to vine robustness. For best results in fine wine making, quality vineyards are provided very limited
water, especially when close to the harvest date.
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wine quality and focus on bottled wines, to leave the (larger) table wine market in big
demijohns to wholesale merchants."118
Table A.2
SURFACE AREA WITH VINEYARDS; CHILE AND MENDOZA 1935-1998
(Hectares)
Year 1935 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1998
Chile t112,000 101,000 96,000 110,000 109,000 1 ,000 54,000 *63,000
Mendoza 101,000 84,000 121,000 173,000 211,000 232,000 146,000 143,000
t Datum corresponds to the year 1938
* Estimate based on unofficial reports from largest growers of recent plantings (International Wine Associates 1998).
Source: SAG for Chile; I.N.V., Marzo & Inchauspe (1967) for Mendoza, Argentina.
In the case of Mendoza, the relationship between wine industry actors and government was
far more complex than that prevailing in Chile. For one, different levels of government had
somewhat different interests with respect to the wine sector. Until the 1940s when the provincial
economy began to diversify, wine making was Mendoza's principal driver of economic growth.
For instance, in 1914 it accounted for 77 percent of its industrial output. Thus the provincial
government's interests became closely aligned with the industry. For this reason the first provincial
public policies attempted to defend prices for growers and processors alike. In contrast, the earliest
national public policies were designed to control wine quality, especially to prevent its falsification.
The federal government also had an interest in keeping the price of wine low, an important item in
the average consumer's market basket. 1 9
Participants in Mendoza's wine industry were also far more heterogeneous than in Chile.
The largest wineries were in the hands of a small landed elite. But there was also a petite
bourgeoisie in the making, composed of successful immigrants that had started out modestly with
backyard operations and gradually grown their businesses with their own savings. Then there were
also the merchants that led the sector's expansion once the market connection by rail with Buenos
Aires was established. It did not take long for various splits to show when growth in wine
consumption decelerated after 1914 as a result of the deceleration of new immigrant arrivals to the
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118 Hemandez Muoz (1996:11).
country. As wine prices fell, the antagonism between processors on one side, and independent
growers on the other became visible, mainly over the cost of grapes. These had become the most
costly input. All in all, the wine sector's social composition may have been far more varied than in
its neighboring country.42 0
In the early 1930s, after a continuous series of production crises, a provincial government-
run Regulatory Wine Board implemented a vineyard eradication program in 1937 that eliminated
approximately 17,000 hectares. In hindsight, this was evaluated as a serious mistake because wine
demand picked up again soon after, and continued to increase for several more decades at
astonishing rates. These events are crucial to understand the deterioration of wine quality in the
1950s and 1960s. As the industry literally scrambled to increase production, two factors in
particular explain the quality drop: first, growers set up new vineyards with the most productive,
low-quality varieties, including the Criolla grape introduced by the Spaniards in the early days of
the colony.' Second, the national government in its attempt to keep the lid on the price of a mass
consumption good, authorized the "hydratization" of wine. In plain language, it allowed the
industry to water its wines. In the words of one commentator,
" 'This gives origin to the darkest period shaping the wine industry's future
orientation...Major transgressions took place...Wholesale bottlers made the most of
the product scarcity. The public was forced to accept a low quality product, and the
new grape plantations were a reflection of those (market) conditions. There was no
need to select the better vines and varieties, nor was there any interest in the quality
119 A rising urban working class predominantly Mediterranean in its tastes had cheap table wine as an important item
in its basket of family consumption goods. As this group grew quickly in the 1950s, wine regulatory activity also
increased.
120 The earliest statistics available to me, corresponding to the early 1960s, show a fairly mixed land distribution,
and a variety of sizes of wineries. For example, 49% of grape growers had plots of land between 4-50 hectares
owning more than 50% of total vineyard surface. Another 2.5% of growers (mostly integrated wineries) with
properties larger than 50 hectares owned 35.3% of vineyard land. The remaining 48.6% with properties smaller than
4 hectares owned 8.6% of the vineyard land (Marzo and Inchauspe 1967:380). There were also 632 wineries with
less than a million liters each in storage capacity, 580 wineries with 1-10 million liters, 2 wineries with 40-50
million liters, and the largest with 70 million liters (at the time, considered the largest in the world).
121 In the early 1960s, Mendoza had 81,000 hectares of medium-quality red Malbeck grapes (introduced from France
and through Chile), 51,600 hectares of Barbera grapes, and 8,900 hectares of Verdot. Among white grapes, there
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of the wines produced; what mattered were the economic benefits that high grape
yields could produce.' The future of the wine industry was structured with this
mindset." 22
During the 1950s, the Mendozan provincial government's interest shifted towards
diversifying the regional economy into manufacturing. But the continued rise of wine demand led
the provincial and national governments in the mid-1960s to further encourage winemaking
activities. It was in this context that they designed a series of tax incentives to induce the private
sector to develop Eastern Mendoza as the new agroindustrial frontier.
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were 12,600 hectares of Pedro Gimenez grapes of medium enological quality and 30,000 hectares of Criolla Chica of
poor enological quality.
122 Marzo and Inchauspe (1967:454).
Appendix B
Origin of Eastern Mendoza's Low-Quality High-Volume Production
Starting in the mid-1950s, and especially from the mid-1960s through the 1970s, provincial
and federal promotion policies encouraged the expansion of agribusiness across the province, but
especially into Eastern Mendoza. This policy coincided with the steady rise of domestic demand
for cheap table wine and the introduction of an innovative vine training system, the "parral
cuyano," that increased yields significantly. Poor-quality high-yield varietals were preferred over
less productive, more tasteful grapes. The land expansion, the new training system, and the vine
choice, all combined to significantly change and deteriorate the industry's overall quality. The
result is paradoxical given the magnitude of the growth and the investment: from 1950 and through
the mid-1970s Mendoza's vineyards grew at a heady rate of almost 5,000 hectares per year,
doubling surface from 120,000 hectares to 240,000 hectares (Table B.1). At current value, the
investment in vineyards alone over a 25-year period was more than 1.25 billion dollars.m Similar
progress was made with Mendoza's storage capacity: it doubled from the mid-1950s through the
late 1970s, to reach 4,500 million liters. In a short period of time, Argentina had become the fourth
largest wine producer in the world (after France, Italy, and Spain), with Mendoza its main
contributor to that growth.
Table B.1
SURFACE AREA WITH vINEYARDS; MENDOZA 1938-1974
(Hectares)
Year 1952 1959 1964 1968 1974 Change 1952-
1974
Great Mendoza 47,000 51,000 53,000 50,000 55,000 8,000
Eastern Subregion 44,000 50,000 57,000 66,000 77,000 33,000
Northeastern Subregion 14,000 14,000 18,000 20,000 25,000 11,000
Central-West Subregion 9,000 11,000 14,000 17,000 20,000 11,000
Southern Subregion 36,000 41.000 50.000 57,000 63,000 27,000
Total Mendoza 150,000 167,000 192,000 209,000 240,000 90,000
Source: Own compilation, based on I.N.V. data.
1 Current investment costs are no less than $10,000/hectare, excluding the land acquisition costs. At 5,000
hectares/year the annual investment in vineyards is at least $50 million dollars. For a detailed cost analysis of
vineyard investments in Mendoza see SPE (Secretarfa de Programaci6n Econ6mica) (1996)
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The financial impetus for growth during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s came from the public
sector both at the national and provincial level to strengthen grape processing capability and
vertically integrate grape growers. The cooperativist movement had had few successes in Mendoza
except in rural electricity, and government agencies wanted to encourage the integration of the
smallest producers and reduce their vulnerability to grape price manipulation by large processors.
Cheap credit for cooperatives became readily available from several sources to build grape-
processing and wine storage facilities: one of them was the Instituto Nacional de Vitivinicultura
(IN.V.), created in 1959 as the federal government's regulatory agency for the industry, charged
also with its promotion. The IN.V. had substantial resources, its annual budget roughly equivalent
to the value of 100 million liters of wine." Funding also came from the provincial government
itself, already with a substantial experience in sectoral promotion.12 5 It built wine-processing and
storage facilities that it then handed over to cooperatives to manage. By 1965, Mendoza had 39
wine cooperatives in operation.126
1 The I.N.V. is a regulatory agency politically semi-independent from the national government, but completely
independent in its financing. Located in Mendoza but with jurisdiction over the whole country, neither the Executive
nor Congress determines its budget, which (until 1991) came from a 7% tax on wine sales. (In October 1991 the tax
was reduced to 3%.) The agency is directed by a President named by the national government and a 12-member
Directive Council, composed of 7 political appointees one for each producer province, and five sectoral
representatives (supporting growers, labor, and wineries). Thus, despite its financial independence, the agency's
leadership has always been widely viewed as more 'political' than 'technocratic' (Juri 1991, Novedades Econ6micas
1990).
125 Mendoza's government was one of the first provinces in the nation to aggressively pursue industrial promotion
strategies. Already in the early 1930s it had set out to diversify its economic base, at the time overly dependent on
the wine industry's performance. For example, in 1932 Laws 932 and 938 provided support specifically to
encourage the establishment of milk and cement industries respectively. Another more general law (1337) enacted in
1939 provided provincial and municipal tax exemptions to the first firms in each manufacturing sector that
established themselves in the province. Other similar laws and decrees followed in subsequent decades. In 1959 Law
2626 encouraged private sector participation in hydroelectric projects. In turn, in 1964 Law 3110 promoted a
petrochemical facility in the province. Yet even as the provincial economy diversified into cement, oil and chemical
production, and several other agricultural and agroindustrial activities, the wine industry itself continued its
expansion and forward-integration (Martin op. cit).
126 In addition, in 1954 Mendoza's legislature signed Law 2301 authorizing the purchase of the province's largest
winery, Bodegas y Vifiedos Giol, SA. Industrial y Comercial. Handling roughly 10% of Mendoza's wine
production, it became the provincial government's key socioeconomic development tool to assist the sector's
smallest growers and processors. For example, Giol used its extensive distribution network across the country to
channel small growers' and processors' wine to markets, paying them better-than-market rates (Marzo and Inchauspe
1967: 456). (Small processors typically have little bargaining power vis a vis large bottlers/distributors.)
Unfortunately, it did not take long for Giol to run a deficit, which the provincial government financed for several
decades until it finally privatized the firm in the early '90s.
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The final financial impetus, and the one with the greatest consequences for Eastern
Mendoza came in 1965 from the national legislature: it made into law a project submitted by the
Mendoza government to provide ten years of tax relief to firms that invested in new agroindustrial
and manufacturing activities in the province. Different to the preceding initiatives, this program also
attracted large firms with substantial capital. Especially encouraged were agroindustrial projects
that incorporated modern irrigation systems and pumps to tap underground water reservoirs, to
make more rational use of the scarce liquid than that achieved with the traditional surface-flooding
system.m Eastern Mendoza was benefited with hundreds of new integrated wineries, processing
facilities, and vineyard expansions. Until the late 1940s the area had seen its share of vineyard
growth, but was generally viewed as agroecologically poor for fine grape growing. The
subregion's elevation of 600 meters above sea-level was generally viewed as insufficient to provide
the cooling effect that high quality grapes need during the hot summer growing season. However,
the microclimate was ideal to grow high-yielding, sugar-producing varieties for grape juice, widely
used as a natural sweetener in many beverages and in wine itself. With its large expanses of arable
land, and the financial incentives in place to pay for underground wells and irrigation systems,
Eastern Mendoza was a good choice even for winemaking, given that table wine demand kept
growing and domestic consumers were accepting of a poor quality product. Within the subregion,
the Department of San Martin grew fastest, its vineyard surface jumping from 12,000 hectares in
1947 to 40,000 in 1979, a full 18 percent of the province's total vineyards. By 1996 the share had
increased to 23 percent. The growth was so spectacular, that between 1947 and 1980 the San
Martin Department's rural population almost doubled, at a time that the nation as a whole was
becoming highly urbanized (Table B.2).
1 Among those participating in these programs were firms that would dominate the Mendoza economy and national
economies in subsequent decades, for example, Greco, Sasetru, Recoaro, Peiiaflor, Cartellone, Nieto y Senetiner,
Inca, Campagnola, Canale, as well as successful mid-size firms such as Berrutti y Chini.
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Table B.2
URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION IN THE PROVINCE OF MENDOZA; 1947-1980
Year 1947 1960 1970 1980
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
Great Mendoza 232,921 103,823 371,978 111,153 482,767 107,401 616,084 131,470
Eastern Subregion 19,610 71,245 52,870 74,837 52,882 89,473 76,208 101,733
San Martin 13,967 22,048 32,111 24,766 30,506 35,300 45,201 42,407
West Subregion 2,437 35,389 21,053 29,380 16,440 42,240 23,602 43,701
Southern Subregion 41,607 81.199 81.520 81,245 88,832 93,040 112.654 90.776
Mendoza Province 296,575 291,656 527,421 296,615 640,921 332,154 828,548 367,680
Source: Own compilation, based on D.E.I.E. data.
In the urge to favor volume over quality and satisfy surging market demand, growers
increased their net holdings of low-quality, high-yield varieties such as Criolla, Cereza, and
Moscatel Rosada, with new plantings. Of Mendoza's net gain of 87,000 hectares of vineyards
between 1964 and 1978, a full 77,000 hectares were of these low quality varieties. By 1978 they
alone accounted for 43 percent of the grape supply. Growth also came at the expense of lower-
yielding but higher-quality varieties, that were gradually eradicated. For example, from 1964 to
1978 the French Malbeck grape lost 14,000 hectares. (Table B.3).
Table B.3
VINEYARD SURFACE AREA OF SELECTED LOW AND MEDIUM QUALITY GRAPES; MENDOZA 1938-1974
(Hectares)
Year 1964 1968 1974 1978
Selected Medium-Quality Grapes 85,000 90,000 100,000 99,000
Chenin 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000
Semill6n 5,000 4,000 4,000 4,000
Pedro Jimenez 13,000 13,000 16,000 17,000
Barbera d'Asti 9,000 5,000 5,000 5,000
Malbeck 52,000 43,000 46,000 39,000
Tempranilla - 11,000 11,000 12,000
Bonarda 2,000 9,000 13,000 17,000
Selected Low-Quality Grapes 39,000 77,000 103,000 109,000
Criolla Grande 26,000 52,000 66,000 70,000
Cereza 8,000 17,000 22,000 22.000
Moscatel Rosada 5,000 8,000 15,000 17,000
All Varieties in Mendoza 192,000 210,000 240,000 253,000
Share of Selected Low Quality Grapes 20.3% 36.6% 42.9% 43.1%
Source: Own compilation, based on I.N.V. data.
The 1960s were also the period of mass diffusion of a vine-training technique--the parral
cuyano--that produced far higher yields than the industry standard at the time. Until the 1950s, the
majority of grapevines tended to be trellis-trained, organized in low parallel rows no more than 4
feet high, and separated from each other by 4-8 feet. The vines grew as a vertical curtain, held by 2
or 3 vertically-aligned wires above the ground. This was called the espaldera baja. Yields were
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typically around 5-8 tons per hectare. As the industry shifted its priority and began to privilege
volume over quality, a higher version (6 feet tall, with as many as 5 wires) was introduced, the
espaldera alta. It elevated yields to 10-15 tons/hectare. The parral was the innovation that
followed. Wires were positioned to intersect at right angles to each other, allowing the vine to
extend itself horizontally, forming a continuous canopy over the ground. Average yields jumped to
30 tons per hectare and could rise to as much as 50-60 tons/hectare. However, the structure did
require more wiring and wood poles to set up, but cheap credit and tax breaks made it more
attractive. Between the 1950s and 1980s, the parral's share in the province jumped from 4 percent
to 43 percent of total vineyard surface (Tables B.4, B.5). The combined growth of low-quality
high-yielding cultivars on productivity-enhancing parrales dramatically shifted Mendoza's grape
supply toward the low-quality end.
Table BA
VINE TRAINING SYSTEMS USED IN MENDOZA'S VINEYARDS; 1950s-1980s
(Hectares)
Decade Espaldera Baja Espaldera Alta Parral Cuyano Other
(Low Trellis) (High Trellis)
Hectares % Share Hectares % Share Hectares % Share Hectares % Share
Average 1950s 144,000 86.3% 7,000 3.9% 16,000 9.5% 1,000 .
Average 1960s 154,000 79.2% 10,000 5.1% 30,000 15.4% - 0.3%
Average 1970s 132,000 53.4% 30,000 12.3% 81,000 32.9% 4,000 1.4%
Average 1980s 93,000 43.3% 28,000 13.2% 91,000 43.3% 1,000 0.3%
Source: Own calculations, based on CunV. data.
Table B.5
MENDOZA'S VINEYARD SURFACE AREA WITH HIGH-YIELD ORTHOGONAL TRELLIS SYSTEMS (PARRAL); 1950s-1980s
Mendoza Province Decade 1950s Decade 1960s Decade 1970s Decade 1980s Decade 1990s
Provincial Average 10% 15% 33% 43% 56
Eastern Mendoza 1959 1969 1978 1990 1992
Junfn 11% 24% 37% 48% 56%
Rivadavia 10% 21% 35% 52% 59%
San Martfn 16% 33% 47% 56% 65%
Lavalle 14% 32% 40% 46% 55%
Santa Rosa 14% 33% 50% 60% 68%
Source: Based on data from I.N.V., Mendoza
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